


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# NGOs and Civil Society in India

*B. S. Baviskar*

*"It is not the water in the fields that brings true development, rather, it is water in the eyes, or compassion for fellow beings, that brings about real development"*

—Anna Hazare<sup>1</sup>

*"Democracy and development require active and informed participation at the grassroots "*

—Ela R Bhatt<sup>2</sup>

We are living in an era characterised by some as marked by the decline or retreat of the state. The decline of the state is accompanied by increasing attention towards civil society institutions. Among the social groups and associations of various kinds that are considered to make up civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become especially prominent in the last two decades. In the years after independence, people exhorted the state to take the initiative with respect to social transformation, now the expectation is that NGOs will perform the same role. Be it the field of education or health, providing drinking water, organising forest management groups, or thrift societies for working women, NGOs are supposed to take the lead. How has such a dramatic shift occurred? How have NGOs become such an important part of civil society?

Barring a few exceptions, sociologists have not paid much attention to NGOs in a serious and systematic manner. Sociologists need to look at and reflect upon the nature, organisation and functioning of NGOs. Given the limitations of time, I propose to discuss only some aspects of the functioning of NGOs and the challenges and opportunities they offer for serious sociological investigation.

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Presidential Address at the XXVI All India Sociological Conference, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, 29-31 December 2000

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The rise of NGOs is one of the central processes in the sphere of development since the 1980s. This period also coincides with the demise of developmentalism as a project of the nation-state and the rise of post-developmental neo-liberal political economy (or what has also been described as market triumphalism). In what is often described as a move from inefficient states to efficient markets, NGOs hold a distinctive mediating position. Given the profound implications of NGO involvement in development, there is a great need to critically examine the changing relations between NGOs, state agencies, multilateral and bilateral funding institutions, and other social groups. This has great bearing on the way in which we conceive of the process of social change and the roles of different social actors within it. Students of the sociology of organisations, political sociology, the sociology of social movements, and the sociology of development need to pay greater attention to the phenomenon of NGOs.

By and large, sociologists have not given the phenomenal growth of NGOs the critical attention that it requires. There are hardly any systematic studies of their membership. What is the socio-economic background of the activists associated with them? Similarly, there are no attempts to analyse the NGOs as organisations. What is the dynamics and the process of decision-making within them? We know almost nothing about the power relationships within these groups and associations nor do we know about the forms and channels of participation that affect the power relationships (Fisher 1997: 456). The literature on NGOs mainly consists of broad descriptive histories and sometimes generalised accounts of their achievements in the form of evaluation studies.

One of the reasons for the absence of rigorous studies is perhaps the close collaboration between academics and the NGOs' practical work. Often, social scientists have close links with NGOs, and since many NGOs operate in the cross-disciplinary space between academic research and activist intervention (policy study and advocacy, training and capacity building, social work and service delivery, etc.), they offer to academics many opportunities to pursue their work into the domain of non-academic practice. This collaboration has prevented many scholars from subjecting NGOs to the same scrutiny as other social institutions.

Although NGOs claim to believe in openness and transparency, many of them are not open to scrutiny by outsiders. Those who have achieved a degree of success and fame are often hostile to any objective studies by outsiders not approved by them.

The NGO sector in India is characterised by tremendous diversity and heterogeneity. Ignoring this diversity, unfounded generalisations are often put forward and unfair comments and criticisms are offered. NGOs differ from one another in size, in funding, in functions, in the levels at which they operate, and in organisational structures, goals and membership (Fisher 1997: 447). There are over 14,000 NGOs registered under the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act. In all there may be over 30,000 NGOs in India.

There are many definitions of NGOs. The voluntary sector includes non-governmental, non-profit organisations. They may be engaged in a variety of activities: implementing grassroots/sustainable development, promoting human rights and social justice, protesting against environmental degradation, and many other similar tasks. Some activists<sup>3</sup> resent and reject the term non-governmental organisation and instead designate themselves as social action groups, political action groups or social movements. Anna Hazare's village development group at Ralegan Siddhi in Maharashtra and Ela R. Bhatt's Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in Gujarat are both identified as NGOs but are very different from each other in terms of size, membership, funding, approaches, strategies and outcomes. This only shows that one should be very careful while making generalised statements about NGOs.

Just as there are many definitions of NGOs, there are several classifications too. Shah and Chaturvedi (1983) divide NGOs in three main categories: techno-managerial, reformist, and radical. Hirway (1995) classified NGOs in Gujarat into welfare-oriented (including health and education), development organisations, and empowering NGOs. Iyengar (1998) classified NGOs in Gujarat into four categories: Gandhian, service delivery organisations, professional organisations, and mobilisational organisations. Korten distinguishes three generations of NGOs: the first committed to relief and welfare, a second attending to small-scale, local development projects, and a third consisting of community organisations interested in building coalitions (1990: 115-27). Elliot (1987) has outlined a similar typology of NGOs based on distinctions among charity, development, and empowerment work.

In Korten's view, first generation relief and welfare NGOs, which predominate in the developing world, often have close ties with state and international development aid organisations and do not overtly engage in political activities. Second generation development NGOs organise individuals locally to address issues like public health and agricultural

development. These groups frequently help their constituents to overcome structural constraints, to challenge local and regional elites, and to assist in reducing dependency relationships. Third generation NGOs explicitly target political constraints, engaging in mobilisation and 'conscientization'. Their focus is on coordinating communications and linkages among people's organisations. These networks help to spread awareness of the practical local successes of some second generation development strategies and to serve as catalysts for wider social movements. However, these types are more ideal than real and not mutually exclusive (Fisher 1997: 448).

In the literature on NGOs, there are several positive cases of the very poor people successfully organising themselves. The Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) at Ahmedabad is one such example. Ela R. Bhatt has described the activities of the SEWA Bank, one of several organisations working under the SEWA umbrella. SEWA Bank has organised thousands of poor working women and mobilised them to run a cooperative bank which encourages savings and fulfills their credit requirements for consumption, trading and production purposes. Its annual turnover runs into crores of rupees (Bhatt 1998: 146-61). George Mathew, in a persuasive paper, has pointed out several instances in which Panchayats and NGOs have worked together using their complementary skills and resources to achieve common goals (Mathew 1999: 529-34).

As reported elsewhere (Attwood and Baviskar, n.d.), NGOs sometimes try to fill the gap between informal savings groups and dysfunctional, state-run 'co-operative' credit systems. In 1976, the Grameen Bank, a new type of NGO, was established in Bangladesh. The Bank makes only small loans to poor people, primarily women organised into small groups. As with informal savings groups, group discipline ensures loan repayment. Other NGOs in Bangladesh have established similar 'micro-credit' programmes. The Grameen Bank system of small group discipline seems particularly effective in reducing poverty and promoting women's empowerment (Hashemi, et al. 1996). Yet, cultivation of group discipline entails high administrative costs, paid by external donors.

In Andhra Pradesh, an experiment in Women's Thrift Co-operatives (WTC) was launched in 1990 under the auspices of the Co-operative Development Foundation (CDF), a local NGO, based in Hyderabad. WTCs raise funds solely through small, regular contributions from their



members, who earn interest on savings at 1 per cent per month. For loans they pay 2 per cent. A village WTC may consist of 200 to 500 women, divided into groups of 10 to 50. Group discipline ensures excellent rates of loan recovery. Loans are used for household expenses, including house repair, education and health care, as well as investments in agriculture, livestock, and small business.

In less than a decade, over 33,000 women formed 101 WTCs. On 31 December 1998, their combined savings totalled Rs 26 million, with no external grants or loans. The CDF provides advice and support in establishing WTCs, but the latter soon become self-sufficient and self-managing, a source of empowerment for their members. About half the members and leaders come from landless households, another one-third have less than three acres of land (Biswas and Mahajan 1997, Rajagopalan 1999).

If strong, vibrant and lively civil society is the foundation of modern open democratic polity, NGOs are the very life-force for the civil society. Civil society and NGOs seem to go together. One cannot exist without the other. Civil society, when it is not used as a synonym for society in general, is used to refer to 'that segment of society that interacts with the state, influences the state and yet is distinct from the state' (Chazan 1992: 281).

The growing prominence of NGOs in the field of development is strongly related to the declining legitimacy of the state. Increasingly, the state is looked upon with suspicion if not contempt. It is considered to be corrupt, oppressive and anti-poor. Least governance is seen as the sign of good governance. Post-developmental ideologies of neo-liberalism choose to espouse the virtues of market enterprise. 'Good governance' is believed now to consist of two functions: facilitating the free play of market forces, and enabling decentralised institutions of 'participatory management' to be formed. Participatory management is the new *mantra* for the provision of services through local municipalities and panchayats, as well as in the sphere of natural resource management. State structures are criticised as being rigidly bureaucratic and corrupt, and thus unsuited for performing either welfare or resource management functions, whereas NGOs are seen as 'civil society' actors that are more accountable, responsive and committed to bringing about social change. The state is seen as consisting of entrenched interests and styles of functioning that make it unwilling and unable to work with people, a role that NGOs are supposed to be good at. Thus, NGOs have emerged to

perform a bridging function, taking on functions that the state is unsuited for, and are performing them with lower overheads, greater efficiency and motivation. Increasingly, it is not only funding institutions but the state itself that accepts the presence of NGOs and, in fact, expects them to take over certain tasks. This new set of institutional linkages between state agencies and NGOs, between state and 'civil society', needs to be explored more thoroughly.

The Indian State was initially indifferent, if not hostile, to encouraging NGOs in the sphere of development, although charity and relief organisations were tolerated to a certain extent. The climate changed after the mid 1980s. First in the Seventh Five Year Plan and later in the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) the government openly welcomed and encouraged participation of NGOs in the development sphere. Recently, the state has sanctioned about Rs 150-200 crores annually for NGO funding, which is a substantial amount (Patel 1998: 47). Such a significant presence of NGOs in our civil society is not so common elsewhere. In October 1992, while speaking on the role of NGOs in India's rural development at the American University in Cairo, I was told by senior faculty members during discussion time that there were hardly any NGOs in the development field in Egypt. In India they are so ubiquitous that we take them for granted, just as we take our democratic political set-up for granted. Prof. Amartya Sen brought out the significance of India being an open democratic society in his comparison with China where nearly 23 million people died during a famine in 1958-61 and the world at large did not even hear about it for decades. In the Indian political system, with a free press, opposition parties, and a large number of NGOs, this could never happen (Sen 1986: 39-40).

Many international agencies, such as the World Bank, which were earlier working exclusively through national governments, now prefer to work through NGOs in implementing some of their projects. In one of its reviews of such programmes, the Bank (Gibbs *et al.* 1999) has noted several positive aspects of working through NGOs without giving up some of its reservations. It is noted that the NGOs are far less constrained by bureaucratic procedures and administrative inefficiencies. What is more important for the Bank is the relative absence of blatant corruption and leakages in the channelling of funds. This results in a much greater share of benefits reaching the targeted groups than is likely to happen while working through the state machinery.

However, one should be cautious in generalising from some of these developments. One should not jump to the conclusion that the state is retreating. Those who benefit from state structures are well entrenched. One should not rule out the possibility of the state trying to co-opt NGOs to retain its supremacy rather than retreating from the scene.

NGOs are now an organisational form to which considerable social prestige adheres, they are in an advantageous position to secure contracts and consultancies. They provide opportunities for social enterprise for many individuals and social groups. The range of NGO activities spans a vast spectrum.

On the one hand, there is the case of Joint Forest Management (JFM), where a caucus of NGOs mobilised by the Society for the Promotion of Wastelands Development (a government-initiated NGO) helped to reform government rules regarding JFM in several states to make them more equitable and democratic, especially with respect to women's rights (see Jeffery and Sundar 1999).

On the other hand, there is the case of an NGO in Andhra Pradesh in the animal husbandry sector that systematically misappropriated funds for several years, while the Delhi office of their foreign donors turned a blind eye to this for fear of attracting adverse publicity.

State corruption and NGO complicity had a field day in the Council for Advancement of People's Action and Rural Technology (CAPART), the government body set up to fund grassroots NGOs, where funds were disbursed and later evaluations favourably conducted if bribes were paid to the CAPART staff. There are several instances of NGOs being started by bureaucrats (retired or in service), academics, and politicians -- sometimes for sincere contributions to social development, and sometimes as a conduit for receiving funds with scant work to show for them. Given the cross-over of personnel between the state and NGOs, the contrast between their institutional structures and ideologies may well be overdrawn.

As with other agencies, the cases of outstanding success in the NGO sector are few and far between. Whenever there is any case perceived as successful there is an attempt to replicate it elsewhere. SEWA in Gujarat was persuaded to start branches in other states. One has to find out if these efforts succeeded as much as the original. The cooperative dairy complex represented by Amul at Anand in Gujarat is another famous example. From 1970 to 1995 there was a huge programme called Operation Flood, funded by the European Union, and World Bank to

replicate the Anand pattern all over the country. It did not work (see Baviskar 1999). Impressed by the success and vitality of sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra, the central government encouraged similar projects in other states. Most of them failed. Inspired by the outstanding success of Anna Hazare bringing about all round development at Ralegan Siddhi in Maharashtra, the state government persuaded him to accept the chairmanship of a committee to replicate the experiment all over the state. The committee was to select one village from each taluka and thus create about 300 Ralegan Siddhis across the state. He was given the necessary financial and other support. But the political parties had their own agendas. Their representatives, such as the MLAs and others, pulled in different directions. The state bureaucracy was lukewarm in its support since it resented Hazare's critical stance towards it. Hazare had to give up the mission when he encountered the problems of replication under state patronage. He is much more chastened after this experience. The issue of replicability is linked to the question of scale. How adequate are NGOs when they attempt to substitute for the state and take on tasks that, in order to make any kind of dent in terms of social problems, must be conceived on a nation-wide or state-wide scale?

Whereas many NGOs espouse democratic decentralisation, the working of their own organisations is often idiosyncratic, with authority being vested in one charismatic figure who started the NGO. Structures for the redressal of employee grievances, mandatory in most formal organisations, are often absent in NGOs where personalised management practices tend to prevail over more impersonal rule-based procedures. This contradiction has been the source of conflict in at least two well-known cases, where workers were forced to leave the organisation at the behest of the founders. Whereas state structures are at least formally rule-governed, the same is not true of NGOs where the spirit of voluntarism is sometimes used to obscure exploitation and manipulation.

NGOs often seem to indulge in double standards. When criticising state structures, they plead for openness, transparency and democratic participation. However, many of them do not seem to observe these norms in their own functioning. Crucial decisions are often taken at the top by the senior leaders without any scope for ordinary workers to participate in decision-making deliberations. The leaders are most reluctant to openly discuss the matters relating to funding. They talk enthusiastically about the current and future programmes but not about the sources and quantum of funding. That is why, when Bunker Roy of

the Social Work and Research Centre (SWRC), Tilonia, announced open scrutiny of the finances of his organisation, it made headlines. He offered to open the accounts in a public meeting and answer any questions relating to them. No other NGO has come forward with a similar offer. Similarly, Roy sparked off controversy by suggesting a code of conduct for NGOs. His move was strongly opposed in several quarters. It was considered to be an attack on the freedom of NGOs and an attempt to control them through regimentation<sup>4</sup>

Many NGOs find it hard to resolve the problem of succession and routinization. Having been set up with the initiative of some dynamic and charismatic leader who inspires a following and support, the organisation finds it difficult to continue once the leader is removed from the scene. It may lose its old elan and spirit. Routinization with impersonal rules and regulations has the same effect.

It is now recognised that development requires not only the 'hardware' of investment in physical infrastructure, but also the 'software' of developing human capabilities. Without capacity building for managing institutions, learning legal-rational procedures for decision-making and accounting, raising questions and suggesting alternatives, development will not be socially sustainable. NGOs have been entrusted with the task of developing this 'software'. This raises problems of its own. By and large, NGOs that receive external funds are expected to fulfill physical and financial targets, show tangible results (how much money spent, how many trees planted, how many people trained), but without considering the quality of the output. Often, the expected output is hard to measure since it is difficult to come up with quantifiable indicators of empowerment. After thousands of training workshops and orientation tours have been held, it is still not clear at the end of the day exactly how the cause of development has been served. Yet the pressing need to meet physical targets (the requirement of bureaucratic accounting practices) often forces NGOs to take shortcuts so that the more gradual and open-ended process of empowerment is compromised.

While NGOs are often critical of politicians and bureaucracy for misusing and misappropriating public money earmarked for development, the NGO record is not so exemplary. Recently it was reported that NGOs have not submitted grants utilisation certificates amounting to several crores of rupees. They have been warned that no further grants will be released till they submit utilisation certificates<sup>5</sup>

The economy and efficiency claimed on behalf of NGOs is only relatively superior. When the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi revealed that less than 15 per cent of the total money spent by the government on development programmes reached the targeted beneficiaries, there was a wave of shock and surprise. According to some calculations, this proportion may be 20 per cent in the case of NGOs, which also spend substantial amounts on their own salaries and infrastructure. The difference in terms of benefits to the poor may not be so great after all (Ramachandran 1998: 170).

The issue of accountability is also raised by the dependence of NGOs on external sources of funding. Ever since the issue of foreign funding was raised by the CPM leader Prakash Karat (1984), characterising it as an imperialist strategy of penetration into neo-colonial settings, the debate crops up again and again. Opinion is sharply divided among NGOs themselves on this issue. While Bunker Roy is willing to accept a ban on foreign funding, many others are vehemently opposed to it.

Before the last general elections, several highly respected NGOs, such as Indian Social Institute and Ankur, were asked by the government to show cause why their FCRA (permits under Foreign Contributions Regulation Act) should not be cancelled because they had supported an anti-communal advertising campaign. Any overtly political NGO activity that seems to threaten the status quo may thus be attacked by the state or by a political party. And the issue of funding gives the state a convenient leverage over NGOs.

Conflicts among NGO, donor, state, and grassroots agendas and understandings are also exemplified in the recent controversy over 'Sahayog', an NGO in the UP hills that produced a booklet about AIDS and reproductive health using 'explicit' language. This NGO, led by urban-educated upper-class activists and funded by the Macarthur Foundation, ran afoul of local sentiments as mobilised by BJP activists. This controversy shows also that the issue of representation (whose concerns do NGOs voice?) needs to be examined more carefully. The belief that NGOs represent the view of vulnerable social groups, or are sympathetic and empathetic towards them, a belief that has been used to justify the greater reliance on NGOs for development, needs closer scrutiny.

NGOs have been around for quite some time and they are likely to remain with us in the foreseeable future. Systematic studies are required to say anything with confidence about them. In the absence of such

studies, our understanding of NGOs will remain vague, superficial and hazy. Sociologists of organisations, political sociologists and sociologists of development all need to pay serious attention to them. Such a cumulative effort will enable us not only to understand NGOs but also their contribution to development and social change.

To begin with we need a regional mapping of NGOs. Is there a pattern in the regional spread of NGOs? If so, what is the explanation for it? Baviskar and Attwood (1995) attempted such an exercise in the case of rural cooperatives and arrived at tentative conclusions following a political economy approach. Why is there widespread voluntary effort in the field of education or health in some regions but not in others? We also need to know about the internal structure and functioning of NGOs. What is the composition of membership, and who are the leaders? What motivates them to undertake such work? Dhanagare (1988) noted the middle class background of activists in most NGOs. We need to know, why is it so? We also need to examine the NGO links with the outside world. What are their achievements and failures? What contributes to the rise and decline of NGOs?

As sociologists our concern should be to grasp the interface between NGOs and the wider society of which they are a part. How do they influence each other? We chose 'civil society in India' as the theme of this conference. Being an integral part of civil society, NGOs need to be looked at seriously and carefully by sociologists. If our deliberations lead to some steps in that direction, it will be a substantial gain for sociology in India<sup>6</sup>

### Notes

- 1 Quoted in Dantwala *et al* (eds) 1998: 83
- 2 Quoted in Dantwala *et al* (eds) 1998: 160
- 3 See Smitu Kothari (1993)
- 4 For an insightful discussion of internal contradictions of NGOs, see Amita Baviskar (1995)
- 5 According to the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) before the Delhi High Court, over 30,000 NGOs had not accounted for Rs 7,535 crore given to them by the government during the past several years. See *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 19 December 2000, P 5
- 6 I am grateful to D W Attwood, George Mathew, Nicholas S Hopkins and Amita Baviskar for useful suggestions and comments on the earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.

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# **Global Governance, Power Accountability and the European Union**

*Alberto Martinelli*

In contemporary globalisation the traditional system of states and international governmental organisations is not enough to assure governance at the world level, and, even less, democratic governance and accountability of power. Governance is made difficult by the erosion of the nation state and by the increasing number of relevant actors with diverse and often conflictual interests and identities. Democratic governance is hampered by the fact that powerful global actors make decisions affecting the lives of individuals and groups, to whom they are not accountable.

Globalisation is one of the most distinctive features of the contemporary world. It has been defined as, 'time-space compression' (Harvey 1989), 'action at distance' (Giddens 1990), 'accelerating interdependence' (Ohmae 1990), 'networking' (Castells 1998). We can define it as a set of related processes which interconnect individuals, groups, communities, states, markets, corporations, international governmental and non-governmental organisations, in complex webs of social relations.

Globalisation is a multi-faceted process with far-reaching consequences for the lives of all women and men, imposing constraints and opening opportunities for individual and collective action. The spatial organisation of social relations is deeply transformed insofar as relations become more stretched and more intensively interconnected. Transcontinental and trans-regional flows and networks of activities, exchanges and power relations are generated, with major implications on decision-making processes. New patterns of hierarchy and inequality and of inclusion and exclusion are shaped, that cut across national borders. And new problems of global governance and democratic accountability arise, insofar as the sovereign power of nation states is eroded and their role in world politics reshaped.

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Globalisation is not just a continuation of the process of internationalisation, but also a qualitatively different process. It is not just another phase in the longstanding cycle of openings and closures, of free market and protectionist policies, of the world economy. The difference lies in the combined effect of the rapid growth in communications and information technologies (computers, telecommunications, and television) and in the increasing power of economic and financial transnational actors. More and more activities – not only the production and distribution of goods and services, but also the spread of material and symbolic communications – are organised on a world scale. The lives of individuals and the fates of communities increasingly depend on what takes place in distant places.

Borders, both national and local, are weakened and redefined through processes of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation. Whereas internationalisation implies a limited and controlled erosion of sovereignty insofar as every political entity autonomously decides whether to enter into relations of exchange with others, globalisation implies a greater erosion of national sovereignty and a growing interconnectedness. Among the many instances of sovereignty's erosion we may here recall the constraints set by international monetary institutions on the economic policies of national governments, the impact of transnational corporations' (TNCs) strategies on workers, consumers and entrepreneurs of the countries where they operate, the permeability of national frontiers to illegal immigrants, the difficulties faced by authoritarian regimes in filtering – or altogether banning – the images and the informations of the global village, the problems of coexistence between different cultures in increasingly multiethnic societies. Growing interconnectedness among peoples and states is shown by a variety of indicators – which range from the number and types of treaties to international governmental institutions, from imports and exports to levels of inward and outward investments, from electronic communication traffic to measures of ethnic, religious and linguistic composition of national populations, from military alliances to environmental risks.

These various tendencies toward the world-wide extension, impact and interconnectedness of social phenomena and toward the erosion and reshaping of borders also foster a world-encompassing awareness among social actors of the interdependence of their activities and of their communality of fate.

Globalisation has raised major research questions among sociologists and other social scientists, political leaders, mass media and public opinion, such as the extent of the phenomenon and its degree of novelty, the various processes which take place under this general heading and their different scope and dynamics, the beneficial or detrimental effects of those processes for different countries and social groups, the identification of major actors and their strategies

In this paper I will focus on the joint questions of global governance and accountability of power in the interconnected world. In order to answer these key questions, I will, first, shortly review the major conceptions in the huge literature of globalisation. Second, I will discuss the question of global governance, identify major actors on the global stage, and assess the factors favouring or opposing democratic accountability at the world level. Finally, I will discuss the European Union as a model of supranational government and as a potential major component of global governance.

### **Different Conceptions of Globalisation.**

The numerous attempts to conceptualise globalisation can identify a space described with reference to three major axes: a) the axis 'hyperglobalisers vs sceptics' (D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton 1999) where the key distinction concerns the degree of novelty of globalisation and its impact on nation states, b) the axis 'neo-liberals vs neo-marxist and radicals' where the key points are the balance between positive and negative impacts of globalisation and its truly global or Western hegemonic character, and c) the axis 'homogenisation vs heterogeneity and hybridisation' – which focuses on the cultural dimension of globalisation. Various conceptualisations differ in terms of the type and number of aspects which are analysed: causal dynamics, periodisation and trajectory, major actors, social impact on people in terms of new patterns of hierarchy and inequality, and political implications for state power and world governance. Analyses also vary according to the type of countries, social groups, institutions, cultural phenomena under investigation. But all scholars of globalisation can be placed in the space defined by those three dimensions, with the first axis (hyperglobalisers/sceptics) as the key one, and the other two as specifications.

For the hyperglobalisers, globalisation is mainly conceptualised in economic terms. Peoples are increasingly subjected to and integrated into the global marketplace, and economies are increasingly denationalised through the establishment of transnational networks of trade, finance and production. Contemporary globalisation is seen as a novel condition, hardly reversible, a 'reconfiguration of the framework of human action' as Albrow puts it, which constraints the range of choices of nation states and individuals, compelling them to adopt neo-liberal economic policies in order to compete in the world market. The global economy reshapes the traditional division of labour between centre and periphery and between the 'North' and the 'South' of the world, and replaces it with more complex patterns of hierarchy of inequality (resulting in 'winners' and 'losers' both among and within countries) and with new tacit transnational class allegiances.

Hyperglobalisers sharply disagree among themselves with regard to evaluating the risks and opportunities of the global market for individuals, countries, and groups. Neo-liberals are convinced that globalisation has non zero-sum outcomes and that benefits are far greater than costs, and go so far as to state of witnessing an emerging global civilisation (Perlmutter 1991). Neo-marxists and radicals portray a much gloomier picture of growing inequalities and dominance by the strongest economic actors (Greider 1997). Both agree, however, in stressing the loss of sovereignty and of the autonomous power of nation states (Ohmae 1995) and in arguing that the impersonal forces of world markets are now more powerful than the states (Strange 1996), and that governments' major concerns are competing for attracting investments and managing the social consequences of globalisation for those who are marginalised. States are considered increasingly unable to control transnational flows of people, money and goods, and have to reduce their welfare policies because of the budget constraints imposed by global competition.

Many arguments of the hyperglobalisers remind us of the contradiction exposed in the '70s by the theories of the overloaded government (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975), the legitimisation crisis (Habermas 1975) and the fiscal crisis of the state (O'Connor 1977). Again, national governments are torn between the need to foster economic competitiveness and that of enhancing social cohesion, but this contradiction is framed in the new context of the challenges set by the global market.

The hyperglobalist thesis of the demise of the nation state can be criticised for not distinguishing among states with quite different power and influence. While in the case of the countries of the European Union, we can agree that their sovereign power has been reduced – both through their spontaneous giving away of portions of it to the institutions of the European Union and by the constraints of the global market – the same does not apply to the United States, which are the hegemonic power and continue to exert an unprecedented state power.

Close to the hyperglobalist pole are also those cultural descriptions of globalisation which stress the increasing homogeneity of world values (rationalisation, market competition, commodification, democratic rights), and of consumption patterns and styles of life ('MacDonaldization', 'CocaColization', 'Disneyfication', etc.)

At the other extreme of the conceptual spectrum are the sceptics. For them globalisation, defined as a perfectly integrated world economy, is a myth. What is happening is not a novel phenomenon, but another wave of internationalisation, i.e., of interactions among predominantly national economies, as it happened at the start of the 20th century (Hirst and Thompson 1996). In order to prove their point the sceptics conceptualise globalisation in even stricter economic terms than the hyperglobalists. The indicators they select to prove their argument are mostly based on trade and finance flows and on their value as percentages of the GNP of various countries.

The sceptics make a good point in arguing that what is actually taking place is the division of the world economy into regional financial and trading blocs – North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific. Actually, most of foreign trade of European Union countries, which are among the most export-oriented economies in today's world, takes place among themselves. The concentration of trade and foreign investments in the most advanced capitalist countries also accounts for the continuing patterns of inequality and hierarchy in the world and for the marginalisation of most 'third world' countries. But globalisation is not just trade and finance.

Sceptics strongly disagree with hyperglobalists also on the fact that national sovereignty is undermined by the world market and global governance, since they point out the continuing key role of governments (essentially of the most powerful Western states) in shaping economic relations. The forces of internationalisation themselves depend on the regulatory power of national governments to ensure free trade.

Multinational corporations are not multinational at all, since they have a clear home state and regional base. The sceptics' view is not exposed to my critique of neglecting the asymmetry of power and influence among nation states, but some of them go too far, interpreting contemporary internationalisation as the by-product of the US-initiated multilateral economic order since the end of the second world war (Gilpin 1987), or just as a new phase of Western imperialism with governments acting as agents of monopoly capital (Callinicos et al 1994). To this mostly economic perspective can be added Huntington's culturalist view of a world fragmented into conflicting civilisations and radically opposed religious fundamentalisms and aggressive nationalisms, which run against the very possibility of a global civilisation and democratic global governance (1996).

In between the opposite poles of hyperglobalisers and sceptics, optimists and pessimists, and homogenisers and heterogenisers, lies the perspective of those whom Held defines 'transformationalists'. They conceptualise globalisation in broader and more complex terms as a multi-faceted process with multiple causes (economic, technological, cultural, political). They are cautious about future developments and do not stress global integration, but rather the emergence of webs and networks of relations among individuals, groups, communities, states, international organisations and transnational actors.

According to this view, globalisation not only reinforces old patterns of inequalities but also forms new social hierarchies which penetrate all regions of the world, thus recasting the traditional patterns of inclusion and exclusion. However, significant opportunities for empowerment of individuals, communities and social groups also exist. Alongside the homogenising impact of global corporations on styles of life and consumption patterns, the transformationalists point out the increasing hybridisation of cultural traits and the staunch defence of specific identities. They stress deterritorialisation and also the chances for a potentially greater role of national governments. And they point out the need for democratic global governance based on the principles of universal rights and responsibilities.

This is also my perspective and it is in this framework that I will discuss different views of global governance, major factors favouring or opposing accountable governance, and the potential model provided by the European supranational Union.

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### **Global Governance**

The main political implications of globalisation are the erosion of the nation state and the related question of global governance. Globalisation implies a massive shakeout of the world order. It provokes an 'unbundling of the relationships between sovereignty, territoriality and state power' (Ruggie 1993), affects the institutional encasement and implies a basic restructuring of the territorial nation state (Sassen 2000), and brings about a new mix of domestic and foreign policies (Rosenau's "intermestic" affairs, 1997). These transformations create the need for global governance, i.e., the organisation and the institutional regulation at the world level of social and economic life by the combined action of a plurality of actors who pursue strategies of various kinds (industrial exports, financial profit, national security, religious indoctrination, betterment of their own life chances, etc.) on the world stage. Global governance is difficult because of the erosion of nation states, the increasing number of actors with conflicting goals, and the increasing interconnectedness of social relations.

Global governance can have different meanings. It does not equate with the notion of world government, which is today still largely Utopian. It implies the notion of world leadership, and it raises the questions of legitimation and accountability of this leadership. As a matter of fact, world leadership has been exerted by hegemonic powers, as in the case of Great Britain in the 19th century 'concert of nations' or the US and the USSR in the decades after the second world war, or of the US today. But in these cases, leadership can hardly be considered as legitimate and accountable to constituencies outside those of the hegemonic power and its allies. World leadership is also to some extent the outcome of international organisations, first of all the UNO, mostly through the Security Council and the various agencies acting in various fields – from health to food, from preserving the world cultural heritage to industrial development, from drug control to peace-keeping. The United Nations enjoy greater legitimation, given the number of member countries which are represented in the General Assembly, but the UNO is accountable only to states, besides, given the conflict of interests and opinions within them and the lack of autonomous law-enforcement capacity, it does not prove very effective. Other international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World



Bank, or military leagues like NATO, exert leadership, but are legitimate and accountable only to member governments

The notion of global governance I wish to stress defines a complex set of global norms concerning the entire world as a single system in various ways, i.e. the planet earth as an ecosystem, humanity as an endangered species, with the related concerns for the lives of future generations, the peoples of the world as a single constituency of individuals entitled with equal rights and responsibilities to whom decision-makers must be accountable, the world market as an economic space regulated by an international "lex mercatoria" which can guarantee not only investors' but also workers', consumers', and communities' rights

Different conceptions of global governance compete with each other. Different notions of basic human rights rooted in different religious and ethnic traditions, different models of business enterprise and competition (which is now basically Anglo-American and neo-liberal), different conceptions of ecological balance and of population control. What is important is the effort to make power in whatever form accountable to larger constituencies than the specific one and a cultural attitude of contextual universalism, i.e., the fertile and non-destructive encounter of cultures and the mutual respect of different cultural outlooks, along the lines of thinking developed by authors like Robertson (1992) and Beck (1997).

In this sense, global governance does not equate with any kind of world order – as in the historical cases of the ancient empires and of the modern hegemonic systems of nation states – but it means democratic governance in the sense that global decision-makers (the most powerful nation states, TNCs, financial institutions, international organisations, religious institutions and movements) should be accountable not only to their restricted constituencies (i.e. their citizens, their stockholders and employees, their investors, their members, the believers in their faith), but also to the constituency of all human beings.

My conception of global governance is polyarchic mixed actor system, based on accountability, contextual universalism, multiple identities, and supranational democratic institutions. Is such a system possible? In order to answer this question, I will discuss major actors on the global stage, different conceptions of world democracy, and then factors which can favour or run against democratic global governance.

### **The Main Actors on the Global Stage**

The need for global governance, as a polyarchic mixed-actor system, stems from the scope of collective policy problems which cannot be dealt with by inter-governmental cooperation alone. Global governance is defined by the number, type, relative power, and different resources which can be mobilised by the various economic, social and political actors which pursue goals impinging on transnational rule and authority systems. I will limit my appraisal to six main actors: nation states, transnational corporations and international financial institutions, international governmental organisations and international regimes, international non-governmental organisations, international collective movements, supranational regional institutions.

#### *Nation States*

Globalisation tends to erode the nature of sovereignty and autonomy of nation states. This is ironic, since the 20th century has been, among other things, the century of the proliferation of nation states as the fundamental form of political organisation. The erosion of national sovereignty and power is only a part of the picture and its extent has been largely overestimated by those scholars who argue for the demise of the nation state. In reality, globalisation brings about a variety of adjustment strategies by national policies which can require a rather active state, not the neo-liberal minimum government, but the 'developmental' or the 'catalytic' state. As Rosenau argues (1993), the state is not demised, but rather reconstructed and restructured. And as Keohane points out (1995), sovereignty is less a territorially defined barrier as a resource for politics characterised by complex transnational networks in competitive country systems and regional systems. Let us think as an instance of this view of the competition among national governments in industrial policies with the aim of creating the most favourable conditions for foreign investment (friendly corporate law and fiscal policy, good infrastructures, flexible labour force, efficient public administration, etc.), while at the same time maintaining control over basic development strategies.

*Transnational and Multinational Corporations (TNCs and MNCs) and International Financial Institutions*

Transnational corporations are firms which organise global productive and distribution networks, while maintaining a clear national base. Only a few of them are truly multinationals. In 1998, they were 53,000 with 450,000 subsidiaries and accounted for about 70% of world trade and up to 30% of world output. The 100 largest among them employed 6 million workers worldwide, accounted for 30% of total world sales of transnational and multinational firms, controlled about 20% of global foreign assets, and dominated such industries as oil, food, car, electronics, telecommunications, chemicals and pharmaceuticals (UNCTAD 1999). Although the vast majority of them has a clear national base (Martinelli 1979), their interest is global profitability. They have grown from local or national firms to global concerns through the skillful use of foreign direct investments and of the technological breakthrough in material and symbolic communication in order to exploit their competitive advantage on a world scale.

Global productive and distribution networks are by no means limited to large TNCs, but involve small and medium-sized firms as well, due to the opportunities offered by global communications for financial markets and world trade. TNCs act according to the rules of the world market and to the laws of the different countries where they operate. Some of them reject any other kind of regulation and consider their stockholders as the only legitimate constituency, others are willing to recognise their responsibility vis à vis a plurality of stockholders besides their stockholders and investors, such as workers, consumers, suppliers and sub-contractors, local communities, national governments, environmental associations, etc, and develop devices for self-regulation such as codes of conduct, social and environmental reports, which are subjected to evaluating bodies and rating procedures on a world scale.

*International Governmental Organisations and International Regimes*

The number of international governmental organisations (United Nations, World Health Organization, International Labour Office, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, NATO, etc.) has increased manifold, passing from 37 in 1909 to 176 in the late 1990s. In spite of

complex negotiation procedures, lack of resources and waste of resources, veto powers, they have achieved important results

Less known but equally important are international regimes, i.e., implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures concerning given issue areas of international relations such as nuclear testing, allocation of radio frequencies or satellite orbits, high seas fishing, etc. They show the growing institutionalisation of global politics and constitute forms of global governance, distinct from the traditional notion of national sovereignty. Some have been in existence since long, others are quite recent. But what is new is their constantly growing number and importance. At the core of international regimes there often is an intergovernmental organisation. Important examples of such regimes are also international commercial arbitrations and security and bond ratings agencies like Moody's and Standard and Poor with huge bodies of professional analysts scattered in various regions of the world, they can hold more influence on the policy-making of a given country than foreign governments or domestic interest groups)

International regimes foster the formation of transnational communities of interests and of policy networks connecting government officials in similar departments, members of given IGOs and of several NGOs. They shape a system of 'governance without government' as Rosenau argues. The result is that national governments are inserted into a growing system of global, regional, and multilateral systems of governance, and that legal processes and national legislations are growingly enmeshed with international rules.

### *International Non-Governmental Organisations*

Their number has increased much more than that of IGOs, passing from 260 in 1909 to 5,500 in the late 1990s. Some of them, like Amnesty International, the World Wildlife Fund and Green Peace, challenge governments and win wide support across national borders. Others are less visible, but play key roles in international cooperation and in the formation of a global civil society and public space.

International scientific associations provide a major instance. They can play a beneficial countervailing role, insofar as they are able to build truly global communities of scholars and inspire their conduct to universalistic principles on the basis of which everyone is evaluated in terms of her/his scientific achievement, teaching ability and professional

ethics, and not in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, or nationality. Unlike the most influential global actors like powerful governments, MNCs and fundamentalist religious or nationalist movements, international scientific associations do not inspire their conduct to increasing power or gain, nor tend to impose a given Weltanschauung.

### *International Collective Movements*

They are the heirs of the critical social movements which developed on a national base such as the feminist, environmental, anti-war movements. They are engaged in mobilising transnational communities of resistance and solidarity, taking advantage of the same technological resources that corporations use to control the market. Many are issue oriented movements, but a loose general coordination is taking place. Since Seattle, the pictures of the anti-global movement gathering in the same place and at the same time of major transnational institutions, like the IMF or the G8, have become familiar. The anti-global movement is in fact a rather heterogeneous family of movements kept together by the common adversary, where the more protectionist anti-global market advocates join forces with the more internationally concerned ecologists. In the light of Hoogvelt's three-tier arrangement of concentric circles which cuts across national boundaries, representing respectively the elites (which have decision-making power), the contented (which in various ways benefit from the global interconnectedness), and the marginalised (which are either excluded or pay the costs), the anti-global movement draws most of its recruits from those who are afraid to pay the costs. Some are all out against globalisation, others try to tame it. Both types are important actors of global governance.

### *Supranational Regional Institutions*

Other global actors of growing importance are supranational regional institutions, as exemplified by the European Union, and in more embryonic ways, the free trade areas in South America, South-East Asia and North America. The EU can be a model for supranational political and cultural entities in a global world. Although more successful in economic and monetary integration than in political building, and in spite of all its problems, the EU is a remarkable example of how unity and diversity can coexist, and how unity can be generated from diversity,

instead of leading all the different identities and cultures into a cultural melting pot. Following this model, the EU has created mechanisms of collaboration in several policy areas, new instruments of human rights enforcement, it has pooled resources for achieving common goals through the voluntary devolution by member states of portions of their sovereignty.

### **Factors Favouring or Hindering Democratic Governance at the World Level.**

These various actors play different roles with quite different degrees of power and influence, but are united by the global scope of their actions and by their more or less conscious involvement in global governance. The key question, however, is whether governance can take a democratic form, a question whose preliminary answers vary according to the notion of democracy which is put forward.

Liberal internationalists, on the one hand, argue that in order to cope with the threats to social cohesion and with the ecological and political risks of contemporary globalisation it is necessary to extend the model of liberal democracy beyond national borders into the world arena. The Commission on Global Governance (1995), for instance, states that "the articulation of a collaborative ethos based upon the principles of consultation, transparency and accountability of decision making among all actors either involved and/or affected in global decision making (states, corporations, collective movements)

Radicals, on the other hand, argue for alternative mechanisms of global social and political organisation based on the principles of self-governing communities (Falk 1995) and of people's empowerment in order to control their own lives. The radical view is generally exposed by critical social movements which developed on a national base, such as the feminist, environmental, anti-war movements. These movements are engaged in fostering new international identities and notions of global citizenship, taking advantage of the same technological resources that corporations use to control the market.

The two projects differ in terms of their basic constituencies and of their conceptions of democracy. The first appeals to responsible elites (economic, political, technocratic, cultural), and it implies a top-down, circumscribed notion of representative democracy. The second speaks to collective movements and discriminated groups, and it implies a bottom-

up notion of democracy with populist overtones. A more viable and sound project of global governance should try to integrate the most promising elements of both views, adding a special emphasis on democratic accountability, multiple citizenship, and supranational institutions.

Powerful obstacles run, however, against the achievement of such a project, i.e., political and cultural trends in contemporary world society have negative implications for it. First, most powerful actors on the world stage usually address matters of common concern in terms of their specific goals and of their own interests, i.e. the interests of what they consider their own constituencies (such as the national interests for state powers, profits and capital gains for multinational corporations, dogmatic beliefs for fundamentalist movements, etc.), with the result of consolidating old inequalities and hierarchies and of fostering new ones, as well as old and new violations of basic human rights.

Second, the strategies of international organisations – which by definition should have a global constituency – are often weighted in favour of their most powerful members (such as the Security Council members in the UN or the members of the G8). These first two tendencies foster the charges that global governance is a Western project designed at spreading Western values, laws and institutional arrangements and at sustaining the richest countries' primacy in world affairs.

Third, the emergence of new forms of fundamentalism, aggressive nationalism and tribalism – which construct people's identities upon 'primordial ties' and dogmatic beliefs – make very difficult the growth of democratic citizenship both at the nation state and at the supranational levels. We have in today's world several instances of perversion of local identities – in terms of dogmatic closure, intolerance and prejudice – as a reaction to global trends.

Fourth, the declining participation in democratic politics and the reduced confidence in democratic processes and institutions – as showed by many opinion polls – in the developed countries with representative governments weaken the appeal of democracy and make more difficult to 'export' it beyond national boundaries and into developing countries with authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, growing neo-populist forms of consensus formation appeal to many 'losers' in globalisation, and, on the other, an increasing reliance on technocratic elites appeals to many



'winners' in globalisation, both reduce the space for democratic participation and accountability

Fifth, the persistence of authoritarian regimes, repressive of civil rights and political liberties and engaged in non-democratic decision-making in many developing countries, are facts that do not contribute to strengthening the voices in favour of democratic accountability of power at the global level

And yet, the project of a cosmopolitan democracy is not impossible. In order to achieve it, we should strengthen a few basic building blocks: the specification of the principles and institutions for making accountable the decision-making processes with global implications, the spreading of the notion of multiple citizenship through which different overlapping identities (local, national, regional, cosmopolitan) can define different sets of rights and responsibilities, the growing role of international regimes and of supranational institutions of governance at the world level (through a transformed United Nations Organization) and at the regional level (through a reformed European Union and similar political entities), in order to avoid that the unbundling of the relationships between sovereignty, state power and territoriality leads to political chaos, the emergence of a transnational civic society and of an international public space, where women and men learn to respect and try to understand others' values and beliefs, without renouncing their own, but rather 'reinventing' them.

All these elements can contribute to the advancement of a 'cosmopolitan project' of global governance (Archibugi, Held, Kohler 1998), in which sites and forms of power that at present operate beyond the scope of democratic control can be made more accountable to all those who are affected by their decisions. A key role in this respect can be played by regional supranational governments like the European Union – the topic to which I will now address my attention.

### **The European Union (EU) as a Model of Supranational Government**

I am persuaded that European peoples have an interest in developing the present supranational entity into a true federal union. The common European market has been a great success, in spite of present troubles, with its monetary union and single currency. But these results are at risk if a unified political government is not formed, since the different economic and fiscal policies of the member states tend to paralyse action.



Madison's dictum 'federate their purse, their hearts and minds will follow' can be true, but it needs federal institutions which go beyond the present coordination of policies among national governments of the members countries. Some scholars, like Schmitter (2000), praise the 'clever' solution of transferring functions such as the monetary function to a higher decision-making level by member states without divesting themselves of state power.

I think that the present weakness of the euro and the difficulties of the European Central Bank prove, on the contrary, that the transfer of government functions to a higher level requires a transfer of power too, to the democratic institutions of a supranational state. This institutional arrangement should include the components of a federal state, i.e., besides the existing European Court of Justice, a parliament with one chamber elected by all EU citizens and a second chamber with members designated by national states, a government accountable to the parliament and endowed with true decision-making capacity.

The view of a federal European Union has strong opponents: on the one hand, those who, like judges Grimm and Kirchhoff in the decision of 12 October 1993 of the German Supreme Court, argue that in Europe today democracy can function only at the nation state level, since neither a European public opinion nor a European public debate presently exists, on the other hand, those like Weiler (1995) think that a European federal state is not advisable since it would reproduce the excluding attitude of present nation states.

I think that these difficulties can be resolved if we make clear what model of political union should be adopted. It cannot follow – and it should not follow – the historical model of nation building which gave rise to present national states, because contemporary Europe lacks its basic component, i.e., the nationalisation of the masses on the basis of strong single national identity, and the involvement of the elites into a project of political and military hegemony.

The early Europeanists conceived European integration with the basic goals of putting an end to the long series of inter-European wars and of restoring democracy against the 'anti-Europe' of nazism and fascism: peace instead of war, freedom instead of oppression, cooperation instead of aggressive confrontation. It was and it is a noble and powerful purpose, but a less emotionally appealing motivation of common citizens than that of uniting against a common enemy. The common enemy element was partially present in European integration in

the years after the second world war, when the Soviet threat helped the process, both directly (through the common enemy syndrome) and indirectly (by fostering the benign attitude of the United States) But, besides the fact that large communist minorities in countries like Italy and France took side with the USSR in the cold war, after Stalin's death this threat was less and less evident and less and less capable of arousing strong identities

In the building of Europe the original political-military factor was thus substituted by market integration, a cooler and more general motivating factor for the common citizens and it looked more the fulfillment of the project of enlightened elites rather than of mass collective movements This implied that efforts to create a European defence community failed, that a common foreign policy did not become a priority of European integration (also because of the special status of Germany as a military occupied country and of the United States hegemony in the Western sphere of influence), whereas, on the other hand, more and more emphasis was put on market liberalisation and economic policy harmonisation

European integration proceeded at an uneven pace, and recurrent crises were 'overcome' through enlarging it and extending areas of cooperation and policy harmonisation (the Single Act, the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties) But the question of political union cannot be further deferred and must be addressed with political and sociological imagination

If the traditional European model of nation building cannot be adopted, the American 'melting pot' model, although less distant, cannot either The United States have been defined the 'first new nation', since they provide a successful, although conflict ridden, model of forming a single nation through the integration of millions of immigrants with very different cultural and social backgrounds and characteristics Yet, the integration into the melting pot took place in the presence of an hegemonic culture (the Anglo-Saxon liberal democratic free market oriented culture) which, although increasingly challenged, is still dominant in America American federalism, as well as other forms of federalism, such as that of India, can teach very important lessons, but the European Union must follow its own way

The model of the European Union should be a specific one a multicultural entity with a core of shared values (democratic institutions, basic human rights, civic responsibilities, peaceful coexistence with all

people on earth, free competition) which are at the foundations of common institutions, together with the respect for different cultures, languages and heritages. According to this model, unity should induce the redefinition of different identities – both of the European peoples and of the immigrants from other parts of the world – rather than impose their abolition. And citizens should share multiple identities – the city, the regional, the national, the supranational.

Unity should be achieved through diversity. Already in ancient Greek philosophy we find the notion of harmony stemming from contradictory elements. If one postulates unity at the beginning, it follows a tendency toward the continual coming back to the lost original model, if, on the contrary, one postulates diversity at the beginning, unity is seen as the continuous effort stemming from conflict and competition, never predetermined.

We are well aware, however, that the recognition of multiple cultural identities within a single state can be a destabilising factor of national unity, since it alters the delicate balance between *ethnos* and *demos*. For this reason, although European political unification should be built around the notions of unity stemming from diversity and multiple citizenship, in the process we should also foster those elements of traditional nationhood which are compatible with the multicultural supranational model. Let us consider for this purpose the basic components of nationhood as we can draw from the scholars of ethnicity and nationhood (A. Smith 1991, Tullio-Altan 1995): *ethnos*, *logos*, *topos*, *ethos*, and *epos*. We cannot rely on *ethnos* (that is, on ancestral ethnic origins), since it fosters closure, exclusion and discrimination and runs against the core values of the EU. We cannot rely too much on *logos* as well, since, if language is taken as the basis of *logos*, European citizens cannot be forced to speak a single language, since multilingualism is considered the basic requisite for the respect of different cultural identities. *Topos*, i.e., the symbolic transfiguration of the space where Europeans live, can help to some extent. There are, in fact, distinctive common characters in European cities, buildings, squares, public and private spaces, but this goes together with such a great variety of natural and human landscapes that it can be hardly considered a strong identifying element.

We are then left with *ethos* and *epos*. We can certainly invest more on *ethos* (i.e. the basic core values which define the new European identity and outline the basic rights and responsibilities of democratic

citizenship), and on epos (i.e. the great figures and the great events which bear testimony to the common European heritage in arts, science, culture). Both ethos and epos should be basic common components of the educational programmes for the new generations in education, and should orient the activities of the media and the various manifestations of public discourse, in order to create a real European public space grounded on a shared political culture, which could orient people's choices on matters of common concern. Moreover, the process of union building will be helped by an increasingly homogeneous European social fabric and by the growth of a European public space. The strengthening of a common culture, I want to stress it once again, should not be seen as a means to exclude others, but rather as a necessary basis for the dialogue among civilizations.

If this project fails, it will bring evidence to the theory that states continue to be built only either upon an homogeneous culture, or upon an hegemonic culture capable of integrating different immigrants into a melting pot.

If the project succeeds, the European Union can become a model for other regions of the world – which can form large supranational multicultural unions – and can thus significantly contribute to global democratic governance.

### Note

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# **Hinduism and Female Sexuality: Social Control and Education of Girls in India<sup>1</sup>**

*Karuna Chanana*

## **Introduction**

The general conceptual framework that has guided this paper has evolved over the last three decades of my work on the education of girls and women in India and in South Asia. The argument is that the growth and development of women's education in India is caught in two simultaneous processes. On the one hand, the state policy and public discourse on education put a premium on the need to promote education among girls and women to generate positive forces at the macro-level. On the other, the micro-level forces rooted in the family, the kingroup and culture determine the educational policies, programmes and ability of girls and women to access them. Therefore, it is not possible to view women's education without reference to their social context, which is rooted in culture, religion and in the 'patrifocal family structure and ideology'.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the macro policy itself is coloured by the cultural counters surrounding the societal conception of the feminine role. Although feminists have been able to uncover the hidden agenda of the educational policies and programmes, yet the societal rootedness of femininity is hard to overcome. Moreover, it is not possible to confine to the structural characteristics of education as an institution or to look merely at its growth or absence of development due to financial and administrative constraints but it is necessary to look at its interplay with culture and religion.

Additionally, looking backwards to the historical past is also a necessity. Practices such as female seclusion and sex segregation, the relative rigidity of the division of labour and of the notions of the 'naturalness' of males' and females' work, and many subtle aspects of gender relations all contribute to the shaping of and are themselves

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shaped by the ideology underlying these practices and behaviour patterns (Dube 1997). Moreover, there are continuities in the issues during the colonial and post-colonial period. Some of these are shortage of single sex schools and of women teachers, unsafe or undesirable location, coeducation, relevant curriculum, etc.

In South Asia, girls undergo a socialisation process which is common in several of its dimensions. Further, the central concern with protection of female sexuality and the attendant notions of female purity/impurity and its links to caste status and the honour of the agnatic kin-group and familial consideration put severe constraints on the schooling of girls and women. This has to be seen alongwith the practice of seclusion and segregation, especially around puberty, to control female sexuality. Formal education or schooling involves moving into public spaces, interaction with males (in coeducational schools and with men teachers), or being socialised (through the curriculum) as boys, and supposedly moving away from the eventual goal of wifehood and motherhood.

The basic argument is that the concern with protection of female sexuality accounts for whether girls have access to education or not. It also determines the quality, type and duration of education they receive and what they do with it later, i.e., whether they work or not and what kind of jobs they take up, whether they work to earn before or after marriage. Further, that adaptations to changing situations are basically adjustments which do not call for structural changes or question the basic premises of the value system surrounding female sexuality. If anything, the correspondence between the higher education of the groom and higher amount of dowry, reappearance of sati and the uses of higher educational qualifications of girls for marital alliances in contemporary Indian society have reinforced the traditional values and ideology. This paper explains the material or the empirical reality in conjunction with the ideological and the textual. It begins with the images of women as depicted in the Hindu scriptures and texts, moves on to the colonial period and the independent India. It seeks to see links between socialisation and education as processes.

### **The Textual and the Ideological**

Classical Hinduism or Hindu ideology is neither monolithic nor uniform nor is it static since it has been changing over time. There is also differentiation between textual and contextual Hinduism, namely, the ideological and the empirical (Saraswati 1977). Scholars also talk of multiplicity of customs and social practices and their



forms over time and space. Similarly, they refer to the varied and changing ideals of femininity within Hinduism (Wadley 1977, Allen 1982, Mukhopadhyay and Seymour 1994, Dube 1997).

There are ideological variations in the way woman's question has been handled in India. These ideological differences also influence the view of the Hindu woman<sup>3</sup>. For instance, Altekar (1978) and Mukherjee (1978) provide several instances of women's centrality in rituals, family life and education and contend that the Hindu woman enjoyed a position of equality in the early Vedic age. Altekar infers that deterioration in her position comes much later. Several scholars (Roy 1999, Chakravarti 1999) contest this position. Moreover, in spite of ideological differences, there is a general agreement among scholars on some points. For instance, images of the Hindu women have varied over time and it is generally agreed that their position has undergone change for the worse from the Vedic to the classical period and thereafter. Second, that even though there are textual references to women occupying the public space of education and the birth of a scholarly daughter being desired (Altekar 1978) the patriarchal constraints begin to impinge on her life in the later Vedic period (Bose 2000). The disagreement among scholars is about the time when the decline begins. Third, that there is ideological continuity from the present to the past which enables one to identify the 'ideal Hindu woman'. Fourth, the image of the 'ideal Hindu woman' is that of the householder and dominates and co-exists along with other images.

Again, religion adapts to local culture and thus there are likely to be variations in how socio-cultural practices impact on access to education. Moreover, tradition and modernity have dialectical relationship and may not be viewed as polar opposites. While 'tradition' constraints women's entry into public spaces of 'schools', it also allowed entry into masculine disciplines such as medical education. The question is: How far can one stretch this argument?

One is also aware that 'gender relations are constructed differently in different cultures' and that Hinduism cannot be painted with one brush, nor all of India, or even Hindus can be viewed as having one culture (Dube 1997: 1).

For example, 'there is corporate or individual control over female sexuality and strong emphasis on seclusion and segregation in North and Central India. Again, there is considerable diversity across castes, regions especially between the North and the South, and between patrilineal and matrilineal communities (Dube 1997: 5).

Thus, the South Asian sub-continent is characterised by 'immense geographic, historic, economic, sectarian, caste and other differences' – all of which are reflected in the diversity of their women, their life styles and their position vis-à-vis men' (Allen 1982 1) Yet, underlying this diversity, there is a thread of cultural uniformity which allows one to talk of a Hindu woman

Writing on Hindu women, Allen reduces the fourfold goals of *moksa*, *dharma*, *artha* and *kama* to a dialogue between *moksa* and *dharma*, between the renouncer and the man-in-the-world Similarly, he argues that the Hindu woman can be alternatively viewed as pure-impure, sinister-benign, creative-destructive, ally-opponent, goddess-witch These structural categories also give rise to several female stereotypes such as pure virgin, voluptuous temptress, obedient wife, honoured mother, etc (Allen 1982 1) In Bengal, this opposition and the female power are reflected in the cult of the Mother Goddess in her two different incarnations destructive Kali and benign Durga (Engels 1999 73) Madhu Khanna (2000) refers to three paradigms of female sexuality in Hinduism These are the reproductive model wherein the female body is the instrument of fertility, the second is the virile female body for pleasure and the third is the female body as an instrument of transcendence In the first model, the female is the virgin maiden and the chaste-wife (*Kanya-patni*) whose womb is the receptacle to receive the male for perpetuation of the patriarchal line It is the first model which is relevant to the discussion on its linkages to education that will follow later What is pertinent is that the varied images of the Hindu woman and the corresponding stereotypes and their impact on the contemporary Hindu girls and women in the context of accessing 'modern' education

While renunciation has been an important value in Hinduism, which views *moksa* and *samsara* as incompatible, 'Woman with one foot planted firmly in the physical world of reproduction and sexuality, and the other in the social world of the family, - is an obstacle to the goal of spiritual salvation' (Allen 1982 2)

In addition, the powerful and the wealthy among the high castes place high value to the production of sons for continuation of the line, for descent, inheritance and ownership of property Therefore, among them, the reproductive mother is worshipped along with the worship of the pure virgin Thus, while purity, virginity and chastity are valued in conformity with caste mores, fertility and maternity are valued in conformity with joint family and lineage (Allen 1982 9)

According to Leela Dube 'a proper analysis of the ideology of the family and its concern with protection of female sexuality is not

possible without understanding its roots in Hindu traditional thought' (Dube 1997 5-6)

South Asia shows a special kind of male control over female sexuality, rooted in patrilineal ideology and in a consciousness of territoriality and group solidarity which may be called corporate control. The South Asian sense of rights over the sexuality and productive capacity of an in-marrying woman is closely tied to the sense of common agnatic blood, to patrilineal, patri-virilocal family solidarity (Dube 1997 52-53)

Further, the development of a social hierarchy based on notions of relative **purity** has had a doubly unfortunate effect on the lives of Hindu women. On the one hand, they are impure and a source of pollution because of menstruation and childbirth and are assigned lower social worth. On the other, they are venerated as pure beings and their condition reflects on the honour and status of their menfolk. According to Engels, the contradiction between pollution and power is vital to the understanding of the practice of female seclusion or *pardah* (1999 73). The view of the Hindu woman as the pure, who is in danger, and as the impure one, who is dangerous (Mukherjee 1978), led to loss of autonomy, male control and management of her sexuality. Central to this is the concern with **purity** which underlies the division and hierarchy of the caste system.

Thus, apart from religion and kinship organisation, the position of women and concern with purity related to the social status of men in the caste hierarchy. Dube argues that 'uncontrolled female sexuality is a danger to the purity of both the agnatic group and the caste group. The phenomenon of boundary maintenance characteristic of caste society places special responsibilities on women and, therefore, it is legitimate to place restrictions on their behaviour and movements' (1997 67).

According to Dumont (1972), the status differentiation in the caste system is explicitly based on an ideology of purity (Yalman 1963, Allen 1982). A concomitant of this concern leads to preoccupation with female chastity. This is so in India, where the purity of the caste and its menfolk is a direct function of the purity of its womenfolk primarily of their sisters and daughters, whom they give in marriage and secondarily, on the women they take as wives (Yalman 1963). This leads to social practices, such as seclusion, early marriage, denial of public spaces etc., to control female sexuality.

A related notion to the protection of sexuality is that of control. Control here refers to the authority and power to direct, command and restrain women and of being able to take unilateral decisions regarding their lives.

Ideology is used to exercise control over resources and women's actions, bodies and sexuality. The main mechanisms are the distribution of resources or entitlements such as education, food, property, organisation of space, work, and time, rules of avoidance and respect, socialisation patterns, and in general, the denial of choices and opportunities (Dube 1997: 8).

Pardah or seclusion and sex segregation are the most important social practices to **control** women which is linked to protection and management of female sexuality. While women in the North and Central India are generally secluded, they are segregated even in Southern India. While seclusion leads to clearly marked physical and social spaces for women and men, segregation can be equally constraining. For example, girls and women were not secluded in Southern India yet the *Agraharam* or the residential quarters of the Brahmins were so designed that women could move from one house to another through doors that directly led into houses on both sides. They hardly ever moved out. Also the concern with puberty and concomitant concern with purity and sexuality lead to segregation as is discussed later. As per the principle of protection, the responsibility for protecting an unmarried girl lies with her natal or patrilineal male kin, particularly fathers and brothers. It has two aspects, viz the honour of males vests in the purity of the females, i.e., the sisters and daughters. Even now brothers, fathers and kinsmen in India and in South Asia go to any limits, even to the extent of killing her, to prevent an unmarried sister or a daughter from 'sully'ing' the 'izzat' or honour of the family<sup>4</sup> and the kinship by entering into alliances outside the kin/caste group.

This concern with protection of female **purity** and the control and management of **female sexuality** has led to several customs and social practices such as child marriage, sati, prohibition of widow remarriage, limitation on physical movement through pardah, i.e., seclusion and segregation, etc.<sup>5</sup> For instance, puberty rites ensure that when a girl begins to menstruate, she is protected and child marriage ensures that her husband will harness her destructive capability into reproductive power.

Virginity at first marriage is crucial to the honour of the family in Hinduism. The concern to preserve it for the husband has given rise to social practices such as child marriage (in large parts of India), pre-pubertal marriage (as in Nepal), pre-pubertal marriage with delayed consummation (as in Rajasthan), the celebration of puberty rites, spatial confinement of girls around puberty. This responsibility for protection gives men the right to control all aspects of women's behaviour.

Again, it may also be underscored that *pardah* varies not only by religion but also by region,<sup>6</sup> caste and class and, now, by education and working status. Yet again, *pardah* has an attendant code of behaviour and demeanour which affects women's daily lives. Vreede-de-Steurs (1968) refers to strict, partial, intermittent and absent *pardah* (1968) as well as to the *pardah* of the eyes while Bennett mentions the idiom of *pardah* in Nepal (1983: 7).

In a society which places premium on virginity, *pardah* alongwith early marriage is a useful device and puts women under the control of men of the family. Thus, Dube argues, that '*pardah* in South Asia has drawn its legitimacy both from the kinship organisation and from religion' (Dube 1997: 64). Dube identifies two aspects of *pardah* viz. control of female sexuality and avoidance based on respect. The former results in protecting women from potentially threatening outsiders (male) and the latter reinforces rules of respectful behaviour (even among women) within the joint family and kingroup (Vatuk 1982: 62). But both make women dependent on men and both constrain choices.

*pardah* did not only mean secluding women behind veils or walls, but entailed an all-encompassing ideology and code of conduct based on female modesty which determined women's lives wherever they went. Accordingly women's political experience and participation - even if we can establish its significance - needs to be deconstructed and contextualized. (Engels 1992: 2)

Thus, so far it has been argued that Hindu women, their social status, the evaluation of their worth and the stereotypes have an underlying ideology even though at the empirical level there are variations by caste, class, region, religion, etc. Further, that this ideology and the related role expectations and valuations are embedded in the caste system as well as in kinship and family organisation. Central concerns here are purity of the female for boundary maintenance of the agnatic group, the class and the caste.

and the protection, control and management of female sexuality. These have also affected the distribution of familial resources and the capabilities of girls to access them. These concerns are transformed into appropriate socialisation and behaviour patterns, which, as demonstrated later, impinge directly on the schooling of girls.

There is a general agreement that women did not have access to education for most periods of India's history. Examples of exceptional women scholars in the Vedic era do not detract from the fact that during the colonial period, little is known about the girl students, if any, in them, even though one reads about one school in every village.<sup>7</sup>

### **The Context**

While at the ideological level it is possible to talk of Hindu tradition, as it affects women, the empirical reality is far more complex and women are affected by culture cutting across religion.<sup>8</sup> Culture derives from religion but also goes beyond religion as it is more rooted in the material and is therefore affected by the local and the folk traditions.

Culture, as used here, is not a static concept but has a dynamic and flexible frame. According to Giroux, 'culture is not seen as monolithic or unchanging, but as a site of multiple and heterogeneous borders where different histories, languages, experiences and voices intermingle amidst diverse relations of power and privilege' (1992: 205). Here, culture and religion are not being accepted by me as given but 'culture is taken up as a basis for challenging those institutional and ideological boundaries that have historically marked their own relation of power behind complex forms of distinction and privilege. It raises questions about the margins and the centre, especially around the categories of race, class and gender' (Giroux 1992: 202). Thus, religion and culture are contested terrains and yet they intersect.

This paper is based on the premise that decisions regarding access to education are taken within and by the family and are governed by familial considerations of gender roles and the need for formal education. In the process, it seeks to uncover the dialectic between tradition and modernity (Chanana 1992). Moreover, how do considerations of propriety, protection and control of female sexuality, the feminine domain and social roles affect women's participation in education, its perceived benefits, the motivations for sending daughters to schools, and the type and amount of education received by women? (Chanana 1998). This is done using a historical

perspective starting with the colonial period which witnessed the introduction of formal education for girls. This period was marked by several impulses for change viz , reformist, revivalist, nationalist, etc all of which had two common planks – women's education and change in their social status

The paper also provides an understanding of the nature and functioning of familial socialisation<sup>9</sup> as the process of gender construction and its impact on the education of the girl child. It also seeks to provide insights into how the two processes, namely, socialisation and formal schooling or education, interact and react with each other. Both are processes of social control and train the individual to conform to the expectations of the social group. The basic premise is that the family is the site of primary socialisation while schools, which are the sites of secondary socialisation, only reproduce primary socialisation. The second premise is that practices, norms, values and religious ideologies<sup>10</sup> provide the underpinnings for the socialisation process which in turn influence the notions of what a girl should be and what functions formal schooling should perform for her. Protection of female sexuality and her purity are central to the socialisation of the female child. Thus, socialisation practices and their different significance for boys and girls are crucial to expose the constraints imposed on girls' and women's education.

### **The Colonial Context: Why Educate the Women?**

Even though the social position and education of women had attracted the attention of social reformers (Chanana 1994) earlier, the debate over the question acquired a particular intensity around the end of the 19th century. The spate of books and tracts reflecting on the status of Indian women and the need for educating them offer conclusive evidence of this (Basu 1976). Education of women had definitely come to be a public issue by the early 1920s, opposition to it notwithstanding. Such a debate had become possible because the 1920s were a period of immense social and political awakening in India followed by intense social reformist efforts. Thus, the issue of women's status, along the focus of social reform, was also reflected in a series of legal enactments relating to or affecting women. The slogan of Indian leaders and social reformers by this time had become 'educating a girl means educating a family' overcoming the earlier belief 'that a girl who could read or write would never find a husband or would soon become a widow' (Borthwick 1984 61, Engels 1999 60). The desirability of educating women to harness their potential as mothers and wives and also give direction to their

dangerous sexuality as input into familial sphere was a prime consideration. Thus, the twin images of women as dangerous temptresses because of their sexuality and as goddesses because of their spirituality continued to underlie the concerns of the social reform movements. Some scholars contend that they were characterised by ambivalence and that Indian women became a contested site in the colonial period (Chatterjee 2000).

Various push factors were working in favour of sending girls and women to schools and colleges in late 19th and early 20th centuries. The question arises: Why was education considered desirable or necessary for them? What brought about change in the attitudes of parents?

Mahatma Gandhi, along with several other reformers, was instrumental in breaking the age-old barriers of *pardah* and bringing women out of their homes and into the streets (Basu 1976). However, he tried to channel their traditional qualities of forbearance and self-sacrifice into the non-violence movement (Chanana 1993). According to Engels, even Hindu revivalism gradually turned femininity from a passive object of adoration to a powerful agent for political mobilisation. Yet the social reformers such as the Brahmos 'who had internalised new social norms under the British rule and for whom women's emancipation became a matter of self interest' viewed women's education as being different from that of men (1999: 59). So far as the nationalists were concerned, 'women were prepared for household work, and through cultural and national orientation, for their role as guardians of Bengali culture and tradition' (Engels 1999: 166).

The scene was similar in Punjab too. In a study of three generations of Punjabi Hindu women in New Delhi undertaken by the author, the older women who were born in the early 20th century in West Punjab were not only literate but knew more than one language. Although writing skills were not widespread, most could read Punjabi written in the *Gurmukhi*<sup>11</sup> script and Hindi. A few knew English and Urdu as well. *Gurmukhi* helped women<sup>12</sup> to read the *Guru Granth Sahib*, the holy book of the Sikhs. Since Punjabi was spoken at home, reading the *Granth Sahib* provided cultural continuity in terms of language and content. The division into the public and private domain and the learning of languages by men and women seemed to be correlated. For instance, since reading of scriptures was in the female domain, women learnt Punjabi. Urdu, on the other hand, was the official language under the Mughal administration and was replaced by English under the colonial rule. These two clearly belonged to the public domain and were mastered



by men. Hindi was introduced under the impact of reform movement. Yet it was not the official language but was imparted in the newly set up schools. Therefore, it belonged to the public domain and men learnt it more often than women. Later, it also entered the private domain through its association with the reform movement whose major aim was female education. Thus, the primacy of the private sphere determined which language skills were acquired by women (Chanana 1998: 164-165).

In spite of differing motivations of the missionaries<sup>13</sup>, social reformers, Indians of various hues and colours and the government to promote the education of women, their interests in furthering the cause of women seemed to converge. The objectives of women's education were generally formulated within the context of their traditional family roles. It was assumed that the family was and is the basic unit of social organisation in India, and since women as mothers and as wives are integral to the stability of the family, reforming the position of women was crucial to reforming society (Mazumdar 1976: 66, Forbes 1998: 162-63). Moreover, women as keepers of the domestic realm and as the primary agents of the socialisation of children were essential to the success of sons and husbands.

Concern for daughters' sexuality and virginity made the parents reluctant to send them to school or send them unescorted. Therefore, several arrangements emerged in response to this need, e.g., self-learning at home with examinations conducted at home or at school, school teachers went to the homes of students to teach and to give examinations, going to school in covered palanquins or horse-drawn carriages (tongas), or escorted by domestic maids etc. These arrangements are known as the *zenana*<sup>14</sup> system of schooling and were widespread in regions of female seclusion (Chanana 1998: 165).

Again, the preference of educated men for educated women as brides reinforced ideas of women's education and motivated parents to send their daughters to school. Whatever the motivation, most parents were keen to have an education for girls that would embellish their 'feminine' qualities.

To quote Srinivas, 'the pressure to get women educated is part of the process of securing good husbands for them' (1978: 24). Thus, a girl had to receive 'sufficient' education according to the educational standards set by the males of her endogamous group, and the gap between an educated husband and an uneducated wife had to be bridged (Mazumdar 1976: 49). However, there was another significant reason for giving girls some education. Urban-based educated men had come to prefer the company of courtesans to

uneducated wives, and by providing high-caste Hindu widows with an education, it was hoped they would not become courtesans and also if Hindu girls were educated and 'cultured' they would be able to control their husbands who would not seek the company of courtesans

Meanwhile, the emergence of a class of women, who were aware that organised action was necessary to ameliorate their lot, was an additional factor in helping to focus on the current position of women and the need for educating them (Forbes 1998 162). As more and more women received formal education, they became conscious of their problems and social status and sought amelioration of their situation. Women's associations and organisations also joined in promoting female education without departing from the professed aim of reinforcing patrifocal ideology.

Thus, all the justifications for promoting formal schooling among girls are derived from their social and feminine role as good daughters, wives and mothers.

### **Institutional Context: Coeducation**

As mentioned earlier, in Hinduism, pre-pubertal girls are considered intrinsically pure and are worshipped as goddesses in parts of India and Nepal. The onset of puberty in India is marked by special rituals and confinement of the girls. In order to preserve her purity, she has to be kept confined within physical space generally and from attending school or going out. The main concern at this time is to control sexuality in the direction of motherhood. There is thus a rush to marry girls before or soon after they reach puberty. The onset of puberty, coupled with the practice of female seclusion and sex segregation, limits the girls in terms of time and space. *Pardah* implies strict sex segregation and results in the reluctance of parents to send their daughters to school. Thus, if the schools were mixed or had male teachers, parents were unwilling to expose their daughters to male company and influence, even within the educational institutions. These concerns had a direct impact on acceptance or non-acceptance of coeducational schools.

A central issue in the educational debates was the limited response of parents to coeducation and whether or not to open separate schools for girls and at what levels. Acceptability of coeducation for girls varied by province or region. For instance, separate schools for girls were found in the initial stages in the Bengal Presidency. On the other hand, Madras and Bombay Presidencies where women were not secluded the girls either

attended boys' schools, or did not go to school until much later, as in Punjab, Bihar and North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). In fact, in the early 20th century, more girls at the primary level were studying in boys' institutions than in the 1930s. For instance, in 1902 as many as 44.7 percent of the girls under instruction were attending boys' institutions, but this percentage dropped<sup>15</sup> to 38.5 percent in 1927 (Government of India PEI 1927-32 171).

The relationship between social practice and women's education is not, however, a simple one. The social inhibitions against coeducation gave a fillip to private enterprise in girls' education and provided the impetus for expansion. Leading political and social leaders and proponents of women's education supported *zenana* education which assured parents to send their daughters to school. This was an indicator of change in attitudes.

That orthodoxy and female learning were no longer contradictory, as had been the case only half a century ago, was a measure of the ideological shift orthodox Bengali Hindu society had undergone. *Purdah* girls arrived at school in closed carriages and horse-drawn buses, which were provided by the *pathshala*<sup>16</sup> to be instructed about 'the strict observance of Shastric injunctions in matters of domestic life and about *pativrata dharma*, devotion to their future husbands. The novelty was the cultural similarity between school and home education (Engels 1999 167).

It is difficult to decide, however, whether some leaders - Hindu as well as Muslim,<sup>17</sup> men and women - reinforced *pardah* by setting up *zenana* schools for reasons of strategy or because they were convinced that these traditional social practices should continue (Minault 1982 92, Chanana 1994 48). Or it was a strategy adopted to assure parents that established social values, norms and practices would be reinforced within the new institutions and their daughters were 'safe'.

It may be noted that women were and are not secluded in all parts of India. The Indian sub-continent is marked by a variety of social practices rooted in regional cultures. For example, while women are secluded in the north, northwest, central and parts of eastern India, they were not affected by this practice in southern and western India. However, sex segregation and female seclusion, though different, share certain similarities, e.g., separation of physical and social spaces is a characteristic of both. Also the concern with the protection of female sexuality and the purity of the agnatic group

heighten the constraints on women in segregated societies even if they are secluded. For instance, during 1927-32 Madras Presidency, where female seclusion was not in practice, had the highest percentage of girls under instruction as well as a much higher percentage of girls attending boys' school than in the other provinces, such as Punjab and NWFP where female seclusion was in practice. However, even in Madras Presidency they were withdrawn from boys' schools in large numbers after V standard, i.e., at the 11 plus age when they reached puberty (Chanana 1994). In Punjab, the government had to set up separate schools for girls and employ only women teachers.

In 1932, more than half the girls' primary schools in British India were in Bengal where female seclusion was practised. Thus, the relatively low percentage of girls in coeducational schools in Bengal, for example, reflects the large number of girls' schools in that province due to the practice of *pardah*. Thus, sex segregation and female seclusion combined with the relative stress on female sexuality impact on access to female schooling.

Linked to this issue, however, was the availability of women teachers. In the *pardah* dominated areas, the presence of male teachers in girls' schools was not socially desirable. That is why Bihar and Punjab started late and made a slow beginning. Missionaries and social reformers, therefore, concentrated their efforts on establishing separate schools and training schools for girls, whereas the kinds of schools set up by the government were governed more by financial than social considerations. Separate schools for girls with women teachers involved an overall higher cost which, coupled with the initial reluctance of parents, resulted in fewer schools for girls and fewer girls availing of the educational facilities.

### **Education as Content: Curriculum and its 'Relevance'**

While emphasising the need for educating girls and women curricular content became a key issue in women's education among all the actors in the field and continues to be so even now, although in a modified form. The main argument was that there should be a special curriculum designed to meet the needs of girls. By 1882, considerable public opinion had built up in favour of a differentiated curriculum for girls keeping the 'nature of women' and their social roles in view. The Education Commission of 1882 supported this view, while advising a cautious approach to its implementation.

As reform movements gained momentum, most proponents of women's education, despite varied motivations, seemed to believe in education for enlightened motherhood and took a narrow, domestic perspective of the social roles of women. The question in favour of what to teach seemed to have been settled. What could not be decided easily was when and at what age to introduce feminine subjects.

Social reformers, Hindu as well as Muslim, propagated this view. Thus, girls' schools run by Hindu voluntary organisations, such as the Seva Sadan at Pune, taught music, home science, first-aid, nursing, midwifery, along with languages for girls. Those run by Muslims included the Quran as an essential component of the curriculum.

Kumar has something similar to say about a girls' school, Arya Mahila School, which was established in Benaras, U P in 1933 as a primary school and recognised as a high school in 1939. This school was set up by a revivalist reform organisation, Arya Samaj, which played a leading role in opening schools for girls in northern India. According to Kumar,

Arya Mahila's is the clearest case of a grand philosophy that falters for reasons of a familiar contradiction: the logistic problem of following a modern government syllabus and simultaneously breeding a new generation of Aryan mothers. The much trumpeted Hindu culture to be transmitted by her school restricted itself, and that with mixed success, to art, music, dance and recitation, all described as 'optional subjects' (Kumar 2000: 170).

While a gender-differentiated curriculum at the primary level was not considered necessary, its need was seen to be greatest at the secondary level where schooling was viewed as most socially problematic for girls who had reached puberty. In addition, a differentiated curriculum for boys and girls was justified on the assumption that girls were not going to take up jobs after completion of their education but would be getting married (Chanana 1988). Therefore, the curriculum should be made relevant by teaching subjects suited to perform their social roles more efficiently. An education that failed to do so would be wastage. A further justification was provided in terms of the 'nature of women', i.e., although the moral, emotional and intellectual makeup of women and men was similar, women were psychologically and physically

distinct from men hence the need for a separate curriculum to enhance these differences (Karlekar 1993)

Thus, debates on curricular change, although extensive, reveal the same, consistent theme, even from enlightened leaders – education for socialisation and reinforcing patriarchal ideology

### **Contemporary Context: Familial Socialisation and Formal Education as Process**

How soon does the process of gender construction begin? Answers to this question will, no doubt, vary from society to society and also within a society. Yet, at the risk of generalisation it can be stated that the construction of feminine identity begins very early on in all societies. In some cases even before birth or at birth – which is evident from the following quotes about Hindu daughters in different parts of India

‘It is a girl’, sighed Lakshmi’s husband Gangaram. Gangaram was right, had it been a boy, Sarju would have come out in the rain and thunder shouting, in her shrill voice, ‘It is a boy, it is a boy, give me money’ (Mehta 1977)

‘Four daughters! Each one will take ten thousand rupees and walk out of the house. Bringing up a daughter is like pouring water in sand’ (Dube 1987 167)

‘Bringing up daughters is like watering plants in the neighbour’s house’ (Dube 1987 167)

According to Dube, girls begin to understand the special value accorded to brothers when they hear comments like, ‘Oh, what a sweet child! How wonderful if she had been a boy’ (1987 167). Bennett in her study of Nepali Hindu women also mentions that all her women respondents were aware of the superior position accorded to boys in their families. Some recalled that milk and curd were given only to the boys and that boys did less work. All the older women reported that only boys had been allowed to go to school when they were young (Bennett 1983 166)

Thus, there are values, norms, social practices, customs and rituals that need to be understood in order to see the connection between gender socialisation and formal process of education at school. However, we shall briefly mention some of those which affect a girl’s schooling. A point that may be mentioned here is that the process of socialisation varies by age and status as well as in accordance with a girl’s relationship to sex and reproduction, e.g., small girls are given some freedom and may be sent to primary schools (even the coeducational ones) but the nearer they are to

puberty, the more the restrictions imposed on them, a point substantiated earlier in the context of coeducation. Therefore, why girls drop out at 11 plus and 14 plus may be understood in this context.

The notions of adjustment, tolerance and sacrifice are embedded in cultural ideology and therefore restraint, obedience and sacrifice are important elements in a girl's training. The crucial point in a girl's training is that she is a target of control and adjustment for the family. Toward this end, gender-typing of tasks, behaviour, dress, food,<sup>18</sup> toys, game, space and time utilisation begins early. Moreover, there is a hierarchy of tasks wherein domestic chores occupy the lowest place. The hierarchy of male and female tasks within the domestic realm correspond with those associated with the pure/high castes and polluting/low castes. For instance, women perform the polluting/inferior tasks associated with the caste system and this sexual division of labour reaffirms their low valuation due to the impurity inherent in them during menstruation and childbirth. Thus, daughters and women, may or must sweep floors and wash clothes and dishes, but sons and men must not. Sisters and mothers cook and serve food to brothers, fathers and husbands.<sup>19</sup> Thus, from infancy girls are socialised to help, to be submissive and to learn the centrality of their domestic realm.<sup>20</sup>

What are the other implications of this for girls as students? Since girls are expected to be obedient at home, they find it easier to obey and to conform at school. Again, boys are found to be better at motor and spatial skills as also verbal facility, which explains their ability to compete in debates, etc. While girls, socialised to be docile, are discouraged from talking all the time<sup>21</sup> and are therefore better at written ability and do well in written examinations. Even now when most girls come home from school, they are expected to help their mothers in household tasks after completing their homework. Boys can finish their homework and go out to play. In fact, in these homes, if sons stay at home they will be asked – are you girls? In addition, the aspirations of young girls are unrelated to their actual intellectual and cognitive abilities.<sup>22</sup> Although they perform better at schools, by the time the girls reach the end of middle school or secondary school, their educational and occupational aspirations differ markedly from that of the boys. Again, when they join college, they take up gender-specific courses even though they are performing better than boys in school finishing examinations.

Since marriage is not just an individual act but a social institution such considerations as a girl's purity and virginity are crucial. Dowry is an added factor. Parents who have to invest in dowry are

reluctant to invest in their daughters' education because they cannot afford to spend on both. *Kanyadaan* in Hinduism is the central ritual in wedding ceremonies. Literally it means 'the gift of a virgin'. Its ideological underpinnings are not clear to most of us. The concern with the purity-virginity of the bride, its effect on her as a person and its implications later on, are overlooked. Even now educated parents 'gift' their educated daughter to the educated groom and his educated parents with a lot of pomp and show.

### **Schools as Context**

If this is the training at home, how does schooling mediate in this process? There is sufficient evidence to show that schools discriminate in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. For instance, sons are sent to expensive private schools while their sisters go to cheaper schools. Again, sports activities are used to reinforce this divide because girls are not encouraged to play football or cricket and are expected to play with the swing, hopscotch etc. Even in music, girls may be offered vocal or instrumental music while boys have to take up drums. This is done subtly by saying to a boy, 'sufficient number of students have already given the option, you are late'.<sup>23</sup>

Again, the voluntarily limited choices of subjects and disciplines of girls are reinforced in most schools through informal and formal counselling and through the hidden curriculum. In addition, principals of girls' schools do not even offer science subjects at the plus two or higher secondary stage. Science is not only perceived as masculine but also involves longer hours of work in the laboratories, study and reading. A common perception is that this will affect the eyesight – a handicap in the marriage market. Parents also discourage daughters from taking up science because who will escort them while returning home late in the afternoon or the evening.<sup>24</sup> This way the convergence of gender based divisions of roles, subjects and extra-curricular activities, at home and at school, reinforces the belief that this division is natural, and hence must be maintained.

More recently, women are becoming 'visible' in pure science subjects in colleges and universities. For instance, their proportion has increased from 7.1 percent in 1951 to 34.17 percent in 1996-97 in comparison to men whose enrolment has shown a decline from 92.9 percent in 1951 to 66.7 percent in 1993-94. In other words, in comparison to one woman student to 13 men students in 1950-51, the ratio is 1 woman to 2 men in the sciences in 1993-94. Is this a sign of women's preference for science? Are they pushing men out and getting into highly prestigious disciplines leading to elite



occupations? This recent trend of 'feminisation of pure sciences' has to be seen in the context of globalisation and market forces unleashed since the 1990s. These forces have reduced the importance of pure sciences for jobs while media, information technology, management, etc. have emerged as the most sought after jobs. Therefore, young men are moving out of science and into the so-called professional disciplines leaving pure sciences to women. One can hear Indian scientists lamenting the lack of students for doctoral and post-doctoral work. Therefore, pure sciences are no longer so prestigious and in demand and, therefore, women are finding space in them. As mentioned earlier, it may be noted that they achieve high grades in most school board examinations. Yet, they are finding larger space in science after it has been devalued. This trend is similar to feminisation of occupations. Given the hierarchy of disciplines and specialisations, the next question in the context of pure sciences will be which science disciplines and specialisations are they entering and how long do they survive? What are the chances of completing doctorate, post-doctoral research and getting jobs?

The enlargement of disciplinary choices in the 90s has also affected the young women from the urban middle and upper strata of professional and salaried class in the metropolises. The two most sought after professional courses by women are the computer and management oriented courses. In the absence of any statistics and macro level qualitative studies, the example of management studies is being given to illustrate the point that even these emerging disciplines are perceived to function within the tradition-modernity dialectic. I would like to give the example of a college for women in Chennai. This is a self-financing college affiliated to Madras University. Here every student has to pay a substantial tuition fee in comparison to the fully aided colleges which charge such low fee that it amounts to tuition free education. Therefore, there are about 250-300 students at one point of time who are enrolled in management courses. Informal discussions at the college revealed that only about 30 percent students have career goals. Others join only to get a degree and now a 'management' degree enhances the marital value of a young woman. This is substantiated by the fact that the wedding invitation cards mention the qualifications of the bride if she has a professional, e.g., engineering or management degree, along with those of the groom (Chanana 2000 1019).

When women enter colleges and universities, that is the time for their marriage too. While it is being increasingly postponed in urban areas for under-graduation, master's degree becomes problematic because by then they are above 21 years of age. Science requires

several years of laboratory work, much more than general education and parents have to choose between education and marriage. While women in all post graduation disciplines are affected, those in the sciences are in a real bind. These are hard decisions especially when marriages are arranged and proposals for marital alliances come at a certain age for a few years. Thus, what is being argued here is that women are pushed into and pulled out of science not on academic considerations or job potential but on the basis of their feminine identity and role.

Tradition and modernity have a dialectical relationship instead of being polar opposites. Medical education is an interesting location to observe the pull of the 'traditional' role and the push of the 'modern' parents' and daughters' expectations. As mentioned earlier, medical education could never be labelled as a masculine discipline in South Asia as it was in the west.<sup>25</sup> Here, female seclusion entailed that women patients' bodies may not be exposed to male (doctor's) gaze. Therefore, the imperatives of tradition opened the doors of a 'modern' profession for Indian and South Asian women, on the one hand. On the other, it also impinged in limiting their entry into it. For example, even now a large number of women doctors remain voluntarily unemployed and do not utilise their skills because of overriding familial perceptions. Again, even now considerations of 'hard work', i.e., long hours of study and several years of education required to become a medical doctor prevail in the choices made by parents. For instance, this year two of my acquaintances' daughters completed 10th class.<sup>26</sup> Both the girls wanted to become doctors and opt for biology. The parents of one of them prevailed on her not to do so because it takes too many years of study and will affect their eyesight and impair her health. This is not an exception or an aberration. Weak eyesight means that girls will have to wear spectacles (contact lenses notwithstanding) sooner or later.<sup>27</sup> Thus, young girl students are denied not only their subject choices but eventual career choices because of the fear of their adverse impact on female health and female beauty which are imperative for marital prospects. Thus, it is the future uses of the female body that determine subject choices, not the present intellectual capabilities or the aspirations of young women.

This assumes special significance for girls, since in their case the social and educational functions are seen as one, whereas in the case of boys these functions are separated. Schooling is expected to perform a function for boys which is quite apart from their social role while it is expected to reinforce the social role of girls which is seen as that of a housewife and a mother (Ahmad 1985). Did or could

education ever be an equaliser in a situation where the socialisation process intervenes in such a manner?

### **Concluding Observations**

Educational policies and programmes are rooted in social values and premises. Even when they are made gender inclusive, they are constantly subverted by the gendered visions of parents, teachers and administrators who are the custodians of formal education. Thus, the process of subversion continues unhindered.<sup>28</sup>

This subversion may be conscious and explicit or indirect and implicit but it is fine tuned to familial expectations and socialisation. It is possible to move along with every stage of the life cycle of a girl through school and college to highlight the concerns around female sexuality and body that colour and determine the options available to her and the options she makes. Thus, schooling of girls is essentially embedded in the societal context even though it provides an expanded space for growth to women. It ensures that women remain passive actors in the process of schooling, do not question the patrifocal ideology and do not transgress the social boundaries and work within the accepted system of values. In fact, schools and schooling become active instruments of cultural reproduction and social control without seeking to alter the informal and the formal processes of socialisation.

The educational discourse emerging from the development and modernisation paradigm imbues education with the powers of engineering societal change at the collective level. Within this paradigm, the individual who experiences mobility and attitudinal change through education is the kingpin who assumes the role of the change agent. This model assumes a positive relationship between formal education, occupational mobility and change. Formal education bestows necessary skills for the market and also the 'modern' attitudes suited for a changing society and school is the site of transformation of individuals. But this is not expected from women's education. They are denied agency because the goals of familial socialisation and schooling as processes have to converge. Denial of women's agency in the educational context revolving around female education is closely intermeshed with the concerns of the family, the agnatic group, the caste (and even the village) in protecting and controlling female sexuality.

### Notes

- 1 This paper was presented at the 5th Women and Religion Symposium held at Siem Reap, Cambodia, from 16-23 January, 2000, under the auspices of Heinrich Ball Foundation, South Asia Office, Lahore. I am grateful to the Heinrich Ball Foundation, South Asia Office, for permission to publish this paper in the *Sociological Bulletin*.
- 2 According to Mukhopadhyay and Seymour 'patrifocal family structure and ideology' refers to 'a set of predominant kinship and family structures and beliefs that give precedence to men over women – sons over daughters, fathers over mothers, husbands over wives, and so on. These male-oriented structures and beliefs, we suggest, constitute a socio-cultural complex that profoundly affects women's lives and hence their access to education and educational achievement' (1994: 3).
- 3 Given the dearth of writings on the social history of women as depicted in the Hindu texts, it is difficult to undertake a comprehensive analysis. However, recently, interest in interpreting original texts which reflect on women's condition has resulted in some publications (see Roy 1999, Bose 2000).
- 4 In Pakistan, this phenomenon is known as 'honour' killings of women and has assumed serious proportions.
- 5 Some scholars are of the opinion these practices did not exist in the early Vedic period and evolved much later in Hindu civilisation (Altekar 1978).
- 6 *Pardah*, the symbolic shelter, as Papanek calls it (1982) and as practised in South Asia is contrasted by Dube with the South-East Asian Muslims with their bilateral and matrilineal systems of kinship and lesser controls over women. According to Papanek (1982) and Dube (1997), the ideology underpinning *pardah* among Hindus and Muslims in India is different and the mechanisms and social practices also vary. Yet the net result is the similarity of outcome for women viz., seclusion and limitation of physical and social space, restrictions of choices, resources and opportunities in the world of education and work and inheritance rights.
- 7 There is evidence (Minault 1982, Chanana 1997) to show that Muslim girls were going to Koran schools to learn to recite the Quran. The fact that they went to a public space from secluded private space has not been explored.
- 8 Scholars (Papanek 1982, Dube 1997) working in the area of gender and kinship or on the impact of *pardah* on female schooling have referred to the similarities shared by girls and women in India and in South Asia irrespective of the religion they belong to. This will be illustrated by what I have to say about girls' schooling in the Indian context. In fact, the concern with female purity and sexuality or the family's honour would have a familiar ring for those looking at Islam and women, especially in India and South Asia.

- 9 Although socialisation takes place in different contexts and sites, in this paper it refers specifically to the socialisation within the family. Here it is also referred to as informal socialisation which too can take place in varied contexts. Formal socialisation and schooling denote formal education in the schools.
- 10 Religion is referred to here in the context of 'religiosity, folk religion or popular religion which have been used to excuse the prejudicial treatment of women, to degrade them, and to restrict them to endless child bearing and drudgery. Therefore, in a development context, we must distinguish a religion's rituals, customs, and institutions from its inner truth and most fundamental philosophy (Carol 1983: 2).
- 11 Gurumukhi is the script in which Punjabi language is written.
- 12 The separation of Hinduism, at the level of ideology and practice, seems to be a later phenomenon. It is interesting that in most villages, Gurudwaras and temples were in the same room or the building.
- 13 For example, the extant literature (for references see Chanana 1994) suggests that one of the objectives of social reformers and thinkers in the pre-Independence period was to meet the challenge posed by Christian missionaries who were proselytising while imparting education. There were divergent views among the Christian missionaries too.
- 14 The literal meaning of *zenana* is – of the women or pertaining to women. It refers to women's quarters in the house. Schooling provisions suited to secluding girls came to be referred to as *zenana*.
- 15 The main reason for this decrease in enrolment in coeducational schools was the establishment of separate schools for girls by social reformers and the private initiative.
- 16 It refers to Mahakali Pathshala opened in 1893 by a female ascetic, Mataji Maharani Tapaswini, to provide formal traditional education to girls (Engels 1999: 167).
- 17 For details of similar *zenana* arrangements for girls' schooling and for similarities and differences between Hindu and Muslim social reform movements, see Minault (1998).
- 18 My childhood schoolmates told me that they were not given meat at home after they reached puberty. This practice seems to continue. The reasons were two. First, the daughter may be married into a vegetarian family and therefore be used to it in anticipation. Second related to her becoming 'too healthy' or too big (tall), i.e., the concern around her body.
- 19 However, when these domestic skills are linked to the market they become male skills, e.g., tailors, cooks/chefs.
- 20 'As in other societies, it is at this advanced stage of early childhood that the cultural expectations of boys and girls begin to diverge radically. Late childhood also marks the beginning of an Indian girl's deliberate training in how to be a good woman, and hence the conscious inculcation of culturally designated feminine roles. She learns that the "virtues" of womanhood which will take her through life

- are submission and docility as well as skill and grace in various household tasks' (Kakar 1979 37)
- 21 Mehta's heroine in the novel, *Inside the Haveli*, was brought up in cosmopolitan Bombay. She was being married into a Hindu feudal family in Rajasthan, where strict *pardah* was observed. Therefore, the mother tells her daughter before marriage, 'Keep your head covered, never argue with your elders. Don't talk too much' (1977 14)
  - 22 This is evident when the results of school finishing or Board examinations are announced. Year after year, the performance or success rate of girls has been better than that of boys.
  - 23 These experiences were related to me by my niece 20 years ago and subsequently I hear them being repeated by successive generations of boys and girls.
  - 24 In order to overcome this bias, science was made compulsory for all students upto 10th class. This had a very positive impact because it provided girls with access to science at least upto 10th class. Now the National Council for Educational Research and Training, the apex institutions for overseeing all aspects of school education, has proposed that this compulsion clause may be removed. It will have a very retrogressive impact on girls and will nullify the positive effect of training successive generations of girls in science during the last decade and a half.
  - 25 For instance, the proportion of women's enrolment in 'medicine' faculty has been substantial. It was 16.7 percent in 1950-51 and stands at 34.56 percent in 1993-94.
  - 26 After the tenth class students have to choose between science and non-science subjects and within science between medical and non-medical science in senior secondary or XI class.
  - 27 This refrain has been heard again and again for the last two decades – the time since I became conscious of the gender bias in parents' choices.
  - 28 For instance, when the feminists raised the issue of 'home science' being labelled as a feminine discipline, they were arguing for a broader framework and for making it gender neutral. But several elite private coeducational schools in Delhi discontinued this subject thereby closing the option of a career (as home science school teachers) to women. Perhaps, considerations of cost went into this myopic decision because home science entails setting up laboratories. It also meant saving on teacher salary.

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# **Industrialisation and Sex Segregation in the Labour Market: A Cross-National Study**

*Bali Ram*

Industrialisation and modernisation have often been equated with increasing sex equality. This hypothesis draws heavily on the evolutionary ideas of some 19th century social philosophers – Spencer, in particular – and neo-evolutionists, according to which all societies would pass through a series of ordered and immutable stages that roughly approximate Western industrial revolution, and eventually they would come to resemble contemporary industrial societies. Guided by this Western development model, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the World Bank, multi-nationals, and numerous donor agencies to import and induce industrialisation and modernisation in order to improve the socio-economic status of women in developing countries.

However, since the publication of Ester Boserup's (1970) *Woman's Role in Economic Development*, and the inauguration of the United Nations Decade for Women in 1975, a considerable body of literature has focussed on the negative consequences of industrialisation (i.e., introduction of new technology), economic modernisation and commercialisation on the social and economic status of women in many developing countries. A critical examination of empirical evidence amassed throughout the UN Decade for Women, led DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) researchers, activists and policy makers to conclude that the socio-economic status of the great majority of Third World women has worsened considerably throughout the decade. With a few exceptions, 'women's relative access to economic resources, income and employment has worsened, their burdens of work have increased, and their relative and even absolute health, nutritional, and educational status has declined' (Sen and Grown 1987: 16). Likewise, the Report of a Commonwealth Expert Group on Women and Structural Adjustment concluded:

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The economic crisis of the 1980s, and the types of stabilisation and adjustment measures taken in response to it, have halted and even reversed the progress in health, nutrition, education and incomes which women had enjoyed in developing countries during the previous three decades. In the 1980s, despite greater national and international commitment toward gender issues, most women have suffered disproportionately during the widespread economic and social disruption that has occurred in much of the developing world. (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989 3)

This paper suggests that these two models are not mutually exclusive, as their proponents generally argue. Conclusions concerning the detrimental effects of industrialisation on the status of women are usually based on the experiences of developing countries, which are at the intermediate stages of the process of industrialisation. It is possible--indeed, likely--that sex inequality in these countries will start declining after reaching a threshold. Using the cross-section of time series data for 80 countries of various levels of socio-economic development, this paper presents evidence to a curvilinear hypothesis according to which sex segregation in the labour market is lower at both ends of the industrialisation continuum, but is at its highest level during the intermediate stage. However, the growth in women's participation in service industries and overall economic inequality through which industrialisation operates, are more powerful predictors of sex segregation.

### **Theoretical Considerations and Related Research**

Although evolutionary theories, particularly the concepts of Spencerian unilinearity and irreversibility, have been challenged by numerous researches, there has been a recent resurgence of evolutionism in the social sciences. There are at least two hypotheses which social scientists of this persuasion still find highly useful in understanding social phenomena. First, industrialisation -- technological innovations in particular -- is a prime force behind numerous social changes, especially those related to the family. As Goode (1963: 373) observed -- though careful in not predicting equality from the degree of industrialisation alone, through his empirical analysis of various developing and developed societies ranging from nomadic tribes to highly industrialised

countries, 'we do not believe that any family system now in operation, or likely to emerge in the next generation, will grant full equality to women, although throughout the world the general position of women will improve greatly'

Second, industrialisation increases specialisation and differentiation which, in turn, increases productivity. Societies with less differentiation among social units are less productive and poorer, whereas societies with greater differentiation are more productive and affluent. In any given society, with the rise in the levels of their industrialisation, all groups--both males and females--perform greater specialised roles and become almost equally productive which, in turn, results in greater sex equality (Huber and Spitze 1983 21-51, Elliot 1977 3). Also, substantial occupational growth which accompanies industrialisation and economic development can markedly reduce segregation by creating a shortage of qualified male workers and thereby enhancing women's access to prestigious occupations and economic resources (Reskin 1993). Several cross-national studies have found evidence supporting the hypothesis that gender inequality is likely to decline with industrialisation and economic growth (Clark 1991, 1992, Charles 1991, Lantican, et al 1996, Forsythe, et al 2000).

However, there are others belonging to the so-called *Women in Development* (WID) school, who fully subscribe to the above view, assert that the industrialisation and Western development model benefit men more than women. These liberal feminists argue and present evidence to suggest that in developing countries, economic modernisation and the introduction of new technologies have displaced women workers from their traditional productive functions and placed them at the bottom of the hierarchy due to their lack of education and training required to perform specialised functions. The introduction of new technologies has reinforced and at times intensified the existing sex inequality by marginalising women. Also, as Beneria and Sen (1981) argue, modernisation is not necessarily beneficial and inevitable 'in the specific form it has taken in most Third World countries'. They maintain that modernisation is not a neutral process, but is dictated by capitalist accumulation and profit making. Contrary to Boserup's assertion, 'the problem for women is not only the lack of participation in this process as equal partners with men, it is a system that generates and intensifies inequalities, making use of existing gender hierarchies to place women in

subordinate positions at each different level of interaction between class and gender' (Beneria and Sen 1981 290)

A similar position is also held by Hartmann (1979) who observed that in England and the United States, the creation of a wage-labour force and the increase in the scale of production that accompanied the emergence of capitalism and the industrial revolution, had a more severe impact on women than on men. By separating work from the home, capitalism served to increase the subordination of women and the relative importance of the area of men's domination since it made men less dependent on women for production, and women more dependent on men economically.

A number of studies in various parts of the developing world show how a transition from a subsistence economy to a market economy and the integration of poor peasant societies into a world system of capital accumulation have been responsible for the downfall of the economic status of women (Elson and Pearson 1981, Mies 1982, Morvaridi 1992). These qualitative studies demonstrate that technological change and commercialisation of agriculture have been selective and class and gender specific, by undermining the social and economic position of women, particularly from poorer, rural and small landholder strata. Also, wage employment has not conferred a greater status or decision-making power on women, even though they may be the chief source of family income. These studies also show that the entry of women into wage work has either intensified the existing form of subordination or introduced a new form of subordination by fathers, husbands and factory bosses. Women were not only left behind with minimum opportunities to work, willing to accept low wages while men monopolised the new and more profitable areas of economy, but they remained confined to the home as housewives.

There is rather limited statistical support for this position at the cross-national level, although Semyonov and his colleagues (Semyonov 1980, Semyonov and Scott 1983, Semyonov and Shenhav 1988) did find that the greater rate of women's labour force participation resulting from industrialisation lowered women's odds of joining high status occupations. They observed that increases in labour force participation of women undermined women's chances of obtaining relatively prestigious occupations and put women at a greater occupational disadvantage. Semyonov and Scott (1983) reaffirmed this conclusion in another study utilising data from U.S. cities during the 1960-1970 decade. This study

showed that the industrial shifts, which occurred during that period, generated an intensive entry of women into the cash economy, but these women were disproportionately excluded from higher status professional and managerial occupations. In their cross-national study of 110 countries, Moore and Shackman (1996) found a linear and negative impact of economic development on women's relative occupancy in administrative occupations, but nonsignificant effects on gender equality in powerful political positions (seats in parliament).

In contrast to the two divergent perspectives mentioned above, there is a middle ground that postulates a curvilinear relationship between industrialisation and sex inequality.<sup>1</sup> This view has received its best-known reformulation by social scientists famed for reviving evolutionary theories (Lenski 1976, Blumberg 1978, Huber and Spitze 1983). It is hypothesised that sex inequality worsens in the early stages of industrialisation, heightens during the intermediate level of industrialisation, but declines after reaching a threshold. Anthropological and historical studies suggest that during preindustrial times when social organisation centred around hunting, gathering and horticulture, the sexual division of labour, degree of sex inequality, and women's subordination were at the lowest level. However, they gained prominence as human society emerged from the primitive and became 'civilised' and 'complex' as a result of technological innovations introduced in agriculture, the establishment of settled agriculture, specialisation and increased productivity (Boserup 1970: 53, Hartmann, 1976). The traditional system of sex segregation was perpetuated and even intensified with rapid industrialisation, modernisation and economic development.

The trend toward increasing inequality reverses itself with the advancement of industrialisation (Lenski 1966: 308). Modern industrialisation brought about an enormous change in the sexual division of labour, particularly resulting from the heavy influx of women into the labour force. Not only did a rapid rise of women's labour force participation in mature industrial societies affect traditional sex-role attitudes and behaviours, but it also increased consciousness of unfairness. Although women are still far from being considered socially and occupationally equal to men, the gap has narrowed substantially. Thus, as Huber and Spitze (1983: 25) postulate, all else being equal, 'women's social status hinges on the level of their economic productivity', and find 'a U-shaped pattern for women's economically

productive activity relatively high in the preindustrial household economy, lower in industrial economies, and higher again with the development of the modern tertiary sector' Several studies have found empirical support for this hypothesis (Evenson 1983, Goldin 1994, Lantican, et al 1996)

One rationale for the above hypothesis is that during the early stages of industrialisation, there is a rapid growth of the service economy which creates low-wage jobs that many men do not find attractive enough and, therefore, are disproportionately held by women Also, rising levels of educational attainment among women allow them to enter non-traditional occupations However, as most women either do not attain high enough education, or primarily attain education which is family-oriented, they are not hired in highly-paid sectors, but are absorbed by the service sector at low wages, whereas men are increasingly employed in well-paid sectors An increase in sex segregation is an inevitable outcome of industrialisation in its early stages Sectors which disproportionately employ highly skilled males expand, while keeping women in family-oriented sectors However, when a country has attained a high level of industrialisation, increasing numbers of women attain education well suited to the needs of an industrial economy and start moving away from traditionally female-dominated occupations which, in turn, reduce sex segregation in the labour market (Evenson 1983)

A slightly modified version of this hypothesis postulates that there is a 'sweet spot' in the development process within which social transformation is especially rapid, followed by a much slower transformation In a recent cross-national analysis, Hughes (2001) identified sweat spots in a number of development indicators However, the 'gender empowerment' – a measure of women's status developed by the United Nations--was one of the few measures where there was no obvious zone of rapid transformation, in the development process, this measure showed a relatively slow and uneven change – a 'steady slog'

The shift in the distribution of the labour force from the primary sector to secondary and tertiary sectors is the most obvious consequence of industrialisation This results in a reduction of agricultural activities which traditionally have employed women and a growth in the low paid service sector Since the supply of men is insufficient to meet the growing demand of the low paid service sector, it increasingly attracts women who find these occupations compatible with their family obligations, thereby increasing their disproportionate representation in

low-skill positions (Lorence 1992, Moore 1995) Although skill upgrading does occur across the service sector, skill degradation can be found in the industries dominated by women (Wajcman 1991, Steiger and Wardell 1995) This process results in occupational sex segregation

Reduction in overall economic inequality is another mechanism through which industrialisation can influence sex inequality, although empirical work on this subject is rather rare Following Kuznets (1955), there has been an abundance of economic literature on the inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between industrialisation and economic inequality, but it has not been properly linked to sex inequality Social scientists, particularly those of Marxist persuasion, posit that the overall inequality is at the root of sex inequality, regardless of the time and the region of the world It is argued that sex inequality is inextricably linked with the overall socio-economic inequality and that sex inequality cannot be appropriately examined outside of the context of class inequality because it is class more than gender which determines access to resources (Leacock 1978, Bandarage 1984, Charles 1992) These social scientists agree with WID researchers that women workers are marginalised in the process of industrialisation and economic modernisation as men accrue greater benefits than women, but they argue that not all men, particularly those belonging to lower classes, are beneficiaries of modernisation They see economic exploitation as a primary force in the exploitation of women, and sex inequality basically a reflection of the overall inequality that accompanies modernisation A revealing example of this position can be found in Stoler's (1977) study of women of rural Java Stoler showed that in Javanese village society, exploitation resulting from agricultural modernisation did not occur primarily along sexual lines Changes in the rural economy adversely affected both men and women of lower classes Thus, Stoler concluded that modernisation encouraged class exploitation more than sex exploitation.

### **Data and Method**

Ideally, time-series analyses are required to test the above mentioned hypotheses However, because of the lack of adequate and reliable time-series data, especially for developing societies, the cross-sectional approach has become a preferred technique in the social sciences A cross-sectional study involving contemporary societies of different levels



of socio-economic development does not necessarily present a direct representation of historical trends, although it has been found to be a reasonably appropriate tool to yield some insight into the nature of socio-economic and sex inequality (Leacock 1978 254, Jackman 1985) Thus, this study employs an approach of pooling time series of cross-sections, involving a sample of 80 countries for three periods, 1960, 1970, and 1980<sup>2</sup> These data are rather dated, but they were used because of definitional consistency of the dependent variable over time, as discussed in the following paragraph Measures included in this study provide only a crude estimate of the conditions prevailing in any given country at a given time, but even with lower levels of reliability they are likely to increase the statistical power of models dealing with differences across nations The large observation (240 cases) enables us to take into account the unexplained differences between countries, which usually bias results based on a single cross-section Since these observations are not independent over time, pooling of the time series of cross-sections introduces a serial dependence of the errors Thus, we have used a form of generalised least square procedure outlined by Fuller and Battese (1974), which provides a general robustness to the underlying error structure The computer programme used to perform the regression analysis is described in SAS (1983)

Definitions of the variables used and sources of data, along with selected descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 The dependent variable, occupational sex segregation (SEGREGATION) is measured by the well-known index of dissimilarity In the calculation of this measure we used a consistent series on the distribution of the labour force, by sex and three industrial sectors--agriculture, industry and services--for 1960 1970, and 1980, which was prepared by the International Labour Office (1990) for a large number of countries The agricultural sector comprises agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, the industry sector comprises mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction, and the service sector comprises the wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage and communications financing, insurance, real estate and business services, and community social and personal services Apparently, the definitions of labour force (i.e., economically active population) and its various sectors differ from one country to another for various social, cultural and methodological reasons The ILO has standardised labour force data for international comparability This sex segregation index based on these data, ranges

from a low of 0, when men and women are evenly distributed across occupational categories, to a maximum of 100, when men and women are completely segregated. The mean of this index is 23.53, with a standard deviation of 14.46. This suggests that about 24% of the population in the labour force has to be redistributed across occupational categories in order for the distribution of the two sexes to be similar to each other. Surprisingly, the decline in occupational segregation over the twenty-year period has been rather modest, from 24.41 in 1960 to 23.18 in 1970 and 22.92 in 1980 (Table 1).

Following previous research, per capita energy consumption is used as a measure of industrialisation<sup>3</sup>. The mean per capita energy consumption for the entire sample is 1,935 kilograms of coal equivalent, it rose rapidly during the period of study, especially between 1960 and 1970 (from an average of 1,145 to 2,159). Although variations between countries in terms of per capita energy consumption have declined over the years, they still remain large, as revealed in a coefficient of variability, at 1.40 in 1980. Because of skewness, this measure was transformed logarithmically (LNENERGY) for regression analysis.

The GINI coefficient of sectoral inequality has been used as a measure of economic distributional inequality (Taylor and Jodice 1983). Unlike the conventional GINI index, this measure is not calculated on the basis of individuals or households, but rather on the basis of large economic sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.). The cumulative percent of the labour force in each sector is plotted against the cumulative percent of the total domestic products produced in each sector and then a Lorenz coefficient is calculated. This measure has been found to be a reasonable proxy of socio-economic inequality in various cross-national studies, and is also available for a large number of countries for 1960 and 1970 (Jackman 1974, Taylor and Jodice 1983). Because of its unavailability, the 1970 values were assumed to remain constant for 1980 in the present study. The overall mean for this variable is 25.68, with a standard deviation of 15.64, with very little change over time.

The proportion of the female labour force that is engaged in the service industry is used as a measure of women's relative access to new occupational opportunities. Although the increase of women's share in the service sector does not necessarily mean an improvement in their socio-economic position, it does imply that they have increased access to managerial and prestigious jobs (Charles 1992). The mean value for this

variable for the entire sample is 44.11%, it rose from 39.80% in 1960 to 44.08% in 1970 and 48.53% in 1980

## **Results**

Table 2 reports the zero-order correlations between the variables used in the analysis. Both LNENERGY and its square term (LNENERGYSQ) are positively but modestly associated ( $r = 0.28$ ) with SEGREGATION, although their association with GINI ( $-0.55$ ) and SERVICE ( $0.70$ ) is rather strong. As expected, GINI is negatively associated with SEGREGATION, but the strength of association is weak. SERVICE and SEGREGATION are highly correlated ( $0.62$ ) to one another, as one would suspect given that the service sector is a major component in the calculation of the index of sex segregation used here.

Table 3 presents the results of cross-section and time-series regression analysis performed on the entire sample of 80 countries. The analysis begins with the simplest specification in which sex segregation (SEGREGATION) is related to the log of per capita energy consumption (LNENERGY) and its square (LNENERGYSQ). This specification approximates the hypothesised curvilinear relationship between industrialisation and sex segregation in the labour market. Both terms of this equation are statistically significant. The coefficient for LNENERGY is positive, while that for its squared term is negative, indicating that the effect of industrialisation on sex segregation is indeed curvilinear. The inverted U-shaped form of the equation suggests that sex segregation is low in the early stages of industrialisation, it increases first but then declines after industrialisation has reached a high level. This model explains 11 percent of the variance, which is certainly an improvement over the linear correlation between the two variables. When GINI and SERVICE were added to the equation (model 2), the explained variation increased significantly, to 54 percent. However, in this model LNENERGY is barely significant ( $b = 3.946$ ,  $t = 1.75$ ), although its curvilinear effect on SEGREGATION is maintained. Here SERVICE emerged as the most significant predictor of SEGREGATION, suggesting that the higher the growth of service occupations among women, the greater is the sex segregation in the labour market. GINI is also seen as having a highly significant and positive influence on SEGREGATION, supporting the hypothesis that increases in overall economic inequality lead to women's weaker

position regardless of the level of industrialisation and economic development

However, these results do not necessarily refute the industrialisation hypothesis. It is possible – indeed, likely – that the effect of industrialisation works via increases in women's involvement in the service sector and reductions in the level of economic inequality. Thus, while the independent effect of industrialisation on sex segregation is rather modest, the effects of the rise in women's share in the service sector and economic inequality are strong.

As a robustness check, in Table 4 we examined the sensitivity of our results by estimating separate models of SEGREGATION, with samples of varying size depending on the degree of economic development of countries in 1980. In Table 5, we also ran a separate ordinary least square model for three periods, 1960, 1970, and 1980. All equations in these two tables included LNENERGY, GINI, and SERVICE as independent variables. Because of the homogenous nature of the samples based on the level of economic development, it was unnecessary to keep in the model the square term of LNENERGY. As expected, industrialisation appeared to be a poor predictor of sex segregation in all but one equation (Table 4, model 3) where it had a negative coefficient. However, SERVICE carried a highly significant coefficient in all but one equation, whereas GINI was significant in all but two equations. Overall economic inequality is especially a significant predictor of sex inequality in the early stages of development, suggesting that in less developed countries sex inequality is inextricably related to overall economic inequality. This can be corroborated with the experiences of less developed countries today, many of which display high economic inequality as well as high sex inequality. When countries are in the midst of economic development, economic inequality does not exert highly significant effects on sex inequality. However, at the later stages when economic development has reached a high level, the countries with high overall inequality also experience high sex inequality. It appears that sex inequality is a reflection of overall economic inequality rather than industrialisation. Because of overall inequality, the society may segregate men and women into compartmentalised occupations. As economic development increases, overall inequality declines and so does the sex inequality. These results confirm the robustness of our findings in that while industrialisation does not necessarily influence the degree of sex segregation in the labour market, the existence of the service sector and

economic inequality does. Regardless of the level of economic development, the existence of high inequality and the greater dominance of the service sector exert a positive influence on segregation.

### **Conclusion**

That women are not equal to men in the labour market is well known. Evolutionary models suggest that occupational segregation by sex has been in existence in every society – primitive and modern – for centuries, but it is reduced across the process of industrialisation and economic development. Analysing time series of cross-sectional data for 80 countries in 1960, 1970, and 1980, the paper finds the relationship between industrialisation and sex segregation in the labour market to be curvilinear: during both the early and later stages of industrialisation, segregation is at a low level, but it is high during the intermediate stage. This finding is consistent with the neo-evolutionist position. However, further analysis has revealed that at any stage of development, industrialisation does not have any significant bearing on sex segregation independent of the level of economic inequality and women's representation in the service industries. It is likely that industrialisation operates through these two variables. Continued industrialisation draws larger numbers of women into the service sector and brings about a reduction in overall economic inequality which, in turn, lowers occupational segregation by sex. Particularly important is the finding that regardless of the level of industrialisation and economic development, the reduction in overall economic inequality and the increase in women's participation in service industries reduces sex segregation. This observation holds for every period under consideration as well as for every region, more developed or less developed. This study, therefore, concludes that sex segregation and women's economic marginalisation are primarily a reflection of the overall societal economic inequality, whether or not it accompanies industrialisation.

Table 1. Variables, Definitions, Sources of Data and Summary Statistics

Variable	Definition	Source	Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Coefficient of variation
SEGREGATION	Occupational Segregation by sex	ILO (1990)	1960	24.41	18.13	1.55	74.20	0.66
			1970	23.18	14.24	1.95	67.85	0.61
			1980	22.92	13.01	3.75	63.10	0.57
ENERGY	Per capita Energy Consumption (kg)	World Bank (1983)	1960	1145.30	2113.78	5.00	13981.00	1.85
			1970	2159.23	3263.60	16.00	18993.00	1.51
			1980	2499.91	3505.20	20.44	17101.00	1.40
GINI	Coefficient of sectoral Inequality	Taylor and Jodice (1983)	1960	26.11	14.51	0.30	74.90	0.56
			1970	25.46	16.26	1.70	73.00	0.64
			1980	25.46	16.26	1.70	73.00	0.64
SERVICE	Percentage of women in service occupations	ILO (1990)	1960	39.80	26.66	0.20	80.15	0.67
			1970	44.08	27.04	1.15	80.00	0.61
			1980	48.53	28.02	1.40	91.80	0.58

**Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations between Variables Used in Regression Analysis**

	SEGREGATION	LNENERGY	LNENERGY SQ	GINI	SERVICE
SEGREGATION	1 00				
LNENERGY	0 28	1 0			
LNENERGY SQ	0 25	0 99	1 00		
GINI	-0 12	-0 55	-0 58	1 00	
SERVICE	0 62	0 70	0 69	-0 63	1 00

**Table 3 Pooled Cross-Country and Time-Series Regression on SEGREGATION (values are in parentheses)**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)
LNENERGY	6 062 (2 59)	3 946 (1 75)
LNENERGYSQ	-0 399 (-2 09)	-0 399 (-2 14)
GINI		0 279 (3 99)
SERVICE		0 448 (9 86)
Intercept		-11 085 (-1 64)
R Square (Adjusted)	10 6	53 6
Number of observations	240	240
Number of countries	80	80

Table 4 Regression Results by Level of Economic Development  
(t values are in parentheses)

Independent variable	Other combinations									
	Less Developed	Inter-mediate	More developed	Most developed	Lesser developed	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
LNENERGY	0.398 (0.47)	-0.017 (-0.01)	-3.570 (-2.57)	-0.806 (-0.51)	-0.002 (-0.00)	-0.687 (-0.78)	-0.868 (-1.06)	-1.543 (-1.05)	-1.374 (-1.41)	1.467 (0.98)
GINI	0.191 (2.80)	0.208 (1.09)	0.408 (2.00)	0.285 (1.99)	0.283 (3.16)	0.312 (3.85)	0.334 (4.33)	0.268 (1.87)	0.305 (2.42)	0.305 (1.90)
SERVICE	0.111 (0.97)	0.464 (5.01)	0.389 (3.92)	0.537 (5.60)	0.469 (7.45)	0.471 (8.40)	0.450 (8.50)	0.461 (6.08)	0.426 (6.33)	0.334 (3.99)
Intercept	1.785 (0.51)	2.377 (0.14)	20.125 (1.70)	-5.055 (-0.40)	-2.088 (-0.31)	0.114 (0.02)	0.654 (0.12)	8.667 (0.76)	5.651 (0.64)	-12.493 (-0.98)
Number of Observations	63	72	51	54	135	168	186	105	105	72
Number of Countries	21	24	17	18	45	56	62	35	35	24



Table 5 OLS Regression Results for 1960, 1970 and 1980  
(t values are in parentheses)

Independent variable	1960	1970	1980
LNENERGY	-0.887 (-1.03)	-1.388 (-1.68)	0.1282 (-1.33)
GINI	0.451 (4.63)	0.386 (4.37)	0.353 (3.79)
SERVICE	0.593 (9.50)	0.554 (9.51)	0.454 (7.34)
R Square (Adjusted)	60.0	57.6	46.0
Number of observations	80	80	80

### Notes

- 1 This hypothesis runs parallel to the so-called Kuznets curve (Kuznets 1955) according to which there is an 'inverted-U' relation between the level of development of a country and inequality. Kuznets postulated that due to the intersectoral shifts which occur during the early phases of the secular development process of a country, inequality first increases but begins to decline after some turning point, as the benefits of growth are diffused to a growing proportion of the population. Kuznets found support for his hypothesis from historical data for several industrial societies, and argued for its applicability to contemporary developing societies. This hypothesis rests basically on a two-sector model according to which resources are assumed to shift from the traditional sector to the modern sector during the course of development. During the early stages of industrialisation and economic development, countries first experience a rise in inequality because incomes grow the largest and first among those employed in growth sectors. As industrialisation matures, development 'trickles down' in the form of greater economic opportunity, the entry of a larger number of workers into modern sectors, wealth to the masses, and consequently reduced economic inequality.
- 2 These countries can be divided into four broad (from low to high) groups, according to their levels of economic development (per capita gross national product in 1980): **Less developed** (21 countries) Benin, Myanmar, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia; **Intermediate level** (24 countries) Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe; **More developed** (17 countries) Argentina, Barbados, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Trinidad, Uruguay, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Portugal, Singapore, Yugoslavia, and **Most developed** (18 countries) Japan, Ireland, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
- 3 There is no consensus on the definition of industrialisation or technological advance. Following previous research, I use per capita energy consumption as a measure of this concept. Frisbie and Clarke (1979) developed a composite index of the level of technology by employing six dimensions: energy, agriculture, manufactures, science, transportation and communications for a sample of 66 countries and found that per capita energy consumption was most highly correlated with the composite index. Thus they concluded that 'scholars who have relied on energy consumption

as a single variable index seem to have been on the right track' (Frisbie and Clarke 1979 602)

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# **Politics of Class(ness) in the Farmers' Movement in India: Validity of the New Social Movement Paradigm**

*Vibha Arora*

The central message of the new social movements is **Civil society against the state**. Under the rubric of the new social movements(hereafter referred to as NSMs) are placed the women's movement, the student, the peace and the environmental movements. In the Indian context the science, women's, environmental, farmers', and dalit(ex-untouchables) movements have been characterised as the NSMs(see Guha 1989, Omvedt 1993). In the perspective of the NSMs, the state is seen as oppressive and unable to solve the problems of exploitation, poverty, and uneven development. The social movements arising in the civil society hence come to the forefront as the vanguards of democracy.

It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss the validity of the new social movement thesis. What this paper proposes to discuss is the validity of the new social movement paradigm to the farmers' movement in India by taking a case study of the Shetkari Sanghatana in Maharashtra<sup>1</sup>. By contextualising the farmers' movements in a differentiated agrarian structure in which some sections of the rural population exercise hegemony over the rest of the rural population, the issue of inequalities and class contradictions is foregrounded. The central question posed by the paper is: Are these movements for genuine democracy or is there a dominant class character in these farmers' movements? Whose class interests are presented, affirmed or perpetuated in the farmers' movement? By focussing on the class character, I also want to examine if there is a disjunction in the discourse and the praxis<sup>2</sup> of the farmers' movement.

I would like to emphasise that the class character of the farmers' movement should be regarded as the key to the debate on their being a 'new' or 'old' social movement. In this paper, the first section discusses

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the discourse of the NSMs and the discussion of various theorists from a developing country's perspective. The second section focuses on the emergence of the farmers' movement in India and the rise of the Shetkari Sanghatana(henceforth SS) in Maharashtra. This section also discusses the organisation, the mobilisation strategies, the leadership and the discourse of the SS. The third section analyses the SS from a class perspective by contextualising the movement in the agrarian structure. The debate on the dominant class interests represented and sustained by the SS is discussed and analysed. The concluding section focuses on the debate on the farmers' movement being a NSM.

## I

### **New Social Movements**

What are the **new social movements**? How are these new social movements different from the so-called old social movements?

It has been argued that these NSMs have taken place in post-industrial societies. The doyen of the NSM theorists is considered to be Alain Touraine(1976, 1984, 1985). Touraine has differentiated the old social movements from the NSM based on the discursive character of the NSM. Unlike the 'old'/'past' social movements which opposed domination through meta-social principles, NSMs are proposed to challenge domination by a direct call to personal and collective action based on solidarity carrying on conflict and breaking the limits of the system in which the action occurs. In his opinion, (new) social movements are the works that society performs on itself, and conflict is ultimately about the control of historicity, the cultural model that governs social practices and a struggle over normative models of society.

The other major NSM theorists include J. Habermas(1981), A. Melucci(1985, 1989), and Laclau and Mouffe(1985). By the 'new', all these theorists refer to fundamental shifts in the social structure, and the emergence in post-industrial societies of different actors, different issues and loci of action that are different from the 'old' working class movements. ***These movements are identity involving and transforming, they are 'social'(not class oriented) and located in the civil society.***

The key points of contrast between new social movements and the workers' movements are summarised as below<sup>3</sup>





<b>Organisational form</b>	Formal/hierarchical	Network/grassroots organisations
<b>Medium of action</b>	Political mobilisation	Direct action / cultural innovation

Based on his analysis of the various NSM theorists, Scott(1990 1-18) delineates the following characteristics for NSMs

- 1 They are pre-eminently social and cultural in character and only secondarily political They transcend class boundaries
- 2 They are located within the civil society NSMs bypass the state The aim is to defend civil society against the encroachments from inner colonisation by the society's technocratic substructure(Habermas 1982)
- 3 NSMs are concerned with cultural innovation, the creation of new life-styles and a challenge to entrenched values These NSMs are characterised by a common societal critique that aims at social change through the transformation of values, personal identities and symbols They do so by the creation of alternative life-styles

Fuentes and Frank(1989), Escobar and Alvarez(1992), Guha(1989), Omvedt(1993), Wignaraja(1983), Calman(1992) are some of the theorists that have discussed the relevance of NSMs from a developing country's perspective According to Fuentes and Frank(1989), these NSMs are popular social movements and expressions of people's struggles against exploitation and oppression and for survival and identity in a complex dependent society In such societies these movements are attempts at and instruments of democratic self-empowerment of people, and organised independently from the state, its institutions and political parties and are a reflection of people's search for alternatives Guha has argued that the NSMs work at two levels simultaneously At one, they are defensive, seeking to protect civil society from the tentacles of the centralising state, at the other, they are assertive, seeking to change civil society from within and in the process

putting forward a conception of the 'good life' somewhat different from that articulated by any of the established parties (Guha 1989 12)

Gail Omvedt (1993 xv-xvi) has given her own definition of the characteristics of NSMs. According to her, NSMs are revolutionary in aspirations and anti-systemic in their impact. They are oriented as single-issue efforts to bring about change. These are 'social movements in the sense of having a broad overall organisation, structure, and ideology aiming at social change' (ibid). They have a 'new' ideology which is characterised by the use of non-Marxist concepts of exploitation and oppression (appropriation by the state from peasants through the market), and a corresponding rejection of class, class politics and ideology together with the vanguard role of the urban working class and political parties. These are movements of socio-economic categories such as women, *dalit* and peasants that 'have been ignored as exploited by traditional Marxism or who are exploited in ways related to the new processes of contemporary capitalism but left unconceptualised by a preoccupation with private property and wage-labour' (ibid). According to her, these are revolutionary in aspiration and anti-systemic in their impact, oriented as single issue efforts to bring about change, but because they have grown in a period in which the solutions of traditional socialism are so overwhelmingly discredited, they are forced, in spite of this single issue orientation with the task of '**reinventing revolution**'

Following the criteria stated above, could the farmers' movement be explicated and termed as a NSM? However, before discussing this debate it is important to explicate and situate the emergence of the farmers' movements, to analyse their discourse and praxis, and to critically focus on the (class) character of the movement. Following the discussion of these, I will clarify and critically interpret the debate on the farmers' movement being a NSM in the last section of this paper.

## II

### The Farmers' Movement in India

The farmers' movements<sup>4</sup> emerged in the late 70s and peaked in the late 80s. They have waned since, though they emerged for a short period in 1993 and in mid-1997. They have emerged in the commercially developed rural regions of India such as Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. These movements have given expression to the discontent of the farmers, rather than

'peasants' By 'farmers', I refer to the market-oriented agricultural population and distinguish them from the subsistence-oriented peasantry. The farmers' movements have advocated the 'thesis of peasant unity' (as defined by them, the term peasantry covers a broad spectrum of the agrarian population ranging from subsistence-producers to surplus producers). They have had a powerful impact on the regional and the national context. This has ranged from organising demonstrations, withholding crops from the market, a refusal to pay outstanding bills and loans, and a crucial role in the overthrow of the Rajiv Gandhi government in the 1989 elections. The emergence of the farmers' movements can be explicated by the nature of economic development and the Indian political economy. On the one hand, strategies of rural development (such as Green Revolution) have led to a growth in agricultural productivity, however, this growth has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in prices of agricultural produce, in contrast to industry. Further, during the 80s, there was a decline in agricultural profits and in the terms of trade (between agriculture and industry) which has contributed to the discontent of the farmers. The other side of the picture is that the contribution of the agricultural sector to the national economy had steadily declined from 49.6 percent in 1961 to 36.4 percent in 1981 (Nadkarni 1987:43). The total tax revenue had also declined from 8.8 percent in 1950-51 to 1.1 percent in 1987-88, while the workforce employed had declined only marginally (ibid.). Also, the total inputs as percentage of agricultural inputs have increased both in money and in real terms, the expenditure on fertilisers has gone up (ibid.:48). Although the terms of trade have tilted in favour of industry, the farmers' claims of 'urban bias' are unfounded and groundless. The balance of resource flow from the agrarian sector implied in the urban bias theory ignores the existence of substantial direct and indirect subsidies to agriculture<sup>5</sup>.

Given the limits of space and regional specificities that are embodied by the various farmers' movements, it is not possible to examine all of them. On the basis of a review of the existing studies on the farmers' movements such as Gupta (1997), Hasan (1989), Assadi (1994), Giri (1994), and Omvedt (1989, 1993), I have selected the farmers' movement in Maharashtra – the Shetkari Sanghatana – as a case study. I have focussed upon the SS due to the following reasons. Firstly, it is possible to generalise from the SS as it had reflected the major contradictions in the agrarian sector and had also determined the agenda

of the farmers' movements in other regions. Due to its supra-local orientation we get insights into the other farmers' movements. Secondly, on account of the richness of the data available for research. Under the charismatic leadership of Sharad Joshi who has articulated an ideology for the farmers' movements, the SS had extensively published its perspective. Thirdly, the SS had organised a women's front and has also articulated a gender programme. Lastly, due to its socio-economic history, Maharashtra appears to me as a unique 'terrain of resistance'. In Maharashtra the interface of the farmers' movement with the women's dalit and the co-operative movement is quite pronounced. However, due to limitations of space, I have not discussed them here in this paper.

Sharad Joshi formally launched the SS in October 1979 at Chakan, near Pune. The movement began with a stir for higher prices of onions. In the next decade the farmers under the banner of the SS organised several agitations for remunerative prices of sugarcane, tobacco, cotton and milk (for details see **Appendix-1** on the chronology of events in the SS). The central slogan of the SS is exactly this, *bhik nako hava ghamala dam* which literally means 'we do not want alms but recompense for our sweat' (we are asking for our rightful share and that you should stop exploiting us). The SS has evolved from a one-point programme for remunerative prices to a broader programme by incorporating a spectrum of issues pertaining to gender, decentralisation of power, environment, and an alternative development strategy. These have been extensively discussed in a National Agricultural Policy report (GOI 1991) which the SS adopted as its manifesto on 19th November 1991.

The emergence of the SS is explicated by uneven regional development. The support base of the SS has been concentrated in some regional strongholds. Though the movement emerged in the relatively well developed districts of Nasik and Pune, its strongholds were the backward dry regions of Vidarbha and Marathwada. These regions lagged behind the irrigated and more prosperous areas of western Maharashtra, the land of the super cooperatives. It needs to be emphasised that the SS has emerged in those areas where cooperatives have not been successful. Despite the SS organising agitations for higher prices of sugarcane, the sugar cooperatives have continually evaded their hold and influence<sup>6</sup>.

The agitations of these farmers' had ranged from organised mass protests to pressurise the state government, to locally based spontaneous

self-assertions. The movement had an impressive array of agitation methods that were not the 'weapons of the weak' but constituted the 'weapons of the strong'.<sup>7</sup> These included *rasta-roko*<sup>8</sup> (the blocking of roads, railway tracks and disrupting the transportation linkages in the country), *bandh* or the civic strike, *chakka jam* (not a single wheel shall turn!), they have initiated *gav bandi* (the closing of villages to officials or politicians), called *kisan panchayats* in cities (peasants poured into the cities in large numbers for indefinite occupation of public places), and following Gandhi, Joshi has called for *satyagraha* (fasts) and used *padyatras* (foot-marches) to mobilise the farmers. For Omvedt, the forms of these agitations have reflected the anti-urban, anti-state character of the movement (1993: 41).

In its mobilisational strategy, the SS focussed on one crop at a time, that too on commercial crops and not on food crops.<sup>9</sup> As explicated by Joshi, 'agitations over food grains (non-commercial food crops) were not feasible in Maharashtra, in a situation where small and medium farmers have to buy food grains that the large farmers sell' (*The Hindu*, 22/8/1980). Further, the SS appealed to the democratic traditions of the Maratha peasantry and invoked the images and idioms of Shivaji and Phule.

It is noticeable that the farmers' movements have been characterised by informal organisations permitting a great deal of *ad hocism* and flexibility. There had been no fixed criteria or formal rules for membership in the SS. The SS did not have any formal hierarchy between local, intermediate and the top levels of the organisation although a committee was usually responsible for taking the decisions.

The undisputed charismatic leader of the SS is Sharad Joshi. Interestingly, Joshi is neither a Maratha nor does he have an agrarian background. He is an urban Brahmin and a former civil servant with an intellectualist disposition.<sup>10</sup> He has been the chief strategist, decision-maker, and the ideologue for not only the SS but also the farmers' movements at the national level. Joshi was also the Chairman of the Inter-State Coordinating Committee (ISCC). In 1989-90, the then Prime Minister, V.P. Singh had appointed him as the Chairman of the 'Standing Advisory Committee on Agriculture'. This committee was entrusted with the responsibility of drafting the National Agricultural Policy. Other leaders of the SS such as Madhavrao More, Narendra Ahire, Anil Gote, Ramchandra Patil, Bhaskarrao Boravke are all prosperous farmers with large landholdings (above 10 hectares). It needs to be emphasised

that despite the substantial participation of women in the agitations and the formation of a women's front, women were not to be found at the decision-making level

The ideological discourse of the SS was strongly anti-state and steeped in populist imagery and had at its core the powerfully stated central tenet of 'urban bias'. This was vividly captured and encapsulated in the ideologically powerful slogan coined by Joshi, *Bharat versus India* and advocated the *thesis of peasant unity*. Joshi emphatically asserted that the principal contradictions were no longer within the agrarian structure, between the rich, middle, poor peasants and the landless labourers. For Joshi, the primary contradiction was between *Bharat* and *India* and he spoke of the liberation of *Bharat* from *India* through the farmers' movement. In the booklet *The Women's Question*, Joshi elaborated that by *Bharat* he referred to the villages and the refugees from the villages in the urban areas, while *India* referred to the urban areas, the westernised industrial elite, the *goondas* and the bureaucracy who are the inheritors of the colonial government<sup>11</sup>. According to Joshi, the misery in the villages was not caused by 'the slightly better off farmer in the neighbourhood' but by an 'outside exploiter', the urban *India* 'Transcontinental imperialism' represented by the British, 'has been replaced by internal colonialism' (Joshi 1986.75-7). He further argued that the critical difference between *India* and *Bharat* was 'the distinction between the exploiter and the exploited' (1985.65). The logic of Joshi's argument implies that there are no exploited or poor sections in the towns, that there are no exploiters amongst the agrarian population, the rural-urban divide is absolute and none of the villagers have urban interests, all villagers have the same interests that are expressed in the demand for remunerative prices<sup>12</sup>. Although Joshi persisted in maintaining that the popular interpretation of *Bharat versus India* as a rural-urban polarity was an over-simplification, his usage strongly echoed Lipton's thesis of urban bias<sup>13</sup>. The discourse of the farmers' movement on the one hand posited a powerless, uniformly poor, oppressed rural population – *Bharat*, and on the other hand a powerful, uniformly rich and exploitative urban population – *India* – and its State apparatus.

Any attempt to differentiate agrarian classes or to define the SS in class-specific terms, for obvious reasons, was derided by Joshi: 'It is just a conspiracy on the part of *India* to try and differentiate *Bharat* in terms of big, medium and small peasants with regard to remunerative

prices' (*The Hindu*, 22/12/1980) This line of reasoning, of an 'undifferentiated homogeneous peasantry' was conspicuous in the very criterion used by the SS to define a peasant. The SS has not employed the land-labour criterion, but invoked the logic of economic individualism. According to their definition, a *shetkari* is one who personally labours on the land, which extends to anyone associated with agriculture. So long as a person lives by agriculture, he can be defined as a *shetkari*<sup>14</sup>. This definition renders all forms of physical labour as equivalent – manual, supervisory, managerial – and circumvents the contentious issue of internal exploitation in the agrarian structure (Assadi 1994 213). Joshi has acknowledged the presence of class differences in the agrarian structure, yet he also has insisted that these did not constitute class contradictions. Accordingly, he had emphasised on a differentiating mechanism based on the income criterion and rejected that based on landownership (see Dhanagare 1994 84)<sup>15</sup>. Additionally, Joshi had contended that remunerative prices would benefit all sections of the agrarian population, which includes agricultural labour, by trickling down in the form of higher wages. He emphatically maintained that the interests of the farmers and agricultural labour are not irreconcilable. The discourse of the SS underplayed class contradictions by accentuating the disparity in incomes between the urban and the rural areas. Maintaining the 'thesis of peasant unity', Joshi persistently argued that the socio-economic base of the SS is multi-class and multi-caste. Omvedt (1993) has reiterated Joshi's arguments that there are no dominant or subordinate interests in the SS<sup>16</sup>.

Joshi professed that the SS had evolved an independent system of thought (see Omvedt 1993). Their ideology has combined Marxism and Gandhism with the thoughts of Jyotiba Phule and Ambedkar. Joshi also conceded that he was a marxist, but argued that while he subscribed to the materialist approach he rejected the labour theory of value, proletarian leadership and the belief that surplus is extracted from only factory wage labour (cited in Omvedt 1988). Joshi had also argued that the primary basis of capital accumulation was the exploitation of peasant production. He openly acknowledged the intellectual ancestry of this idea to Rosa Luxemburg (cited in Omvedt 1993 120). The central tenet of R. Luxemburg's thesis is that the continuing growth of capitalism is dependent on primitive accumulation in the non-capitalist (subsistence) sectors. Indeed, Joshi's formulation of '*Bharat versus India*' only typifies the two sectors – non-capitalist (agriculture) and the

capitalist(industry) – that have been delineated by Luxemburg (Dhanagare 1990) According to Joshi, 'the history of human society is the history of the evolution of the instruments of expropriation of agricultural surplus'(1986) He has located a neo-colonialist pattern of development at the root of rural poverty and underdevelopment and the only means of redressing this internal colonialism was through securing remunerative prices for agricultural produce

Distinguishing himself from conventional historical materialism, Joshi had propounded that it was not property ownership but violence and *looting* that constituted the principal basis of surplus extraction throughout history<sup>17</sup> In the rhetoric of the SS, *looter* and 'the *looting* system' were the terms used As in Marxism, *looting* was conceptualised as a historical process which went through several stages – from pure robbery to slavery, to the extraction of surplus by feudal lords, to State-backed *looting* at present(Joshi 1986 12-16)<sup>18</sup> Hence, Joshi termed the exploiters in the present period as *looters* or *goondas* rather than as capitalists Because of the externality to the realm of property defined classes, Joshi expounded that the struggle of the peasantry against exploitation was 'economistic' and not a class struggle(cited in Omvedt 1993 120) He had identified the undifferentiated peasantry and women(of both *Bharat* and *India*) as the liberating forces from the *looting* system In Omvedt's opinion, 'the anti-state and decentralist thrust of the movement, the aim of retaining the accumulated surplus and its reinvestment in the village have challenged the traditional Marxist notion of industrialisation, large-scale urban-based 'collective' production as being progressive'(Omvedt 1994 13)

The mobilising ideology of the farmers' movement has been mostly examined by theorists with reference to populism Populism has been theorised as an ideology which appeals to 'people' above class divisions For Kitching(1982), populism in the 19th century and neo-populism in the 20th century are counter-doctrines to the idea of development based on large-scale industrialisation and urbanisation According to Brass(1994b 39), there are in fact historical continuities in the discourses of agrarian populism between Gandhi, Charan Singh and Sharad Joshi<sup>20</sup> Hence, not surprisingly, not dissimilar to Gandhi and Charan Singh, the main objective of Joshi is to reconstitute the village community Economically, by retaining within it the surplus otherwise appropriated through 'urban bias', socially, by providing an employment-generating self-sufficient village economy based on artisan production, and



politically, by devolving power from state to the traditional panchayat (Brass 1994b). According to Laclau (1977 143-198), populism arises in a specific ideological domain constituted by the dual reference to classes and to 'people'.<sup>20</sup> A populist ideology refers primarily to 'people', although class as a historical agent is very much present. Following Laclau (ibid), a populist ideology has four basic features: (a) its ingrained hostility towards the status quo, (b) a mistrust of the traditional politicians, (c) an appeal on the basis of not class identity but rather 'people' or 'masses', (d) an anti-intellectualist disposition.

Abandoning the reductionist understanding of class as the antagonistic poles of production relations, Laclau (ibid) argues that populism is not a class ideology in **substance**, but a **form** of discourse which is used by a dominant class aspiring to establish its hegemonic position. Thus, the ideology of the dominant class exerts its hegemony<sup>21</sup> by the incorporation into its discourse of non-class contradictions and issues which are part of the political discourse of the dominated classes. Consequently, the dominant class presents its objectives as the consummation of popular objectives through the transformation of all antagonisms into simple differences.

Agrarian populism has promoted the development of non-class consciousness at the level of discourse. As a mobilising ideology, it rejects class struggle and deflects class consciousness (develops false consciousness) by focussing not on class but on a homogeneous 'rural' identity. As is evident from our earlier discussion, all the discursive elements historically associated with populism are present in the case of the SS. The discourse of the Sanghatana has professed the 'thesis of peasant unity' by suppressing reference to socio-economic differentiation resulting from capitalist development in the agrarian structure. It needs to be emphasised that the impression of an all-encompassing peasant unity was largely due to the ability of 'organic intellectuals'<sup>22</sup> such as Sharad Joshi to perform the hegemonic function of deflecting attention from the class contradictions by accentuating rural and urban differences. The deflection of class antagonisms and consciousness has hinged on the displacement of class categories, whereby agrarian subjects who are differentiated by ownership or non-ownership of land were redefined in populist terms as 'peasants'. This, therefore, has permitted the farmers to author and reproduce a discourse which they supposedly share with the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers. This discourse recasted the agrarian population into a (non-economic) 'cultural category' (we-are-

all-the-same by virtue of being rural, not urban, peasants, not workers), who are 'victims' of urban bias. This discursive fusion also permitted the farmers to advance the ideologically potent image of a homogeneous peasantry. The 'agrarian myth' is an essentialising ideology which is defined with reference to the mutually reinforcing aspects of peasantness, national identity and popular culture (Brass 1994b)<sup>23</sup>. This myth also enables them to declare that they represent the 'voice of the people' (the peasants) and the nation itself (ibid 32).

The following section clarifies the class character of the movement and the disjunction between the rhetoric and the praxis of the SS. The crucial function of populism is manifest in the charter of demands and the position of the SS on the issues of prices, land and wages.

### III

#### **The Agrarian Structure and the Dominant class character of the SS**

An agrarian movement can be understood only with reference to the agrarian structure in which it takes place. The size of the landholdings and the kind of labour (land-labour criterion) performed have been the two main variables used by theorists to differentiate the agrarian class structure. However, to reduce or equate class position with the size of the landholdings would be a very simplistic explanation. It cannot be denied nevertheless that in rural India ownership or the control of land continues to be the critical determinant of economic well-being, social status and political power. In the present study, the land-labour criterion has been employed to delineate the agrarian classes<sup>24</sup> as shown in Table 1.

Given the agrarian context of Maharashtra, the concept of **dominant peasantry** by D. Hardiman (1976), and elaborated by J. Pouchepadass (1980) can be used to explicate the interests epitomised by the SS<sup>25</sup>. J. Pouchepadass (ibid 147) has defined the dominant peasantry in the following terms:

the oligarchy of rich and well-off peasants belonging to a respectable caste who hold either as owners or as tenants the bulk of the land rights in each village. It is to this group that the rest of the village population looks in large part for employment and often for credit as well. This dominant peasantry serves as an intermediary

between the mass of villagers and the administration, or, more generally, the whole of the outside world. The oligarchy exercises authority at the village level by virtue of its economic superiority, of its status as a caste superior to those of poorer peasants, artisans and labourers, and of the liberty which it enjoys to employ force. They hold enough land so that they can supply the needs of their families without having to go out to work for anyone else.

Pouchepadass (ibid 147-8) has elaborated this further

At the level of a peasant movement as a whole, the dominant peasantry in the role of a social force, is normally multi-caste. But there are also instances in which movements have been organised on the basis of a particular cultivating caste which constitutes the dominant landholding group in the region, where indeed such a caste exists. The dominant peasantry is nothing other than the group of peasants who, in each village are spontaneously considered by the villagers as their chiefs or *maliks* to use the term proposed by Thorner (1976), together with their class fellows and all those who are generally identified with them. That is why movements launched by the dominant peasantry often develop along lines of class collaboration.

I am aware of the difficulties associated with the use of the concept 'dominant peasantry' (see Oommen 1990 237-40) but there is an overlap between class and caste status in the political economy of rural Maharashtra as shown in Table 2. Therefore, the concept has been adopted for analytic purposes.

Caste-wise about forty percent of the population in rural Maharashtra comprises the Marathi-kunbi cluster. The rest of the rural population can be classified as follows: the Brahmins comprise 5 per cent, the trading castes are negligible, the artisan castes – *sonars* (goldsmiths), *koshtis* (weavers), *nhavis* (barbers) – about 20-25 percent, Scheduled Castes or *dalits* (*mahars*, *mangis*, *chamars*), Other Backward Castes, henceforth OBCs (*kolis*, *malis*), and Scheduled Tribes or *adivasis* (*bhils*,

*koli-mahadeos, gonds*) account for about 20 per cent of the population (see Sirisikar 1995) From Table-2, it is explicitly perceptible that caste-wise the rich and middle peasant categories overwhelmingly comprise a single caste group, the maratha-kunbi cluster<sup>26</sup> In Lele's(1990 115) opinion the pattern of socio-economic and political dominance in Maharashtra is that of maratha hegemony The maratha-kunbis are the dominant caste<sup>27</sup> The roots of maratha power can be attributed to their dominant position in the agrarian structure Comprising the rich and middle peasant categories, they control over sixty percent of the total landholdings in rural Maharashtra(see Dhanagare 1994 76) They are the power wielding categories and occupy positions in the local power structure such as in panchayats and manifest a single political voice To a significant extent maratha power can be accounted and imputed to their ability to form strategic alliances with some of the other castes(see Dahiwalé 1995 336-342) Hence, the Marathas can be categorised as the 'dominant peasantry' while the rest of the rural population can be termed as the 'rural underclass'<sup>28</sup> Despite class differences, the dominant peasantry was sustained by the primordial loyalties of caste, kinship, and religion These primordial loyalties are strong, deep, persisting and cut across class differences<sup>29</sup> The maratha-kunbi cluster therefore has constituted the socio-economic base and are recognisably the moving forces in the SS Hence, their hegemonic status has been perpetuated by the SS By this, I do not mean that the SS was primarily a movement of the Marathas, but that the SS represented and pursued the interests of the dominant peasantry as is evident from the following discussion

My analysis of the literature reveals that there are three principal arguments on the dominant class character of the farmers' movements These can be categorised as follows

**A Thesis of peasant unity and rural interests**

- Joshi(1985, 1988, 1989), Omvedt(1988, 1989, 1993, 1994)

**B Hegemony of the middle peasants or the bullock-capitalists**

- Lindberg(1994), the Rudolphs(1984), Lennenberg(1988)

**C Dominant interests of the agrarian elite or rich peasants**

- Brass(1994, 1994a), Dhanagare(1990, 1994), Banaji(1994), Assadi(1994), Hasan(1989, 1994), B M (1988, 1990), Balagopal(1987, 1989)

As underscored at the outset, the farmers' movements were movements of the commodity-producing agrarian population including the surplus producers with substantial market involvement and dependence, hence the primacy that has been given to agricultural prices in their charter of demands. It is possible to deduce the dominant class character of the SS from an analysis of the charter of demands. The demand charter can be classified into three categories **agricultural** or **economistic**, **developmental** and **social**. The economistic demands were concerned with prices and price-related issues such as lower prices of inputs and remunerative prices for agricultural produce, loans and credit subsidies, lower electricity tariffs and the abolition of land revenue. The developmental demands were for a larger allocation of public resources for village development (such as roads, schools, drinking water and hospitals) and rural industrialisation. The social agenda of the farmers' movement included gender, environmental issues and an alternative development strategy. In my opinion, these were decisively aimed more at raising the consciousness of the mobilised and towards widening of the support base.

Following the issues on which agitations have been organised, it is noticeable that it is the economistic demands that have formed the core concern of the movement. Hence, it is from their analysis that the dominant class character of the movement can be ascertained. Regardless of what they produce, prices are crucial to the well-being of the dominant peasantry as they have substantial involvement both as buyers of inputs and of agricultural labour, and as sellers of produce. Hence, higher prices are of paramount concern, their very viability depends on this. For in drought-prone areas of Maharashtra it is possible to be rich in one year and poor in another<sup>30</sup>. It needs to be noted that while the large landowners had diversified into agro-processing, trading and urban professions, the middling landholders are completely dependent on cultivation for subsistence and are extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations.

As Nadkarni (1987: 24) had correctly inferred, a substantial section of the middle peasant category sells its produce in one form, only to repurchase later in another form. This is not necessarily due to compulsory market involvement or for meeting social obligations or paying-off debts. These are due to economic calculations of the relative profitability of crops. Thus, these farmers cultivate cash or commercial crops (sugarcane, cotton) for sale in order to later maximise their

economic capacity to purchase foodgrains(millets, jowar and ragi) for self-consumption. Hence, a given farmer likes to have higher prices for the commercial crops he sells but at the same time desires lower prices for the foodgrains he has to purchase. In my opinion, the SS had been able to garner the support of this category largely through a clever mobilising strategy of demanding remunerative prices for cash crops. Contrary to its rhetoric, it is the interests of the dominant peasantry that were being advanced by the SS. This can be further explicable with reference to the distribution of gains from remunerative prices. It can be stated that the landlord and rich peasant category, by virtue of producing a larger proportion of the marketable surplus, cornered a disproportionate share of the profits, and were able to take advantage of the credit subsidies. They are able to withhold stocks and are in a better bargaining position in the market. While the middle peasant category gains in **absolute** terms, they benefit less in **relative** terms. They profit from an increase in prices, input subsidies and loan waivers, but the gains are offset to some extent by inflation(see Nadkarni 1987). As opposed to the dominant peasantry, the rural underclass (comprising the marginal landholders, the landless and the agricultural labourers) that constitutes nearly half the rural population subsists on wage labour and has substantial market dependence, albeit of a different kind. They are net purchasers of food and other subsistence goods. Having practically no agricultural produce to sell, they have no objective reasons to extend support to the SS. The demand for remunerative prices concerns them only in a negative sense. An increase in prices undermines their position further and pushes them deeper into poverty. They pay dearly for the consequent inflation as there is no corresponding rise in their agricultural wages.

As a matter of fact, the farmers were engaged in conflict with agricultural labour over wage levels. The primary and immediate concern of the agricultural labourers is with land, higher wages, secure and assured employment and better working conditions. Although Joshi had raised the wage issue his position was inconsistent. He had admitted that, 'employment and wages, and not empty titles to land are the real needs of the labourers'(GOI 1991:26) and criticised the criterion used to determine the minimum wages<sup>31</sup>. Joshi had proposed that the, *Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan* formula be adopted, that the wages fixed should be equal to the entering pay of an army Jawan – Rs. 25 per day(ibid). But, his stance was equivocal as is evident from the contradictory statements

made by him on the wage issue(see GOI 1991 14-15,33-4) Any link between the receipt by farmers of higher crop prices and the payment of higher wages(the trickle-down argument) was problematic This is because he had claimed higher wage costs as a rationale for higher crop prices Following this logic, if wage costs were already too high, then any increase in prices would merely offset these high wages Initially the rural underclass might have been attracted by the pronouncements of sectoral differences and the promise of higher wages But soon after they realised that the SS did not reflect their aspirations Furthermore the question of wages was never taken up as an organising issue In my opinion, it was only raised rhetorically and to counter the criticisms levelled at SS of being a 'kulak' movement<sup>32</sup>

On the land question, the SS has consistently maintained that land redistribution was irrelevant to the eradication of rural poverty Joshi had stated 'Land is more a liability than an asset, it will become an asset only if remunerative prices are given'(GOI 1991) The SS has in fact proposed the scrapping of ceiling laws According to Joshi, 'these have tended to impinge upon the fundamental rights of the farmers and particularly those of rural women'(ibid 15)<sup>33</sup> The leaders argued that ceiling laws and the restrictions on the consolidation of land were responsible for making agriculture unprofitable Following the 'urban bias' thesis, they have pointed out that it was unfair that ceiling laws were only applicable to rural areas and demanded comparable ceilings on non-agricultural and urban property(ibid )

From the above discussion it is explicitly perceptible that the Sanghatana's claims of representing the interests of the rural underclass were groundless and could not be substantiated Concretely behind the façade of the so-called 'rural interests' were hidden particular interests Clearly, the hegemony of the dominant peasantry had been perpetuated and accentuated by the activities of the SS The increasing incidence of violence against the *dalits* definitely testified to this (see Guru 1991, 1994) Ironically, in an earlier essay, Omvedt had commended that behind the caste-wars and increasing *haryan* atrocities were the class wars 'Caste was only the form, the reality is class struggle'(Omvedt 1981 10)

Joshi had repeatedly advanced the idea that the SS is multi-class and multi-caste, and Omvedt(1993) has reiterated his arguments Omvedt(1988, 1993, 1994) has admitted that a large proportion of the Sanghatana comprises the landed marathas but had acknowledged that

the social base of the SS included 'a wide range of non-Brahmin castes, the artisans and specialised farmer-herder 'other backward castes', upper castes and *dalits* and tribals or *adivasis*(were) also found in its ranks but(were) under-represented'(Omvedt 1994 136) She had admitted that *dalits* continued to be exploited and faced atrocities at the hands of the upper castes and the landed classes, yet she argued that there had been a conscious effort by *dalit* organisations to make 'alliance' with the Shetkari Sanghatana(Omvedt 1988 41)<sup>34</sup> In Maharashtra, there are several *dalit* organisations such as Dalit Panthers, the Satyashodak Communist Party, Dalit Mukti Sena, and various factions of the Republican Party Amongst these only one *dalit* organisation, the Republican Party of India had associated with the SS and that also during only the cotton agitations This was because a section of the *dalits* was of cotton growers Moreover, even this alliance was short-lived

I admit that some landless labourers and poor peasants may have participated in the agitations, but their presence has been exaggerated by Joshi and Omvedt(1993) Their presence was symbolic or allegorical than concrete or actual and could be explained by two factors Firstly, due to the existence of caste and kinship links with the dominant peasantry, and not because the SS represented their interests or aspirations It is clearly perceptible that deep ambivalence had marked the attitude of the rural underclass towards the SS On the one hand, their interests were diametrically opposed to the dominant peasantry, and on the other hand, they have economic and affective ties with them Secondly, the presence of a small number of the rural underclass could be attributed manifestly to coercion rather than voluntary participation It could be explicated by the persistence of patron-client relations and for reasons of economic dependence(for loans and employment) on the dominant peasantry The dominant peasantry are well-entrenched in positions of power and patronage such as in panchayats and cooperatives They wielded their considerable power to secure the compulsive participation of some agricultural labourers and poor peasants Thus, in some villages the gram panchayat had threatened to levy a fifty-rupee on any household that did not send at least one member to participate in the agitations(cited in Omvedt 1980)

Hence, clearly there were contradictions between the rhetoric and the praxis of the SS By incorporating on their agenda issues such as wages, the dominant peasantry had portrayed and presented its specific class objectives as popular objectives More precisely the mobilising ideology



of agrarian populism had camouflaged the dominant class character of the SS. This discourse deflected attention from class contradictions within the agrarian sector, by recasting the agrarian population as a (non-economic) cultural category. In practice, the Sanghatana embodied only sectional interests – the interests of the dominant peasantry – which were opposed to the interests of the rural underclass. And a critical role had been performed by the leaders and the ‘organic-intellectuals’, especially Joshi and ‘intellectual-activists’ such as Omvedt to perform the hegemonic function and popularise the idea of rural interests. Additionally, the populist discourse by projecting not class but communal identities and by appropriating nationalist symbols had created an ideological space for the emergence of the politics of ethnic identity and nationalism. According to Brass (1994b: 44-45), there are striking similarities in the components that structure the discourse of the SS, and the Hindu ‘right’ (such as Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), Shiv Sena and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP))<sup>35</sup>. In Maharashtra, the Shetkari Sanghatana had acted as a catalyst for the spread of Shiv Sena (the ‘Hindu’ right) to rural areas<sup>36</sup>. This has been the case in other states also (see Brass 1994a: 15, Hasan 1994). Gill (1994), has also observed that in Punjab the discourse of the Bhartiya Kisan Union (farmers’ movement) has been affected by the rise of Sikh separatism, and he analyses how the invocation of Sikh religious idioms in the course of mobilising the farmers has alienated the Hindu farmers in the state. Similarly, Assadi (1994) has observed that the agrarian struggles in Karnataka similarly correspond to ethnic conflict, a process whereby exploitative economic relationships were represented as caste inequalities.

### **Are the Farmers’ Movement a New Social Movement?**

Both Omvedt and Lindberg have argued that the farmers’ movements are a ‘new social movement’.<sup>37</sup> These claims for ‘newness’ derive largely from what are perceived to be a combination of novel actions, objectives, organisational forms and ideology. There are five senses in which ‘newness’ is suggested by these authors (see Byres 1994, Brass 1994a).

- 1 Agency has passed from the subsistence-oriented peasantry to the commodity-producing farmers. While the ‘earlier’ agrarian movements fought for land and better leasing arrangements

- against the landlords and the colonial state, the 'new' movements see the state as the enemy and focus on agricultural prices which are largely determined by the state
- 2 They profess that they have invented 'new' methods of agitation
  - 3 They are characterised by an independent and 'new' ideology which is anti-state, anti-urban and anti-capitalist
  - 4 Several of the 'earlier' agrarian movements were organised by political parties, mostly by the left Unlike these, the agitational form and organisational style of the farmers' movements is non-party one According to Omvedt(1988 12, 1993 116), the farmers' movements have an anti-party thrust, and these are autonomous from all political parties
  - 5 In a limited sense, by incorporating and associating with the environmental(Greens), women, and the tribals, the farmers' movements are part of the new democratic vision embracing a new set of post-material values

The reasons forwarded to claim the status of a new social movement may be contested by the following arguments

- 1 Land continues to be on the agenda, albeit in a different form The farmers have demanded the abolition of ceilings on landownership Opposition to the state is not 'new' either nor are demands such as prices or lower taxes As discussed earlier, there are historical continuities between the Gandhian led agrarian movements and the contemporary farmers' movements
- 2 The claims of employing novel and distinctive agitational methods are questionable They were actually old tactics employed by farmers in Maharashtra, and women in the anti-famine agitations(see Mies 1976)<sup>38</sup>
- 3 The ideological discourse also is not 'new' In fact, important components of this discourse and the structuring principle of an urban-rural divide are prefigured and symptomatic of the politics and ideology of populism Agrarian populism has a historical lineage that can be traced back to the moral economy argument, the 'middle peasant thesis' and Chayanov's theory(see Brass 1991) In India, neo-populism can be traced

- back to Gandhi before Independence and in the post Independence period to the mobilisations of Charan Singh
- 4 Also, their claims of being 'apolitical', non-party and non-electoral are not veritable. Admittedly until 1989, the farmers' movements had no interest in capturing political power. However, as part of electoral strategy, they have at different times extended support to different political parties, and regardless of the political ideology of these parties. For instance, the SS aligned with the Congress(S) in 1984 and 1985 during the parliamentary and assembly elections, and then in 1987 it supported both the Bhartiya Janata Party and the Republican Party (*The Times of India*, 26/2/1985, *The Times of India*, 26/3/1986, *The Times of India*, 28/3/1987, *Deccan Herald*, 21/12/1987, *Statesman*, 18/12/1987). At the national level, the SS has attempted to counter the ruling party by aligning itself with V P Singh (the Janata Dal) during the parliamentary elections in 1989.

On the one hand, the farmers' movements have claimed to be concerned only with grassroots democratisation and not state power, on the other, the farmers' movements in Karnataka and Maharashtra have contested elections (for municipalities, Zila Parishads, and cooperatives) and organised themselves as political parties. It needs to be emphasised that in 1994, Sharad Joshi, the Shetkari Sanghatana leader, launched the Swatantrya Bharat Party. However, the party has not met with much electoral success in the last assembly elections (see Vora 1996: 173).

In my opinion, the farmers' movements are not anti-state in their orientation. The antagonism towards the state is partial and class-specific. These movements definitely did not want to do away with the state, but only change the relation between the rural economy and the state with the commoditisation of agriculture. While state intervention on the issue of remunerative prices is perceived as desirable and thus actively sought, there is simultaneously an equally strong opposition to the (actual or potential) implementation of legislation enforcing ceilings and minimum wages. Moreover, on occasions, they have actively collaborated with the state apparatus. In 1991, Joshi became the Chairman of the Standing Advisory Committee on Agriculture with the status of a cabinet minister.

- 5 The support for women's issues, *dalits* and environmental issues, which is used to corroborate their claims of being 'new' and progressive are not valid. Since some of the 'earlier' agrarian movements also had incorporated gender (such as in the Tebhaga and the Telengana movements), and ecological issues (such as in the Chipko movement). More recently, as the events between 1999-2001 have revealed, Joshi's and the farmers' movements had mythical commitment to environmental issues or alternative development strategies. Joshi has undeniably contradicted his earlier stand in projecting the SS as a vanguard of the oppressed and the marginalised. He has been repeatedly allying against the anti-dam 'Narmada bachao andolan' or movement of the predominantly tribal peasants of Madhya Pradesh.

As I have mentioned earlier, the SS formed a women's front and also claimed to have an agenda of women's empowerment. It is not possible to take up this aspect in detail, but I am briefly discussing it to emphasise the disjunction that was present here in the rhetoric and praxis of the movement on the issue of gender. The question posed here is whether the discourse and praxis of the SS has reinforced or reconstituted gender identities. By the reconstruction of gender identities we understand and follow that there is a questioning of the established patriarchal gender norms and ideologies. It needs to be emphasised that women had joined the movement spontaneously, and not for the fulfilment of their gender specific demands. The idea of forming the women's front and its agenda were therefore decisions taken by the male leaders. Women's participation **never** got translated into positions of decision-making or leadership.

Briefly, the gender agenda of the SS is evident through Joshi's theorisation on gender oppression in a booklet named *Shudori, in the luxmi mukti* campaign for giving land rights to women, proposal of putting up all women panchayat panels in the elections and in portraying a vanguard role for women in the alternative development programmes (ecofeminist arguments) of the SS. Joshi proclaimed the liberation of men and women through the awakening of women's power *stri shakticya jagarant, stri purush mukti*. The discourse proclaimed the objective of liberation of women, however, in practice the leaders continually procrastinated on the women's question. Joshi's theorisation

on gender oppression never questioned violence and patriarchy within the family and women are posited as a unitary category undifferentiated by caste, class, religion and ethnicity. In the *luxmi mukti* campaign nominal transfers were made by very few individuals (husbands) and became another form of *benami* transfers to evade land ceiling laws. **The campaign was directed at husbands(not men) to 'gift'(not as right) land to their(dutiful) wives(and not women!)** When it came to panchayat elections hardly any women panels were supported by the SS. If some women panels won the election it was on account of the initiative and efforts and not because of any support by the SS. The alternative development programme – *sita shetti* campaign – encouraged women to cultivate their land organically for subsistence(not commercial) agriculture. The ecofeminist arguments of the SS further have essentialised women's link to nature, and are inherently not liberative but conservative in nature. Hence, the manner in which the programme was implemented categorically exposes the duplicity of the leaders on the gender question. Paradoxically, gender equations in the family and in society were upset but not due to the efforts of the leadership, but due to the politicisation of women's consciousness through movement participation in the past. As I have argued in a forthcoming paper, the gender agenda was determined and dictated by the dominant class interests of the movement. Women's agency emerged latently due to their participation in movement praxis.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the radical 'new' agenda claimed by the farmers' movements is neither radical nor new. It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the claims made by Shetkari Sanghatana of being a new social movement are neither cogent nor legitimate. The SS was representing the dominant class interests of the dominant peasantry. The politics of class dominated the agenda and the praxis of the movement. Thus, the SS can be assuredly placed within the rubric of the 'earlier' agrarian movements which were organised on class issues.

Table 1  
**Agrarian Class Structure**

Category	Class Position	Source of Livelihood
Landlords	Large landowners and ex-zamindars	Living on rent and from the exploitation of labour
Rich peasants	Agrarian capitalists and gentlemen farmers	Living from the exploitation of labour
Middle peasants	Owner cultivators, bullock capitalists and tenants	Living through 'self exploitation' of family labour on their own land and may occasionally hire labour
Poor peasants	Marginal landholders and tenants	Living on income through family labour and some wage labour
Agricultural labours	Labourers with some land and the landless	Living on wages

Table 2  
**Caste-Class Complex in Maharashtra**

Category	Class position and Size of the Landholding	Caste Background
Landlords and rich peasants	Large and upper medium landholders (above 4 hectares)	Mostly maratha-kunbis and a few Brahmins
Middle peasants	Medium and small landowners (1-4 hectares)	Mostly maratha-kunbis, artisan castes, a few dalits, OBCs and adivasis
Poor peasants, agricultural labourers	Marginal landholders and the landless (less than 1 hectare)	Mostly dalits, OBCs, adivasis and a few maratha-kunbis

### APPENDIX-1

#### A Chronology of Events in the Shetkari Sanghatana

October	1979	SS is established at Chakan by Joshi
November		Onion agitations launched under Joshi's leadership in Nasik and Pune and they spread to most of Vidarbha and Marathwada
April	1981	The agitations for higher prices of tobacco are launched at Nipani

January	1982	SS holds its First Conference at Satara
October		The Inter-State Coordination Committee formed under Joshi's leadership
	1984	Conference at Parbhani which passed resolutions on boycotting industrial inputs to agriculture, not going to the market and cultivating for subsistence
	1985	Aligned with the Congress(S)
November	1986	The women's conference is held at Chandwad It is marked by the release of 'Shidori' written by Sharad Joshi which puts forward the SS ideology on gender oppression The women's front of the SS, the Shetkar Sanghatana Mahila Aghadi(SSMA), is launched
January	1987	Agitations for higher prices of cotton are launched Aligned with the BJP and the Republican Party for the elections
June		A training <i>shubir</i> women is held at Ambethan to discuss women's participation in the forthcoming panchayat elections It is attended by Vidyut Bhagwat(Pune based feminist scholar), a few SS activists and about 40 women activists of the SSMA The Samagra Mahila Aghadi(SMA) or the 'women's front' is formed
October		The elections to panchayats are postponed indefinitely
	1988	Joshi goes on a fast at Wardha demanding freedom from debt for farmers
January	1989	The second women's conference of the SSMA is held at Amravati where the Hingoli programme of <i>luxmi-mukti</i> is launched women were to be given property rights Another resolution was passed that the SS would contest the assembly elections from the Janata Dal platform Officially 35 candidates, including ten women, contested but only five won the elections
October		The farmers' rally is held at Boat Club in Delhi where a split took place within the farmers' movement due to differences between Joshi and Tikait
November		Elections to Zilla Parishad are held About eight all-women panchayats were elected, while nine panels had been put up by the Sanghatana activists, only five won
January	1990	A fast and a <i>parchar yatra</i> is undertaken by Joshi against the Shiv Sena and to mobilise support for the SS
February		The decision by the SS to contest assembly elections on Janata Dal tickets and fight the communal forces such as Shiv Sena Out of 35 candidates, including ten women, only five won

September	1991	The decision to take up the cause of organic farming is taken at Alandi village
November		The <i>Chaturang-sheti</i> campaign announced at a rally at Shegaon The National Agricultural Policy Report(GOI 1991) submitted to the government is adopted as the manifesto
January	1992	Villagers in about 300 villages have transferred land to women
October	1993	A mass rally of nearly 2 lakh farmers in Aurangabad passed a resolution in favour of the Dunkel draft and liberalisation The third convention of the SSMA passes a resolution opposing the 81st Amendment which proposes reservation of seats for women
	1994	The Swatantrya Bharat Party(SBP) launched by Joshi
	1995	In the assembly elections, the SBP contested from almost 150 constituencies, but secured only 2 seats(including one Scheduled Caste)
April	1997	Sharad Joshi gives leadership to the agitations by farmers in Haryana and Punjab for higher prices of wheat However, the agitations were shortlived
January	1998	Sharad Joshi extends support to Shiv Sena
October	1999	The farmers' movement under Joshi's leadership forms the Narmada Jan Andolan as a mass counter movement against the Narmada Bachao Andolan of the anti-dam activists
December	1999	Launching of <i>kar seva</i> demonstrations for raising the heights of the Narmada Dam by the farmers' movement of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka

### Notes

- 1 This paper is based on my M Phil dissertation submitted in March 1998 to the Department of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics I am grateful to Prof A Chakravarti, Prof B S Baviskar, and Prof J P S Uberoi for their comments and suggestions on the dissertation The material used for this paper is drawn primarily from secondary sources as cited in the references The Shetkari Sanghatana has published a considerable amount of material and in three languages – Marathi, English and Hindi These are in the form of books, booklets, resolution-papers, pamphlets and posters, and constitute the primary source for my critical analysis of the SS These have been mostly authored by Sharad Joshi The other source which has been widely used are the writings of Omvedt, an academic who later became an



- activist in the SS Apart from books and articles in academic journals, as cited in the references, I have used the following material reports published both by government and non-governmental agencies, seminar presentations and conference papers on agrarian movements and gender, and a large number of articles, reports and interviews from various newspapers and news-magazines, both from sympathetic and critical perspectives
- 2 Praxis refers to theory informed political activity It refers to action and in the Marxian sense to free, universal, creative and self creative activity through which man creates(makes, produces) and changes(shapes) his historical, human world, including man himself In 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Introduction' Marx proclaims revolution as the true praxis(cited in Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Bottomore(ed) 1983 384-389)
- 3 See Scott 1990 19
- 4 I cannot agree entirely with D Gupta's(1992, 1997) conceptualisation of the farmers' movements as 'farmers' unions' which 'emphasises the manner in which the countryside enters into the fray of supra-local politics on very economistic demands'(1997 1) In my opinion while undeniably several demands are economistic(such as agricultural prices, and input and credit subsidies), in ideological terms the farmers' movements have also addressed a whole range of issues(such as gender, rural development and environment) which go beyond the purely economistic concerns
- 5 The total input subsidies to agriculture have increased from 65614 28 million rupees in 1980-81 to 1179360 26 million rupees in 1986-87 See Gulati(1989) for details
- 6 The sugar cooperatives have traditionally been the strongholds of the Congress(I), to which the Sanghatana has emerged as an oppositional force Western Maharashtra also constitutes the locus of politico-economic power in the state(see Lele 1981, Srisikar 1995) Lele(1981) has observed that the state policies such as credit and favourable terms of import have favoured sugarcane over other crops such as onions, tobacco and cotton These are the crops cultivated in the dry-farming regions of Vidarbha and Marathwada and the SS has organised agitations for these crops
- 7 I have inverted Scott's(1985) formulation of 'the weapons of the weak by which he refers the everyday forms of resistance used by the underprivileged and the oppressed In using 'the weapons of the strong' I want to emphasise that the farmers do not constitute the underprivileged and oppressed sections
- 8 *Rasta-roko*, contrary to popular belief, was not invented by the farmers' movements but was initiated by rural women during the anti-famine

- agitations in Dhule district, Maharashtra during 1972-73(see Mies 1976)
- 9 In Punjab, Haryana and in Uttar Pradesh the farmers' agitations have been organised on food crops such as rice and wheat. However, in these states(unlike in Maharashtra) these food crops are also commercial or cash crops cultivated for sale and the proportion of deficit farmers is low
  - 10 A former official in the Indian Postal Service he was later selected for a posting with the Universal Postal Union(a United Nations affiliate) in Berne, Switzerland. He holds the M A degree in Statistics from the University of Bombay and is well versed with theories of Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Stalin, Lenin, Gandhi, Kalecki, Schultz and Lipton
  - 11 Sunil Sahasrabudhey(1989) has conceptualised this as *bahishkrit samaj*(*Bharat*) versus the *paschumikriti samaj*(westernized *India*). For him the entire economy is the internal colony of the towns that are part of *India*
  - 12 These points have been summed up by Balagopal(1987)
  - 13 Lipton(1977) accepts the rural and urban division as critical. Underpinning 'urban bias' is a polarisation of city and country into opposing classes. In his opinion, in the vast majority of poor countries the resources for development(financial, physical and human) are deliberately and systematically allocated such that the share going to rural people is far less and that going to city-people is far more than considerations of either efficiency or equity would suggest as desirable. Every mechanism of surplus transfer is relentlessly geared to achieve this. For a critique of Lipton's theory, see Byres(1979)
  - 14 The marathi term *khedut* which refers to owner-cultivators has been consciously avoided(Gupta 1997: 150)
  - 15 The income criterion is highly suspect, with a large scope for manipulation and hiding the actual income. Further landownership confers not only material but symbolic and ideological power in the community
  - 16 Omvedt has eschewed her earlier stand from a critic of the movement to one of a supporter and activist in the SS. In her earlier articles(1980, 1983) she had observed that not only is the movement being led by rich peasants, 'it is also a movement basically of the rural rich which is in contradiction to the interests of the majority of the rural poor who basically require lower prices for food, higher wages, and an end to atrocities, village goondaism and casteism'(Omvedt 1980: 2042). As Ray and Jha have rightly discerned, a consequence of the support Omvedt initially extended in 1986 to Joshi, following his pronouncements on gender oppression, she shifted politically from a marxist to a bourgeois/populist position(Ray and Jha 1987: 2229)

- 17 Furthermore, Joshi(1986) locates the root cause of women's oppression in violence. He has not followed Engels(1977) in locating its origin in the emergence of private property.
- 18 Omvedt has pointed out that the nature of the looting system was not linked to an analysis of the development of capitalism as such. Joshi has not focussed on the role of local inequalities – inequalities within the village, between the labourers and peasants, and between the various castes(1993 125-6)
- 19 The agrarian struggles organised by Gandhi like the Bardoli no-tax campaign and the Champaran *satyagraha* were basically rich peasant movements of the upper-middle castes. These were reformist and fundamental questions relating to land control, were not raised. See Dhanagare(1975, 1983) for details. See Byres(1988) for a discussion of Charan Singh's agrarianism.
- 20 According to Laclau, 'the people or the power bloc contradiction is an antagonism whose intelligibility depends not on the relations of production but the complex of political and ideological relations of domination constituting a determinate social formation'(1977 166)
- 21 As used by Gramsci, the concept of hegemony implies domination of a class not through any special organisation of force but because it is able to go beyond narrow corporate interests, exert a moral and intellectual leadership and make compromises with a variety of allies who are unified in a social block of forces(which) represent a basis of consent for a certain order in which the hegemony of the dominant class is created and revealed(see Bottomore 1985 201-3)
- 22 Following Gramsci(1976), 'organic intellectuals' refers to the chief functionaries of the dominant class who mediate between social groups and the world of production and exercise influence both on the state and civil society as a whole.
- 23 According to Bress(1991) the potent image of ruralism as advanced by the populist discourse has its roots in the romantic-conservative tradition(which is an anti-modern or anti-rational philosophy) and can be traced back to the moral economy argument, the middle peasant thesis and Chayanovian neo-populism.
- 24 Source: Prof. A. Chakravarti, personal communication.
- 25 In my opinion, the term 'dominant peasantry' is a misnomer. Generally the connotations associated with the peasantry are about its under-dog or under-privileged location in the power structure.
- 26 Since the 12th century, the term 'maratha' has connoted an elite group of fighters and commanders. The 'high' marathas(of deshमुख and patil lineages) are the former feudal lords and have large land holdings and juridical authority. These 'high' marathas are distinguished from the major section of maratha-kunbis peasant cultivators or the 'low'

- marathas However substantial economic and status differences, there is no cultural difference between the marathas and the kunbis These difference are effectively concealed or overridden by a shared cultural world-view, flexible and fluid caste-boundaries, an ideology which is patrimonial and patriarchal in its emphasis(Lele 1981, 1990, Sirisikar 1995, Gupta 1997)
- 27 Following Mandelabum's (1970 358-86) dominant caste thesis substantial control over land, ritual rank, numerical strength and a willingness to use that strength to assert dominance, the marathas are the dominant caste in Maharashtra
- 28 'Rural underclass' is a term I have adopted from Prof Chakravarti Caste-wise the rural underclass is the most heterogeneous and lacks unity
- 29 Interestingly, A Varshney(1995) who subscribes to the theme of 'urban bias', has argued that farmer empowerment in India is attributable to the fact that democracy preceded industrialisation, a situation which confers on the rural sector the capacity of rural veto on unfavourable policies According to him, politics based on economic issues has the potential to unite the countryside against urban India but politics based on religious, caste and ethnic identities blocks the economic construction of interests and are constraints on farmers' empowerment
- 30 Mention may be made of the study by W Borkar and M V Nadkarni (1975) on the impact of drought in 1972-73 in two villages of drought prone areas in Maharashtra, where it was found that even cultivators with 50 acres or more sought employment in relief works to avoid starvation(cited in Nadmarni 1987 24)
- 31 The criterion used is based on calorific requirements of a family of five, including two workers with 40 percent added for other expenditure
- 32 Lenin's(1964) term for the agrarian capitalists or the rich peasant category
- 33 The question of land rights for women had actually been used to justify the scrapping of ceiling laws The GOI report had recommended that the surplus land be redistributed or transferred in the name of the female family members(GOI 1991 16) By giving land rights to their wives the activists of the SS cleverly circumvented the ceiling laws
- 34 In the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra, the mahars(*dalits*) are comparatively more prosperous and are landholding categories, unlike their counterparts in western Maharashtra(Sirisikar 1995 59-64) Hence, it is possible that they have participated in the agitations organised by the SS
- 35 For details on the BJP-VHP-Shiv Sena discourse see Anderson and Damle(1987)

- 36 Shiv Sena connotes Shivaji's army. Founded by Bal Thackeray it was originally urban-based but now has a significant rural presence. The party was organised originally to safeguard the interests of 'the sons of soil', 'Maharashtra for *maharashtrians*' with an anti-south bias. The Shiv Sena in alliance with the BJP has now changed its stance to 'Hindustan for *Hindus*' with a pronounced anti-Muslim bias (see Sirisikar 1995 187-90)
- 37 According to Brass, 'the farmers' movements are indeed the same as the new social movements, but paradoxically because neither are in fact new, being much rather the same old class movements articulating the same old class discourses' (1994 6)
- 38 Lindberg (1994) acknowledges this point

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## **Profession**

### **Secretary's Report** *January 1999 to December 2000*

Presented at XXVI All India Sociological Conference  
University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram  
29-31 December 2000

Friends, I am happy to present the report of the Indian Sociological Society which pertains to the period January 1999 to December 2000. As you know, the XXV All-India Sociological Conference (AISC, for short) was held at Aligarh Muslim University in December 1998 when Prof T K Oommen was the President of the Indian Sociological Society (ISS, for short) and I the Secretary. Despite our best efforts we could not hold any conference in 1999. Following the declaration of the election results, Professor B S Baviskar and I assumed charge as President and Secretary, respectively, of ISS in December 1999. As per the provisions of the Constitution, the President appointed Prof Tulsi Patel as Treasurer of the Society. On the acceptance of the resignation of Dr George Mathew from the Managing Committee, Prof S P Punalekar, who had polled the next largest number of votes in the elections held in 1997, was invited by the President to fill the vacant post.

On behalf of the Society and on my own behalf as Secretary, I wish to place on record our thanks to Prof T K Oommen and Prof Mohini Anjum, outgoing President and Treasurer, respectively, for their contribution to the further advancement of the Society. Under Prof Oommen's guidance, the Society was able not only to consolidate its past gains but also to move forward with distinction in every direction as an organised body with a forceful academic presence and as an effective channel for scholarly exchange of ideas and perspectives.

At the outset, on behalf of the Society, I wish to express our gratitude and appreciation to Prof B Iqbal, Vice-Chancellor, University of Kerala, for extending the invitation to hold the XXVI All-India Sociological Conference at Thiruvananthapuram and making all the facilities available. Our special thanks to Prof J J Kattakayam, Organising

Secretary and Prof P K B Nayar, Working Chairman, and members of their Local Organising Committee for making excellent arrangements and looking after all the comforts of the delegates

The XXVI All India Sociological Conference was organised in a new format. The earlier practice of organising four panels on sub-themes with scholars invited to present working papers on each sub-theme as well as the open panel was dispensed with. Instead, we had three symposia on three sub-themes of the Conference theme, Civil Society in India. The Research Committees were given adequate opportunity and time to organise discussions on papers presented by the RC members, as well as to take up other professional matters. In spite of various practical problems, most RCs did manage to conduct business to the members' satisfaction. However, a few could not transact at all. Nevertheless, the conference enabled a good feedback on the RC programme. During the General Body meeting, members pointed out several shortcomings in the programme and gave valuable suggestions for improvement. The members found the introspective exercise quite useful. I wish to thank all the conveners of RCs and their representatives who coordinated discussions in conveners' absence.

The XXVI All India Sociological Conference was inaugurated by Nobel Laureate Prof Amartya Sen, who spoke on different dimensions of civil society. The session was presided over by Dr B Iqbal, Vice-Chancellor of the Kerala University. Since Prof Alberto Martinelli, President of International Sociological Association, had to suddenly cancel his visit to India to participate in the Conference, his learned address was presented by Prof Sujata Patel.

I take this opportunity to thank Prof Satish Saberwal, Prof D N Dhanagare and Dr George Mathew for chairing the three symposia and Prof Surendra Munshi, Prof Rajeshwar Prasad, Prof L Thara Bhai, Prof P K B Nayar, Prof T K Oommen, Prof Satish Saberwal, Prof D N Dhanagare, Dr Rowena Robinson, Dr Ananta K Giri, Dr Vikash N Pandey, Prof Sujata Patel for their erudite presentations at the three symposia. The high academic standards maintained by the symposia speakers and the participants from the audience were an intellectually gratifying experience.

During the period covered by this report, the Research Committees Programme of the ISS acquired a more definite shape with several RCs beginning to function as collectivities of interested scholars wishing to participate in serious academic debate and exchange of ideas. The MC

approved the formation of the 24th RC on Sociology of Knowledge with Prof Satish Saberwal and Dr Satish Deshpande as nominated Co-conveners. I am confident that despite the initial problems, with the members' enthusiasm and cooperation, the RC programme will strike deep roots. All colleagues are requested to join RCs, if they have not done it already. We are grateful to the nominated conveners for putting in their time and best efforts to launch the RCs. We can now hope that the RCs would be able to hold elections to elect office-bearers and thus function more democratically.

As you are aware, the ISS celebrates its 50 anniversary in 2001-02. This is an occasion which demands celebration commensurate with the high stature the society has attained over the years as an effective academic body of professionals. At its meeting held in April 2000, The MC set up an *ad hoc* committee comprising the President, Secretary, Treasurer and all the past Presidents available in Delhi to discuss the celebration of the Golden Jubilee.

The *ad hoc* committee met in May 2000 and discussed various possibilities, including the suggestions made by the MC at its meeting held in April 2000. The committee recommended the following:

- 1 The XXVII All India Sociological Conference in the year 2001 should be held at Mumbai if possible, to mark the Golden Jubilee year. As you might know, the Indian Sociological Society was established in Mumbai, in December 1951. In case the conference cannot be organised, then a seminar should be arranged.
- 2 All the past Presidents and Secretaries of Indian Sociological Society should be invited to participate in the XXVII Conference and a function be organised to felicitate them.
- 3 The Society office should have at least one complete set of all the volumes of *Sociological Bulletin* published so far. Gaps in the volumes should be identified and the missing issues obtained.
- 4 Persons may be approached (through the *Sociological Bulletin*, also) requesting them to institute prizes/medals in memory of eminent sociologists to be awarded at the Conference to scholars doing outstanding work.
- 5 Awards called ISS Career Awards should be instituted by the Society.

- 6 Bodies such as Department of Culture, ICSSR, and UGC could be approached for funds to organise XXVII Conference
- 7 Presidents of regional sociological associations should be felicitated at the XXVII Conference
- 8 An informal meeting of the representatives of regional associations should be arranged at the Conference to obtain a feedback
- 9 A series of volumes should be published by the Society containing articles on particular themes published in the *Sociological Bulletin* over the years. Persons may be commissioned by the Society for this purpose
- 10 One volume containing articles on Development of Sociology in India should be prepared. The articles could trace the changes in the orientations of the Society over the years
- 11 Publishers should be approached right away informing them about the proposed volumes. It was suggested to approach Orient Longman and Popular Prakashan in this connection. A 'concept statement' should be prepared for this purpose
- 12 At least, one volume should be published in 2001. Others may come later
- 13 One volume on the history of Sociology in India with special emphasis on the past 50 years should be brought out. The ICSSR could be approached to institute a Fellowship for two years to enable a scholar to write the history of sociology in India. Sufficient funds should be made available to the scholar for travel across the country to gather material for this purpose
- 14 A website on Indian sociology should be developed
- 15 A priced comprehensive index of all the volumes of *Sociological Bulletin* should be published
- 16 Distinguished Indian sociologists should be honoured
- 17 Information about regional sociological scientists/associations should be compiled
- 18 A history of the Indian Sociological Society should be prepared. The document should be ready for the Golden Jubilee session. Prof. T. K. Oommen should be requested to prepare the document
- 19 A directory of all the Life Members should be compiled

We thank the members of the *ad hoc* committee for their valuable suggestions

The Society is taking in full earnest its association with regional sociological associations in the country on persistent demands by them for the same. Some of the regional associations are quite active professionally and it would be to the benefit of both the ISS and these associations to interact on a more formal footing and on a regular basis. In the first place the Society is collecting information about the regional associations, their activities and their office-bearers, etc. for formalising the mode of affiliation. Members are requested to help us compile this information about the regional associations.

The Managing Committee considered and accorded its approval to a proposal to create an Endowment Fund in the memory of the late Professor M N Srinivas, one of the esteemed founder members of the Society, from the accumulated royalties amounting to Rs 1,65,800 received from the Srinivas Festschrift volumes and a matching grant of Rs 2,00,000 from the ICSSR to the Society. The fund would be utilised to institute Prof M N Srinivas Memorial Lecture to be given by an eminent sociologist/social anthropologist, to be delivered at the AISC, and to institute Prof M N Srinivas Memorial Prize to be awarded to a young sociologist or social anthropologist for publishing the best sociological/social anthropological paper in any social science journal in India. The honorarium for the lecture and prize would be Rs 10,000 and Rs 1,000, respectively, in the beginning, but may be increased in future. The prize shall be handed over at the AISC. The details of this proposal were worked out by a committee comprising the President of ISS, a nominee of the ICSSR and a nominee of the editors of the Festschrift volumes. A formal agreement was signed by Prof B S Baviskar, President, ISS, Dr R Burman-Chandra, Member Secretary, ICSSR and Prof A M Shah, one of the editors of the Festschrift entitled 'Social Structure and Change', on 3 August 2000. I am sure that members will welcome this landmark development which is bound to further enhance the academic role played by the Society on the intellectual scene. On behalf of the society, I thank the editors of the Srinivas volume, viz., Prof A M Shah, B S Baviskar and E A Ramaswamy, and Prof M L Sondhi, Chairman, ICSSR, for this valuable contribution to the society.

I am happy to inform colleagues that for the first time the Society has published volume entitled *Nation and National Identity in South Asia*



edited by S L Sharma and T K Oommen. The volume consists of 11 papers presented at the XXV AISC held at Aligarh Muslim University in December 1998.

Since the last General Body was held in December 1998, several life members and other members have been admitted to the Society. We welcome our new colleagues.

Friends, I am sure you would agree that the two most important activities carried out by the Society are, a) bringing out the Society's journal *Sociological Bulletin* twice a year, and b) holding the AISC.

Thanks to the efforts of the present Managing Editor, Prof S L Sharma and his immediate predecessor, Prof M N Panini, and all earlier editors and their respective teams, the *Sociological Bulletin* has acquired a high stature among social science journals due to its high academic quality. A concerted effort is being made to bring the *Bulletin* on time. Friends, permit me to bring to your most urgent attention that it has become extremely difficult to bring out the journal because of the mounting costs involved in printing and dispatching it and paying for the secretarial help. The price of everything has increased manifold. Sending the *SB* free to all Life Members has become almost impossible. If I may mention here, the cost of only one copy of the *SB* is more than the Rs 100 that some of us paid as life membership fee of the Society.

I request the members to give their serious attention to this problem of resource constraints which, if not resolved, may force us to bring out only one issue a year. This I feel would be most unfortunate. One practical way out appears to be to request Life Members to pay a sum of Rs 1,000 each towards the publication and dispatch of the *Bulletin*. Only those of us who make this payment will get a copy of the *Bulletin*. This is only a suggestion for your serious consideration.

I now come to the second important activity – the holding of AISC. As you know, the RC programme has been activated and it is hoped that after the teething troubles the RCs would become viable and function as the key loci for academic exchanges and intellectual discussions. Such a development necessitates a rethinking on the academic programme of the Society. The time has come to have the AISC once every two years. The RCs would meet once during the AISC and once in the intervening year. As you have noted, the format of the XXVI Conference has changed to accommodate the RCs more effectively. The new format of AISC will widen the opportunities for scholars to present papers and

engage in fruitful intellectual exchanges without having to look at the clock

I must share with members the difficulties in organising conferences every year. Apart from the cost of everything related to the AISC going up, the invitation from universities and institutes to hold the Conference are becoming scarce. Sometimes these invitations are withdrawn at the last minute, due to unavoidable reasons, leaving very little time to look for an alternative host. I am sure you would approve of this idea of the AISC being held every alternate year with RCs meeting at least once every year.

Friends, I am doing plain speaking when I invite your attention to the financial problems being faced by the Society in discharging its duties to the best of our satisfaction. We do need some collective thinking, and action to find solutions to this problem. It will become extremely difficult for the Society to continue carrying out its essential activities if its financial situation is not redeemed urgently.

As Secretary of the Society, I wish to place on record my gratitude to Dr. George Mathew, Director, Institute of Social Sciences, for his help in running the Society's office. I wish to thank personally Mr. Krishnan Namboodiri, Mr. Madhusudan Nair, Mr. P. N. Kuttappan, Mr. Arumugam, Mrs. Molly Bino, Ms. Sapna Sharma, Mr. Nandakumar, Mr. Sunil, Mrs. Vidya, Mr. Amrendra Kumar, Mr. Balwant Singh Rawat, Mr. Jit Bahadur, Mr. Gopi, and Mr. Bhuvan for their cooperation given so willingly and smilingly.

I must thank the President, Professor B. S. Baviskar, for his help and guidance in not only giving direction to the Society but also for his help in day-to-day functioning of the Society. His ready availability whenever we need his help has contributed to the smooth functioning of the Society. The Society is bound to forge ahead under his dynamic leadership.

Friends, since we last met as a G. B. in December 1998, we have lost a few of our esteemed colleagues: Prof. M. N. Srinivas (Bangalore), Prof. Suresh Shukla (Delhi), Prof. Prabhat Chandra (Jabalpur) and Prof. A. R. Shah (Ahmedabad). Let us remember these departed colleagues and their contribution to the making of the Society and pay our respects by observing silence for two minutes in their memory.

**Aneeta A. Minocha**  
Secretary

Indian Sociological Society

**New Members of the Society**

Membership No	-	Name and Country/Place
LMI	1976	Jyotsana Sharma, Dehra Dun
	1977	Rajan Misra, Agra
	1978	Ram Naresh Yadav, Ballia
	1979	Baharul Islam Laskar, Barapani
	1980	V Raji Sugumar, Pondicherry
	1981	Rajib Nandi, New Delhi
	1982	Kuriakose Mamkoottam, New Delhi
	1983	Tribhu Nath Dubey, Chittorgarh
	1984	Supriya Seth, Chittorgarh
	1985	Vineetha Menon, Kanpur
	1986	Suresh Chandra, Meerut
	1987	Anita Kushwaha, Meerut
	1988	Anita Ravishankar, Mangalore
	1989	Shalini Suryanarayan, New Delhi
	1990	D Sivakumar, Trivandrum
	1991	Arvind Tiwari, Mumbai
	1992	Chandan Kumar Sharma, Assam
	1993	Ravindra Nath Prasher, Chandigarh
	1994	Jyotsna R Bapat, New Delhi
	1995	Nandini Sundar, New Delhi
	1996	P Gopinathan Pillai, Trivandrum
	1997	Anurekha Chari, Pune
	1998	Vibha Arora, New Delhi
	1999	Subodh Kumar, Durgapur
	2000	Amar Nath Sharma, Durg
	2001	Som Das Goswami, Raipur
	2002	Sujata Mohanty, Pune
	2003	Anishia Jayadev, Trivandrum
	2004	Jag Mohan Singh Verma, Lucknow
	2005	Surendra Nischal, Saharanpur
	2006	D Parthasarathy, Mumbai
	2007	Monika Nagori, Udaipur
	2008	Archana Ghosh, New Delhi
	2009	Manasendu Kundu, Calcutta

2010	Malika Basu, New Delhi
2011	Motilal Dash, Pili
2012	Sharfali Rastogi, Kanpur
2013	Aradhya Bhardwaj, Delhi
2014	Smita Mishra Panda, Anand
2015	Chaudhari Sandip Murlidhar, Jalgaon
2016	Shailja Singh, Lucknow
2017	Janki Abraham, Delhi
2018	James C Dabhi, S J , Ahmedabad
2019	Pushpesh Kumar, Nanded
2020	Basu Amit Ranjan, New Delhi
2021	V Sujatha, Goa
2022	Arima Mishra, Delhi
2023	Soudamini Rao, Gulbarga
2024	Aishwarya Mahajan, Jaipur
2025	Abraham Vijayan, Trivandrum
2026	Sanjay Singh, Lucknow
2027	Chaudhari Narayan Rajaram, Nashik
2028	Ramesh Narayan Warkhede, Nashik
2029	Shweta Prasad, Varanasi
2030	Urvashi Chandra, Ghaziabad
2031	Suman Goswami, Nadia
2032	Lalita J Jadav, Baroda
2033	Pandya M Nirbhayram, Gandhinagar
2034	E K Munira Beebi, Kannur
2035	Pranit Rawat, Jaipur
2036	Prema Rajagopalan, Chennai
2037	Rajesh Kumar Badoteya, Guna
2038	Harvinder Singh Bhatti, Patiala
2039	Rajwant Singh, Chandigarh
2040	Shinjin Chatterjee, Calcutta
2041	S G Thakur, Osmanabad
2042	Gita Pyal, Shillong
2043	Neha Kala, Jaipur
2044	Anupama Sharma, Jaipur
2045	Rishi Kumar Sharma, Jaipur
2046	C P Rosy, Thrissur
2047	Sr Maries, V L , Thrissur
2048	Surendra Singh, Varanasi

	2049	Rama Shanker Tripathi, Varanasi
	2050	Purushottam Pandey, Varanasi
	2051	Y K Sandhya, Banasthali
	2052	Anita Dash, Bhubaneswar
LMF	159	Kirk Johnson, USA
	160	W Duffie Van Balkom, Canada
M	45	Baidyanath Mahto, Darbhanga
	46	P Vigneswara Ilavarasan, Kanpur
	47	Anirban Sengupta, Nadia
	48	Sushila Mahor, Datia
	49	Meera Nagpal, New Delhi
	50	V Sujatha, Goa
	51	Ranjita Mohanty, New Delhi
	52	Biswambhar Panda, Kanpur
	53	Surajit C Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta
	54	Akhilesh Ranjan, New Delhi
	55	Usha Sharma, Gulbarga
	56	Anindya Jayanta Mishra, Kanpur
	57	Agnoor Preetam, Bangalore
	58	Aditya Raj, New Delhi
<b>Affiliations</b>		
AFL	01	Marathi Samajshastra Parishad, Latur
	02	Uttar Pradesh Samaj Shastra Parishad, Agra
	03	North-West Indian Sociological Association, Chandigarh
	04	Kerala Sociological Society, Thiruvananthapuram
	05	West Bengal Sociological Society, Calcutta

### Notice

The donations made to the Indian Sociological Society are entitled for the 80-G benefit. Our 80-G Certificate No. is DIT(E)2000-2001/I-392/87/1176 dated 23 March 2001, valid upto 31 03 2004.

*Secretary (Office)*

**Professor M. N. Srinivas Memorial Prize**

The Indian Sociological Society and the Indian Council of Social Science Research have jointly set up Professor M N Srinivas Endowment Fund. This Fund has instituted a prize for young sociologists/social anthropologists for publishing the best sociological/social anthropological paper in any of the social science journals, in English, in India. The prize will carry a sum of Rs 1000.

Papers published during 01 January 1998 - 31 December 2000 are eligible for consideration. The author must be 35 years or less in age on 31 December 2000. A reprint of the paper along with a photocopy of the title page of the journal must reach the office of Indian Sociological Society (Institute of Social Sciences, 8 Nelson Mandela Road, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi 110 070) on or before 31 August 2001. Besides the authors, others are also welcome to bring suitable papers to the notice of the selection committee for consideration.

**International Sociological Association**

**XV World Congress of Sociology**

*Brisbane, Australia, 7-13 July 2002*

Theme

The Social World in the Twenty-first Century  
The Ambivalent Legacies and Rising Challenges

For programme and other details contact

International Sociological Association  
Faculty of Political Science and Sociology  
University Complutense  
28223 Madrid, Spain  
Tel (34) 91352 7650 Fax (34) 91352 4945  
Email isa@sis.ucm.es

**Indian Sociological Society****XXVII All-India Sociological Conference***26-28 December 2001*

The XXVII All India Sociological Conference, Golden Jubilee Year (2001) will be held at the Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar, Punjab, on 26-28 December 2001. The theme of the Conference is "Half a Century of Sociology in India (1951-2001) Challenges, Responses and Expectations". The subjects of the three symposia are (i) The State of the Profession Indian Sociology—Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, (ii) The Emerging Information Society Challenges for the 21st Century, and (iii) Contemporary Punjab Development, Conflicts and Contradictions. The first M. N. Srinivas Memorial Lecture will also be delivered at the Conference.

All paper presentations at the Conference shall be only through the Research Committees with the prior approval of the Convenors of the respective Committees. The Organising Secretary of the Conference is Prof. Ranvinder Singh Sandhu. He may be contacted at the following address: Department of Sociology, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar 143 005, Tel. EPABX 0183 - 258804 - 09 Extn 3380, (home) 0183 - 258874 Fax 0183 - 258819, 258820 Email [ranvinder@yahoo.com](mailto:ranvinder@yahoo.com), [ranvinder.sandhu@usa.net](mailto:ranvinder.sandhu@usa.net). Do attend the Conference being held in the Golden Jubilee Year (2001) of the Society in the city of the Golden Temple.

**Aneeta A. Minocha**  
*Secretary*



## Style-Sheet for Reviewers

The *Sociological Bulletin* has, over the years, built up a reputation as an authoritative and lively journal and through your help and cooperation this reputation can be enhanced. Here are a few tips on how to approach a book that you are reviewing for the journal. A good review should whet the reader's appetite or warn her/him against a poorly conceived or executed book. The review itself should be engaging and should bring out both the substance and the value of the book besides providing a judgement on its success in achieving its aims. The following questions will be useful in writing the review.

- ❖ Does the book have a clear and significant thesis and methodology?
- ❖ What is its originality?
- ❖ What is the quality of the author's research and sources?
- ❖ Is the book well written and clearly organised?
- ❖ Is the appeal of the book narrow or broad?
- ❖ Where does it fit in its field? In sociology generally?

Avoid a simple listing of the papers and contributors of a symposium or a collection. Feel free to devote most of your space to the particular papers or ideas you find most stimulating. Avoid introducing the author of the book.

Let the merits of a good book be evident from your elaboration of its contents. Restrain yourself from providing an introduction by writing about the author or about the general class of books to which the title under review belongs. A purposive and concise review which concentrates on the contents of the book and shows liveliness and wit will be appreciated by the readers. Instead of using adjectives and enthusiastic expressions, try to persuade the reader of the book's worth by your reasoning. If the book is part of a series and you wish to call attention to the merits of that series, please do so. If you want to disagree with the author, explain her/his position sufficiently so that the reader can follow the argument. Avoid making much over small defects, such criticisms may create a misleading impression of the book. Your judgements, positive as well as negative, should be on the contents of the book and not on the personality or character of its author.

In your review, think of the book as a whole of its principle themes or topics, its most interesting lines of argument. Do not write an abstract or a chapter by chapter outline.

It is against the policy of the journal to publish unsolicited reviews. If you are interested in reviewing books for *Sociological Bulletin*, please write directly to the Managing Editor, specifying your field of interest and your specialisation.

### **General Instructions**

- 1 Please keep within the length allotted. Send us two copies of your review – with double line space – and keep one with you. Do not send a copy of your review to the author or editor of the work in question.
- 2 If you cannot submit your review on time, if you have reviewed the book already or are committed to review it elsewhere, please let us know at the earliest so that we can arrange an extension or find another reviewer. If you decide either that the book you have agreed to review does not merit a review in *Sociological Bulletin* or that you are, for any reason, an inappropriate reviewer, please let us know immediately.
- 3 Since we want balanced judgements we expect you to decline a work when a sense of overriding personal affection, obligation, competition or enmity exists with the author.
- 4 Do not use a reference list, footnotes, or long quotations. Your references to other works should be incorporated in the text.
- 5 For reviews of more than one book, list the books in alphabetical order by author.
- 6 Once having agreed to review a book, please make sure that you send the review within the stipulated time. Publishers and authors of books will be anxiously awaiting your expert judgement.
7. Please set-up your heading as shown in the format below, always double line spaced, with wide margins on both sides of the sheet. If possible, do provide us with a word count of your review. The format shows you the order in which you should set your review article and the information that you must provide on the book along with the review.

### **Format of the Book Review**

- *Word count of your review*
- *Required information on book being reviewed* Authors' full name, year of publication, full title, place of publication, name of the publishing house, total number of pages, and the price of the book, for example **Ramakrishna Mukherjee** 1989 *The quality of life Valuation in social research* New Delhi: Sage Publications Pp 309 Rs 235
- *Text of Review*
- *Name of Reviewer/Designation/Address*

## Book Reviews

**Amanda Coffey.** 1999 *Ethnographic self* New Delhi Sage Publications Pp 180 \$ 14 99

The author, in the introduction, has started with several 'notes' before addressing to the main theme in later pages. Firstly, it is not a textbook on how to do qualitative research. (There are many excellent texts available). The book is not a single research project report. It is not a personalised account of author's fieldwork, and the book nowhere proposes to encourage the writings of personalised field work account. The book is beyond all such routine exposures provided by routine textbooks and accounts, published from time to time. The central theme (as per author's wordings) of the book is the recognition that field work is 'personal, emotional and identity work', leading to self-presentation and identity construction. According to him, most of the textbooks are 'advice textbooks' and there is a 'silent space' for producing non-conventional writings on research methodologies in social sciences. Once again, in concluding remarks, the author emphasises 'non presentation of prescriptive remarks' to any field researcher. The book is all about just thinking about field work representations and ethnographic self. His basic objective is to explore the reciprocity between researcher's emotions and attitudes and the field objectivity. The author has referred to the works of Loffad (1995), Atkinson(1995) and Le compte Prissla(1993) but in his view these works reveal gaps in the ways in which they address issues of the personal and self in field work.

The book seems to have distinguished between two forms of data collection – quantitative and qualitative. The involvement of ethnic self in quantitative data generation is the least, however, it is qualitative data collection where the ethnic self-involvement seems to be high. Certainly the author's entry into virgin field of non-prescriptive explanation of field work methodology is unique. It is another issue as to how far this non-prescriptive approach is also prescriptive in certain senses. The book may not 'advise' the research field workers but silently cautions about certain involvement, which in turn may prove to be representative.

of one's ethnic self. The book makes a field researcher 'conscious' about self as well as the quality of field in which one is operating. How far this consciousness may prevent a field researcher in imposition of self or 'bias' is a matter of test and examination.

However, the book is well-written, representing articulated views on the themes raised. It has succeeded in generating ideas which otherwise might not have generated. Field work is a physical and emotional work. The idea that whatever pains are there, they are normal and common, can hardly prove to be a burden. Whatever may be insignificant epistemologically or personally, the recording of the social interactive process (most significant in social life) is highly significant.

The transactions, outcome of real conversations and interactions, are significant in understanding the real nature of phenomena for which a field researcher has taken up field work. Coffey has also ably correlated the elements of reading, writing, and experiencing the psychological processes of memory and commitment to oneself.

The book critically analyses the conventional ideas and writings in sociology on qualitative field work. It deals with the proverbial wisdom of ethnography's duality of observed and observer. Over-familiarity with the field is considered a problem and a field worker purposefully divests himself/herself of knowledge he/she possesses. All such ideas have been discussed forcefully by the new arguments that Coffey presents. The author has his own arguments, explanations and specifications. It is a curious reading, rather in a non-conventional manner, suggesting, guiding and encouraging certain elements for research field workers, who may not have thought about this in their field work.

The book may open a serious debate on self-reflections in several aspects of field work. Even the preparations of tools and grasping of the nature of field may have researcher's own images. The perspectives so created or developed may have their own shadows on findings. However, a question that remains is: How to counter such personality formations in conducting field work? The book does not offer answers to queries which are likely to emerge after going through the work.

However, the book raises several issues for further consideration, especially in multi-ethnic structures, where a field work researcher has to face a volume of uphill tasks in understanding of bodies (as discussed by Coffey) and write about them. Here it is partly ignorance, not knowledge and partly avoidance, not involvement, which create

problems. Nevertheless, the book has accomplished its purpose and provides some clues to researchers engaged in qualitative field work.

**N.K. Bhargava**

Dept of Sociology  
M L Sukhadia University  
Udaipur

**Axel I. Mundigo and Cynthia Indriso** (eds) 1999 *Abortion in the developing world* World Health Organization, New Delhi Vistaar Publications Pp 498 Rs 595

Induced abortion is one of the oldest methods of fertility control and widely practised in both developed and developing countries. In some countries, abortion is legal and services are easily available, but in many others, it is still illegal. Induced abortion constitutes the largest share of maternal mortality in India. The same is the case with some other countries. Many women come forward for abortion to get rid of unwanted pregnancy, either in clinics or hospitals. They are also often forced to approach quacks, which results in maternal mortality and reproductive morbidity. In spite of the sweeping changes taking place in the health care sector, abortion still continues to be a prevalent and persistent threat for many women, irrespective of their socio-economic background and accessibility to health services.

The book under review, comprising 22 case studies from developing countries, is a commendable effort to understand the various aspects of abortion and post-abortion care. The World Health Organization has identified abortion as a major reproductive health problem across the world, and commissioned many research projects which has resulted in this pioneering volume to understand abortion in differing cultural, social and service availability context. The basic question addressed here is – why do women opt for abortion, even in contexts where family planning is easily available? This question needs to be addressed seriously when estimates show an increase in the incidence of induced abortion. And, invariably, it is the poorest women in all societies, who become the primary victims of unequal access to safe abortion services.

Part I of this edited volume examines the complex relationship between contraceptive needs and use of induced abortion. It was found that there is a considerable gap between effective contraceptive use and child-bearing intentions. Non-use of contraception is the major contributing factor for unwanted pregnancy and thus, for abortion worldwide. Case studies presented in this volume highlight the failure on the part of health personnel in providing right advice to the clients and indifferent attitudes of family planning workers, often resulting in misinformation or lack of information. It is also true that many women have to resort to abortion due to their husbands' refusal to adopt family planning method.

In Part II, studies focus on the importance of understanding the preference and views of women who seek abortion as well as the attitude of personnel who provide the services. The findings emerging out of various country studies underline the necessity to improve the quality of abortion services, even in countries where safe abortion is legal and facilities are widely available. Proper mechanism needs to be developed to address the physical and emotional health needs of women who undergo abortion. The articles, based on the first-hand experience of women who had to face unwanted pregnancy and abortion, also illustrate women's experiences, the extent of power and negotiation in sexual relationship, and women's control over resources which influence their fertility decision-making and behaviour.

An area of emerging concern is adolescent sexuality and abortion, discussed in Part III with studies from China, Korea, Tanzania and Mexico. The lack of sex education and family planning services on one side and the increasing sexually active adolescent population on the other, often lead to unsafe abortions and emotional trauma. However, the issues pertaining to adolescent sexual abuse and their vulnerability of contracting infectious diseases has not found adequate mention in this volume.

In the final section, the methodology and approaches adopted to study the determinants and consequences of abortion behaviour have been discussed. Since the main focus was on analysing the social and psychological dimensions of abortion, the social science methodology was found favourable in most studies presented in this book. But it is evident that in the field of abortion research, more precise data-gathering approaches and rigorous analytical tools need to be developed. The research gaps identified in the concluding part of the book are extremely

useful and provide guidelines for further research. The interesting case studies presented here also throw light on issues concerning women's health in general and the advancement of their reproductive rights in particular. At the same time, the studies highlight the need for health care systems to be oriented to respond to controversial issues like legalisation of abortion and the provision of appropriate administrative and logistical support. The editors of this book deserve appreciation for this important contribution which will be a valuable resource book for social scientists, health administrators, demographers and medical professionals.

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**Carla Risseauw and Kamla Ganesh(eds )** 1998 *Negotiation and social space – A gendered analysis of changing kin and security networks in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa* New Delhi Sage Publications Pp 353 Rs 450

Until the 1980s the most popular theme in feminist theory was that of patriarchy which was conceived as any form of domination by men in society. This conception which was propagated by the 'Euro-American folk-model' helped in the construction of monolithic images of domination by men which are often belied by ground level reality. Real life reveals the underlying differences in intimate inner workings between the genders in various cultural and historical settings. Consequently, theoretical debates around patriarchy in the 80s and 90s revolved around the strategies that women use, the constraints they face, and the manner in which they redefine their location within patriarchy in different cultural and historical settings. These studies also emphasise how the changing global social, economic and political scenarios have opened up new areas of struggle, re-negotiation and the creation of new spaces among men and women.

This one is an important study around this theme. The two editors look at the gendered shifts within marriage, family and kin networks as a result of globalisation and social transformation of societies in Sub-

Saharan Africa and South Asia. They highlight how contemporary changes have opened up new spaces and economic opportunities on the one hand and have contributed to the shrinking of the available space for negotiation on the other. Consequently, the fall-back position of the vulnerable members of various kin-groups, especially women, gets severely restricted. Several articles in this volume dwell on this theme and raise questions about the existing notions of 'agency' and the manner in which women are forced to cope with and create changes.

The study looks at the various forms of micro and macro level social changes which have opened up opportunities for education, employment, migration, growth of cash crops, economic reforms and the introduction of new legislation for women, and shows the ways in which these have impacted gender relationships within kin-groups. A significant finding of this study is the emergence of new social categories such as economically independent single women and mothers and also the prominence of new phases in the life cycle such as adolescence and old age. Women placed within these and other social categories have not only increased their vulnerability, but the new situations absolve the men of their earlier family responsibilities.

The first section of the book provides an overview of the changing gender and kinship relations in the region under study. It shows that in the pre-colonial situation women were valued and respected for their fertility, for their labour, and care giving tasks. The perception of complementarity between the male female spheres provided considerable autonomy for women as food producers and care givers. Moreover, the customary laws of both patrilineal and matrilineal kinship systems provided sufficient social security to the vulnerable members and women had a relatively stronger bargaining capacity with the support of their own kin. Women enjoyed rights as daughters, sisters, wives and widows while the intricate pattern of kinship and custom provided them the necessary security. Illustrations of the above situation are provided by Baerend's study which shows that earlier when the woman was assigned the task of providing food for her household and children, she had independent control over some land in addition to her husband's land on which she put in labour. She had a measure of autonomy over her earnings which helped in the prevention of gross injustices. The growth of the capitalist economy as a result of the commercialisation of agriculture has put women to disadvantage as far as subsistence farming is concerned, and at the same time, her responsibility for providing food



and care for her household has remained unchanged. This has lowered the level of security available to her and has instead increased her vulnerability. On the other hand, Dube's study shows that family relationships have undergone a change from a 'traditional male-elder-centred community based ethos' to that of 'demonstrative conjugal bilateral relationships'. The small gains made by women in the changing relationships are obliterated because of the unchanging nature of the patriarchal ideology in relation to male preference, inheritance of property, and the practice of dowry and an increase in demand for it and also violence against women. Dube's study further points out that the popular images of women as representatives of community honour and identity have also remained unchanged. Family and kinship have become the agenda for the project modernity. Ganesh emphasises the need to distinguish between household and family to locate situations of gender bias among members.

Brand's study of Mali shows that law reforms brought a uniform change in gender relationships. The growing incidence of single motherhood and 'single women' call for a re-negotiation and consolidation of these categories within the existing kinship systems. Women's symbolic representation as family's honour and prestige once again crops up when the issue of educating the girl child is debated. Chanana's paper highlights that the foremost purpose of educating girls is the production of family status. Agency is exerted on behalf of women by the family and other social institutions and in the process helps in reinforcing the age-old conceptions of femininity and womanhood.

Two other sections of the book contain articles which show how gender-blind policies have affected women adversely. It shows how the liberal discourse on 'Women-in-Development' which promoted free markets, voluntary choice, and individualism disempowered the Third World women. Such policies fail to challenge the existing social and power structures and ignore the ideological aspects of gender, unequal responsibilities between men and women and the unequal value placed on men's and women's work. Where women have a strong position in kinship structures they are successful in building and consolidating trade networks but where such kinship arrangements do not exist the structural adjustment programmes have contributed towards greater hardship for women such as longer working days, increase in male violence, drunkenness and retraction of responsibilities.

On the whole the book deals with two major issues of sociological relevance the question of agency and structure and the question of micro and macro levels of relationships. It attempts to build bridges within the two levels of conception rather than looking at them as polar opposites. Women's agency with substantial variations has been ably demonstrated in several articles. At the same time changes in kinship structures affect women both positively and negatively. Its major contribution lies in putting into the forefront the need for systematic analyses of women's strategies and coping mechanisms can help to capture the nature of kinship systems in their cultural class-specific temporal concreteness. The book transcends the bounds of a single discipline while looking at the specificities of family and kinship and has the advantage of multidisciplinary focus on the subject that has helped it in crossing the micro-macro divisions in the analysis of social reality. Its major contribution lies in showing that forms of consciousness and struggle that emerge in times of rapid social change require sympathetic and open minded examination rather than hasty categorisation. It links the changing family relationships within multifarious gendered dimensions to the macro social policies of development and shows how 'overemphasis on the individual' in development planning raises the issue of levels of security in family relationships. This analysis has helped in dissolving some of the artificial divisions in theoretical discussions, especially the relationships between castes, classes and gender. All these relationships are shaped by the strategies used by the participants and the levels of constraints encountered by them. The book is a welcome addition to feminist research and theory. Its objectivity lies in providing 'situated knowledge' that is concerned with particular and specific embodiments rather than false visions of transcendence.

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**Helmuth Berking** 1999 *Sociology of giving* London Sage Publications Pp x+165 £ 15 99

In his famous work called *The Gift*, Marcel Mauss provided a dazzling analysis of phenomena such as ritual, generosity, hospitality and reciprocity. For Mauss the gift was the primal social contract. It is through the medium of gift exchange that individuals in societies related to one another in stable associations and groups. For Mauss there were two kinds of gifts: one which made for alliances and the other which symbolically demonstrated power, and even violence. Bronislaw Malinowski's work on the *kula ring* of Melanesia investigated the first aspect in convincing detail, while the archetypal example of the second is the much talked about Native American custom of potlatch.

It is to the credit of Helmuth Berking that he has successfully merged the insights of Mauss with the contributions of more contemporary scholars such as Sahlins, Bourdieu, Habermas and Gouldner and thus updated our understanding of the sociology of giving. We now realise that reciprocity, generalised exchange and negative reciprocity are all practised by the same people but with different sets of interlocutors. This is, of course, Marshall Sahlins' great contribution, but if generalised across modern scapes the various forms of exchanges gain greater theoretical fecundity.

I am particularly impressed by the way Berking links sacrifice to the sociology of giving and thus demonstrates yet another form 'the gift' can take. Here the ostensible partners are not living beings but gods and ancestors, and yet the sacrifice has important consequences for sentient beings. In addition, Berking investigates the kind of gift giving that takes place in contemporary societies on occasions such as birthdays, weddings, and so on. If we were to take all the resonances of gift giving starting from alliance building, to status demonstration, to supplication for good harvests, hunting, etc., then it is not difficult to see through surface bonhomie and comprehend the strategy employed under the rubric of gift giving. This relieves us completely from the many naive and popular assumptions of simulated kinship behind gift giving. It makes us a lot more cynical of what happens between friends. In fact, one gets to appreciate one's enemies a little more.

Berking does not want us to stay confined to the so-called preliterate communities, which are the favourite hunting grounds of anthropologists. He has a much wider canvass which includes the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as the modern consumer society. This is why his work is able to explore in greater depth the theoretical inspirations that Marcel Mauss gave long ago to the sociology of gift giving.

I am not fully convinced, however, by Berking's argument that hospitality towards guests is outside the realm of calculations. This comes as a bit of surprise because Berking does not seem to be the kind of scholar who can be taken in by high sounding claims made by well meaning people on how one should behave towards guests. This attitude of benign indulgence towards strangers who drop in unannounced could well be Berking's own predisposition (in which case I would urgently like to have his address), but does not quite fit in with the *nomos* of sociology. What I think needs to be taken into account, and which is completely in accordance with Berking's general analysis, is that guests are not really socially unknown individuals. Even if we do not know them as persons, they belong to a category of people who can be guests.

This is somewhat akin to Levi-Strauss's view that marital alliances are chosen from among those families that are considered marriageable in the first place. In other words, a relationship already exists between hosts and guest prior to the unexpected knocking at the door. In fact on page 100 Berking gives a perfect example of this. When Glaucus and Diomedes faced each other in the Battle of Troy they discovered they had a prior relationship. As 'hospitality joined together their fathers', they took care not to draw each other into mortal combat.

This book certainly sets one thinking. Why is it that women play a major role in the gift economy of today? The gift economy is by no means a side-show. In 1973, as much as 4.3% of household expenditure in Britain went into the purchase of gifts. Further, how are marriage gifts in contemporary middle class Hindu society to be understood? Different kinds of people come to a wedding with different kinds of gifts. Does this signify a hierarchy of guests? What kind of strategy is mooted on such occasions? Are Diwali packages that dealers routinely present to their clients really gifts or are they something else? When politicians throw huge parties to celebrate their sons' weddings is the waste calculated to earn them advantage and social distinction?

Helmuth Berking has succeeded in writing an exceedingly readable work. It manages to perform, rather adroitly, the difficult task of

bringing anthropological wisdom to the service of understanding contemporary realities in complex societies Well done

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**L.S. Vishwanath** 2000 *Female infanticide and social structure A socio-historical study in Western and Northern India* New Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Corporation Pp xiv+186 Price not mentioned

As children in early seventies we have vaguely heard in the lores about the Rajputs of Rajasthan who practised female infanticide Such gleanings about the 'past' may be taken by some as bizarre incidents in the unfolding of history while others recklessly dismiss these as figmental idiosyncrasies about Indian cultural traditions Many of us, however, indulge in self-imploration about such episodes in history and end up with inexplicable inertia in the absence of any well-researched and systematically compiled literature Here is a book about female infanticide in 19th century Western and Northern India, which caters to the avid intellectuals and the interested academics

The central focus in the book is on the Rajputs of Peninsular Gujarat and Benaras region, and the *Lewa Kanbis* and *Patidars* of Central Gujarat This apart, a brief account of several other communities practising female infanticide has also been provided These communities are *Jats* of Mathura, Agra and Rajasthan, *Ahirs* of Rewari region in modern Haryana and the Punjabi *Khatris* It would be a mistake to believe that the patches of such bigotry (here the female infanticide) is exclusive to 'past' There are communities like *Kallars* of Madurai district and *Gounders* of North Arcot, appended in the book, who are still found killing their female infants, in the decades of 80s and 90s of the 20th century

The narratives about female infanticide in the 19th century though stored in the records of British Government, Census Reports, Gazetteers and special Reports of British officials remained unnoticed, unexplored and neglected The author narrates in the preface what impinged upon him to take up this issue for his doctoral dissertation, the present book is the outcome of that endeavour This is a painstaking effort in weaving

the(scattered) archival material in a coherent text and analysing this pent-up narrative in history with the sensibility of a sociologist

Colonial records reveal startling facts about female infanticide. The British officials while touring and surveying different villages of Benaras region and Peninsular and Central Gujarat came across several villages where the near absence of female children among the *Kshatriya* community was a ubiquitous feature. The *Jadeja* Rajputs in Peninsular Gujarat and the *Survyavanshis* of Amroha Pargana in the North, who held superior-most position in the Rajput hierarchy in their respective regions, were practising wholesale female infanticide. A British official learnt that in the household of Rana of Porbandar, there had been no grown up girls for more than hundred years (p 9)

From the archival sources the book provides rich statistical data on sex ratio among these communities around 1830s. The enormous disparity between sexes in numerical terms, particularly among superior Rajput lineages, speaks of the brutalities heaped upon the female children just after their birth. There were different methods adopted to kill these ill-fated infants, they ranged from placing the *afterbirth* in the mouth of the infant to prevent respiration to feeding the juice of *dhatura* plant. This was done in order to maintain a superior position in hierarchy.

Precisely, the author wants to argue that the female infanticide was rooted in the social structures of the communities who practised it. In author's scheme of things, social structure would mean the rigid hierarchy arranged in terms of superior and inferior lineages. The inferior lineages were the givers of wives, while the superior lineages constituted the wife takers. Among the Rajputs, this status inequality was so intense and rigid that even on the occasion of marriage ceremony the Rajput bridegrooms did not visit bride's house which would amount to loss of pride and identity! The bride was symbolically married to the sword called *Khandu* sent to her place by the groom's party (p 46)

Another factor linked to female infanticide was high dowry. Based on archival records, the book provides account of the substantial marriage expenditure, which included ceremonial expenses as well as the uni-dimensional flow of gifts and cash after marriage on certain occasions. A table in this text (p 95) taken from imperial Gazetteer gives detailed description of the average expenditure in marrying a daughter among the *Lewa Kanbis*. The amount expended on various items comes

around Rs 4000, which was a substantial sum by 19th century standards (p 95)

The rigid or flexible status hierarchy combined with the cultural ethos of a particular caste intricately determined the incidences of female infanticide. This is what underpins another explanation regarding variations among and within these communities in female infanticide. In this sense, while the superior-most lineage among the Rajputs did not have any other option but to kill their female infants en masse, the *Lewa Kanbis* did have the option to marry in their own as well as superior endogamous units. This is the reason the *Jadeja* Rajputs of Peninsular Gujarat practised wholesale female infanticide, while the *Lewa Kanbis* and *Patidars* practised it in a relatively controlled fashion.

The last section of the book dwells upon the attempts of colonial state to suppress the practice of female infanticide. The British policy in this regard ranged from indifference to coercion. The coercive measures in terms of keeping close supervision at village level and a threat to confiscate the property of families found killing their female infants did show positive results. In a span of about twelve years the *Jadeja* Rajputs in Gujarat having extreme disparity in sexes showed near parity of sexes (p 63). But the flip side of this conserving female infants out of coercion from the colonial state tells a very distressing story as many women in these Rajput houses were led a life of forced celibacy (p 67). Added to this, these unmarried women, many a time, resorted to suicide to put an end to this torture of forced celibacy (p 69). The British attempt to encourage reciprocal marriage arrangement did not permeate the rigid status hierarchy of the Rajputs.

This is what the book is all about. It provides a commendable exercise in social history. Having a background in both History and Sociology, the author has been able to blend these two disciplines in a meaningful way. The book is equally comprehensible to those not having a high degree in Social Science as the author keeps away from using jargons. It will be particularly useful for the students of kinship and marriage, social stratification, British colonial administration, law and justice and regional history of Western and Northern India.

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**Malvika Kapur.** 1997 *Mental health in Indian schools* New Delhi Sage Publications Pp 168 Rs 275(cloth)

The present book, *Mental Health in Indian Schools*, has provided an experiential account of mental health services in school settings in developing countries, despite the paucity of trained professionals and financial resources. The work has a distinguished feature in the sense that generally the studies focus on the child as a consumer of mental health services, but this study focuses on teacher as a consumer of the training programmes aimed at providing these services and the professional as the trainer. The child is viewed as the real client and the teacher as provider of services, which the child needs. How the provider of services comes out with innovative ideas has been the effort in author's work.

Chapter one describes the school mental health programme as well as the people and organisations responsible for running the programme in school settings. Schools play a crucial and a formative role in the spheres of cognitive, language, emotional, social and moral development of children. Therefore, the school mental health programme should be an essential part in providing the mental health services. Mental health knowledge, attitudes and related behaviour affect students and teachers. Early identification and intervention may prevent more serious problems later on, such as drug and alcohol abuse, school failure, dropouts, delinquency and low-level adult teaching. The study attempts to review the surveys related to mental health programmes in social settings highlighting the key issues of tools of assessment and methodological problems along with some major findings. The surveys are conceptualised as epidemiology of incidental, descriptive, phenomenological, etiological and interventive nature. The interventive epidemiology is suggested as most desirable as it upholds the ethics of applied research.

Second chapter focuses on the child mental health intervention programmes conducted in school settings by different workers. The author's own empirical work done on Child Mental Health Intervention has also been reviewed in describing the evolution and evaluation of strategies to sensitise teachers to the mental health problems of children, and identify those who need help and refer them to appropriate agencies.

How the training in counselling should be carried out as the follow-up phase of the orientation course has been elaborated in the third



chapter The training given to teachers in Bangalore has been evaluated focussing on quantitative analysis The anecdotal approach helps in understanding the problems encountered in training situations, and to describe actual casework done by the teachers In addition to this, a successful school-based intervention is described where the mental health component was integrated into an ongoing school health project

Chapter four highlights the development of some of the intervention strategies by mental health professionals to deal with specific problems such as emotional disorder, hyperkinetic conduct disorder and scholastic backwardness in school settings These strategies have been evaluated to test their efficacy and can be employed for small groups of children in school settings These strategies can be used effectively by interested teachers with some training

Mental health programmes generally have an urban bias Most of the programmes are carried out in urban areas only But here the author has initiated efforts at providing mental health services in rural areas The fifth chapter gives a detailed account of the problems encountered and possible strategies to resolve them The marked differences in the strategies required in urban and rural settings become obvious in the course of the work in rural schools

Chapter six is a reappraisal of the process of evaluation of service delivery systems It reflects the author's growing disenchantment with elaborate assessment measures The chapter highlights, with illustrations, the need for simple indices for the evaluation of service delivery

The national policy for children has been critically analysed in the seventh chapter It demonstrates how the policy documents have been or can be translated at low cost by volunteers (school teachers and non-governmental organisations) in liaison with the health sector and with community participation The magnitude of the problem should make the child mental health professional tread with caution and with due care in evaluating the services in terms of efficacy, manpower, and economic cost-effectiveness

The implications of mental health programme in schools in India for developing countries and in the global context are the concerns posed in the eighth chapter The World Health Organization document has also been critically evaluated while framing the specific programmes for specific population

The appendices provide a manual for orientation programme and a developed psychopathology checklist of teachers to gain insights into child health problems, a manual for training in counselling for trainers and supporting tables for those interested in the specific background of the work which is narrated in a simple manner in the text

The book not only presents a scenario of school mental health programmes run in the country but has also evaluated those programmes and suggested a complete interactional approach by making teacher as a consumer of the training programme for children. Beside the theoretical background of mental health programme, the applied aspect of the programme has been suggested to improve the efficacy of the programme even with the limited sources. Overall, the book is useful for sociologists, psychologists, social workers and those who are interested in the studies of policy-making

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**Michael V. Angrosino** 1998 *Opportunity house Ethnographic stories of mental retardation* New Delhi Sage Publications Pp 287 \$ 44 50 (cloth) \$ 21 (paper)

A decade of life spent with inmates of 'Opportunity House' experiencing and empathizing with almost each aspect of their life – relationships within and the outside world, their approach to problem-solving and to fulfill their wishes has been portrayed in a fictional but natural form. As the title of the work suggests, the book is one such ethnographic study wherein assuming the role of a 'participant-observer', the author has provided a window to the rich and varied life of mentally disabled by using the tradition and technique of oral history narratives rather than collection and presentation of impersonal clinical data.

Ethnographic portrayal of life or ethnographic approach to understand a group of people or a certain community has often been questioned for its scientific validity for want of quantitative parameters of measurement. A matter-of-fact dialogue with one Betty Martin on a

wide range of topics related to art and science of ethnography covers a host of pertinent methodological issues and the author at one stage categorically invites the quantitative researchers to use his material for developing testable hypotheses

The situations depicted for these fictional characters are so lively in their entirety! Desperation of Chadster and his helplessness to control his emotions may be the outcome of his lesser intellectual endowment and poorly developed skills in handling the momentous occasion of his life. But he perhaps behaved more than a normal could to seek help from someone whom he trusted. Look at another scenario in which Rendell Washington's triumphant elation (a life-time achievement of a retard) and first experience of a sort was a thunderbolt to his upbeat ego. His handling by the manager and the worker companion reflected much more than what it appeared – a psychotherapeutic approach. Qualitative ingredients of this or for that matter earlier story may be different to different readers depending on their orientation, but common to all is the picture visualised as to how a retarded person thinks, behaves or faces the desirable or undesirable circumstances in different socio-cultural set-ups. A moving narration of the story of Ronnie Melendez and his girl friend Tammy Saldana makes a virtual autopsy of the family dynamics on the issue of marriage and doubtful ability of Ronnie to lead an independent life.

All these stories force us to think differently about mentally challenged. Going through this book is an experience at emotional, cognitive and social levels equal to what one parent of a mentally retarded was to say about her son 'My son does not learn at the same rate as the other kids of his age. But that does not mean he doesn't learn anything. He is not helpless or hopeless---'.

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**Nita Kumar** 2000 *Lessons from schools The history of education in Banaras* New Delhi Sage Publications Pp 232 Rs 200(Paperback)

An attempt has been made in this book to synthesis and analyse educational history of Banaras where certain occupational groups played a key role in the field of education. The occupational groups include pandits, merchants and artisans who perceived threat to their accepted educational systems. In 19th century, British administration and British missionaries initiated unsuccessful attempts to introduce changes in Banaras. Missionaries did not succeed in their aim of proselytisation. As a result, certain Hindus and Muslims realised what padres thought of their religion and therefore decided to try reform through education. In this reform process, formal associations based on language, caste or other interests responded by founding new institutions that attempted a synthesis between the indigenous and the imported. Their aim was to prepare children for definite vocations, e.g., pandits for Sanskrit education, merchants for account keeping called *nama-lekha*, *bahi-khata*, *munumi* or *mahajani*, weaver for *madarsa* education and individual ladies for rehabilitation of widows.

Pandits being Brahmin and top in caste hierarchy did enjoy their monopoly of propagating Sanskrit education, which was also one of the vocations to continue practice of religion, rituals etc. Rulers and the elite patronised Sanskrit education because that bestowed legitimacy on them. Unfortunately, the cut-throat policy of pandits brought an end to the Sanskrit education besides other socio-economic changes.

The merchants, the second occupational group, also opened school initially to provide education to prepare their children in trade. This group is represented by two castes *khatri* and *agarwal*. *Khatri*s migrated from Punjab to Banaras for trade and jobs in administration. They opened their schools because they perceived a threat to their traditional system of education and learning if they sent their children to other already existing schools where Anglo-Vernacular education was being provided. Another caste Agarwal too decided to continue *mahajani* to their children and usher in reform through education.

The book contains a very interesting chapter on 'The creation of New Indian Identity' (chapter 4). This chapter focussed on how a great lady like Annie Besant played her catalytic role in promotion of education by supporting a Central Hindu School. Another organisation, The Bharat Dharma Mahamandal by Swami Gyananad, also perceived a

threat to Aryan culture After the death of the founder of the Mahamandal, his disciple Vidya Devi, a widow from Bihar, undertook the responsibility of providing education to widows from nursery to B A level

While Hindu social groups had political connections and economically better Muslim weaver caste *ansari* did make efforts in the direction of modernisation of curricula in *madarsas* The hidden agenda of educated Muslim weavers in Banaras was against the British government and partly against Hindu hegemony so as to create their separate identity Another important contribution of the author in this book is analysis of women's position in the society and their educational requirement The primary requirement of women's education was to prepare them as good housewives and mothers Earlier, women were receiving education at home to fulfill this requirement, later on they were also sent to girls' schools

In the last chapter, the author observes that there evolved no great 'Indian model' of schooling in the last two centuries She concludes that the project of modernisation failed twice, first, by virtue of peculiarities of Banaras history due to standards of European and colonial modernity, and second, by non-recognition of the technology of education or non-recognition of child The book is useful for social scientists for understanding education in historical perspective

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**P.P. Barooah** 1999 *Handbook on child (with historical background)*  
New Delhi Concept Publishing Company Pp 396 Rs 500

The author begins with interesting information on the traditional child care customs and rituals observed by different religions in India To some extent this first chapter does delineate images of childhood in our socio-cultural and historical contexts, however, the reader would be better informed if he also knew more about how these images of childhood are manifested in distinct patterns of child rearing, broadly conceived to include aspects of parental behaviour, child care

arrangements, education, indoctrination, and the assignment of responsibilities. Further, the question is how are these images of childhood manifest in the development and implementation of educational and social policies as well as in the legal status of childhood?

Second chapter onwards, one has to painstakingly go through a patchwork of information with no links between sections or chapters. Many times the information is *downloaded* from old files (then why not from the net?) without proper documentation of the source or even references for the reader for an in-depth understanding. I cite a few examples below.

In the chapter on Child Legislation, Barooah presents the various existing laws for children with no attempt to analyse or raise relevant concerns. There are many critical issues and contexts which need careful consideration to ensure that the needs of the highly vulnerable population of children are adequately met. The concern of governments and people for children has surely increased and is manifest in legislation and policy, both in a protective and developmental way. Yet, there are many constraints on implementation which keep the needs of the highly vulnerable younger population outside the purview of existing services such as social poverty (which is not necessarily overcome by improved GNP and per capita income), malnutrition, low literacy rates and high drop-out rates (especially for rural girls), employment and the economic value of children. Understanding child legislation is meaningful in the existing socio-cultural context and the author ignores the need for combining social with economic and political processes in order to alter the existing status of the child's well-being.

In the chapters on International Union for Child Welfare, UNICEF, The Planning Commission, Indian Council for Child Welfare, Universal Children's Day, National Institute for Public Cooperation and Child Development, the author has adopted a directory format where a lot of information (profile, constitutional bodies, functions, budgets etc.) is imposed on the reader without any meaningful interpretation on the state of the child. Important schemes such as Urban Basic Services get no mention at all, just as the work of many NGO's doing excellent work is missing. The compilation is incomplete.

The issue of Child Rights (chapter 9) has been dealt with well with some effort to present reasons for denial of these rights in India. If the other chapters were attempted in the same manner, it would certainly have improved the quality of the book. The issue of Child Rights gains

added importance against the backdrop of our traditional society where children were a part of the life cycle and were thought of as partaking of the verities of life as it proceeded. They merged imperceptibly into adult life. The question that the author fails to address is: Will a Convention on the Rights of Children make much of a difference to the condition of children in such a historical setting? Laws and policy announcements in our culture have often become substitutes for real action, but the same could become sources of power if the social conscience can be aroused to defend or promote what is felt to be a legitimate right. The author only provides information on the CRC but does not attempt to examine the same from different perspectives or raise crucial concerns related to the protection of the child – for example, the unborn child, safeguard against violence and abuse in the family, special safeguards in cases of adoption, sexual abuse or the question of child labour.

Chapter 12 on National Children's Board provides information on the Board which is followed by the address given by the Minister of Education and the Prime Minister (pp. 232-238). The lack of effort to interpret or conclude, or to link given information to policy and programme, exasperates the reader. In a similar vein, chapters 13 and 14 provide information more on a directory format with guidelines but nothing new. The child perspective is lacking. In chapter 15 on Child in India Today, strangely the author cites statistics of 1981 instead of 1991. This chapter attempts to provide an overview on the state of child in India. The last chapter on statistics is informative but once again without any attempt to interpret major trends or raise relevant issues.

In sum, the author has compiled a lot of information (which may interest NGOs or social workers) but fails to discuss pertinent and controversial social issues pertaining to the child by giving a clear presentation of empirical work (especially when so much exists). The book is poorly structured, with poor format, several overlaps, and no outline or overview at the beginning or end of each chapter. The author shifts away from controversies, fails to expose the strengths and weaknesses of different organisations, programmes and policies and offers no solutions. Barooah's perspective on children or child welfare is restricted and fails to expand the reader's view on an integrated understanding of children in the Indian context or of child welfare as it

stands dispersed and fragmented among multiple organisational structures and bureaucracies

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**Subrata K. Mitra** 1999 *Culture and rationality The politics of social change in post-colonial India* New Delhi Sage Publications Pp 438 Rs 525(hb)

The book is a collection of scholarly essays relating to Indian politics written over a period of more than last two decades. Most of the essays have already been published in books and noted journals, and some are his contributions made at seminars. The author has done an appreciable work in bringing these essays together and organising them thematically, not chronologically, in three parts and thus shaping them into a well-organised book.

This book has a strong theoretical and conceptual thrust with the exception of Part II which has solid empirical base. The very first essay sets the broad theoretical framework of the whole analysis of relation between society and polity in India. It finds basic flaws in the major 'Western' paradigms of Indian politics – developmental (modernisation), functional and revolutionary. The modernisation model is regarded as flawed because it takes a dichotomous view of the universe of the developing countries. The current version of this model finds explanation of India's problems in the theory of deinstitutionalisation and criminalisation of politics. It makes a moral case for 'the resurrection of the institutions of modern democratic state to their original stature which they are presumed to have enjoyed during the Nehru era' (p 51). Mitra considers this model descriptive and essentially prescriptive in nature, which 'does not have the requisite theoretical depth to pose the all important question of the cause of the structural discontinuity', for example, the imposition of Emergency (ibid).

The determining factor identified by the author in case of the functionalist paradigm is the proposition of relative autonomy of politics from the social process and its ability to reformulate the rules of social



transaction. Those included in this category are reputed scholars like Dumont, Bailey, Morris-Jones, and Rudolph and Rudolph. To amplify, Bailey describes the Indian political system as the aggregation of a set of interlocking and 'nested' arenas at the locality, district and regional levels. Rudolph and Rudolph are fully anchored to the resilience of endogenous Indian culture. They give an impression of the almost infinite ability of tradition to adapt and therefore survive. 'Thus the functionalist view of 'changes within the structure' gives no space for 'change of the structure'. This is a major limitation of this model. The revolutionary/Marxist model including the Subaltern school is faulted by the author for not being able to capture the quintessentially Indian problematic, a tendency to slip back into orthodox Marxist political formulations, and 're-introducing the dreaded concept of false consciousness all over again' (pp 55-56). On the whole, Mitra finds in the existing major Western models 'the absence of terms of political discourse that are authentic, effective, comprehensive, and largely endogenous in character' (p 60). He emphasises the need of 'the search for a more effective paradigm, set within terms of discourse derived from Indian political experience and articulated in endogenous political vocabulary' (ibid).

The approach adopted by the author is what he calls 'critical traditionalism' which posits an endogenous modernity as the main core of the process of change. This is an 'actor-centred' approach conceptualising the politics of modern institutions and social change in a traditional and post-colonial setting as processes that enrich each other. In contrast with the conventional approaches to social change which take the goals of change as given, this approach seeks to derive them from the 'perceptions and objectives of the actors themselves'. This approach assumes that 'actors, many of them straddling the worlds of modernity and tradition, engaged in goal-oriented and unified action, drawing on all resources they can draw on in order to move the world to a position they prefer, are the main agents of change' (p 16). It is this 'methodological individualism' applied to specific aspects of the politics of social change in India that, as the author rightly says, gives the book its cohesion.

The themes commonly discussed in the literature on Indian politics are those of continuity and change, the occasional local and regional collapse within an overall resilience of the national political system in post-independence India. But to the author, 'the achievements of India continue to puzzle in the context of the failure of most post-revolutionary

and post-colonial states to move from authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy' The book provides a few specific pieces 'to put the puzzle together' The specific issues discussed in the book are largely the very common ones, such as caste and politics in general and the anti-reservation movement in particular, religion and politics in general and the question of secularism in particular, sub-national ethnic movements, the party system and dynastic rule, crisis of governability, and resilience in Indian democracy What distinguishes the discussion is the approach adopted for this

The effort made in the chapter on caste and politics of identity is to move beyond the orientalist discourse in which the existence of caste is considered to 'provide political reinforcement to a moral vision of Hindu society that is essentially hierarchic' (p 116) The orientalist view drives a wedge between the modern state and the institutions of traditional society like caste Opposed to this, Mitra holds that in the modern democratic competitive politics 'castes are now perceived not as rigid but flexible by their members who treat them more as vehicle of self-promotion rather than a structure of domination by the powerful and self-censorship by the powerless' (p 124) Mobilisation of caste in politics is not meant for perpetuating inherited caste-related inequalities Rather it 'destroys precisely those attributes of the caste system such as traditional social obligations, hierarchy and dominance, which the essentialist (orientalist) view presented as necessarily fixed in time and space' (p 122) This shows the 'resilience of caste' which is being used in the search for identity, power and material benefits in competitive politics Mitra affirms, 'corporate identities including healthy and suitable redefined caste identities are conducive to rather than hinder India's political integrity' (p 126)

He considers the anti-reservation movements 'reactionary in their social visions and conservative rather than radical in their political goals' (p 166) He accepts that the existing reservation policy serves the more advanced sections among the potential beneficiaries However, he argues that this policy brings indirect advantages to all potential beneficiaries It plays an 'important symbolic role, suggestive of the transformation of a hierarchical social order into a participatory and pluralist society' Its remarkable achievement lies in 'serving the link between caste and occupation, and undermining its material basis' (ibid) He is opposed to the substitution of income for caste as the criterion for reservation because that would help upper castes more than the SCs/STs

and OBCs. This change would provide one more channel of upward mobility to the poor among the upper castes. In fact, the issue of reservation basically involves taking sides in socio-political sense. To Mitra 'for the foreseeable future at least, the policy of reservation remains a vital political and moral necessity' (p 168).

With reference to relationship between religion and politics in the post-independence India, Mitra holds that 'India got off to a wrong start at the outset' as manifested in the agenda of the modern state in terms of transformation of Indian society from regulation by dharma to one by law and instrumental rationality. The separation of religion and politics treated religion as merely an act of personal faith. This separation, according to Mitra, 'has distorted the true nature of both'. This made the link between the secular state in India and its society tenuous. There has occurred gradual erosion of the power and legitimacy of the state with respect to the society.

Mitra argues that the state was indispensable to religion in Indian tradition both for self-protection and self-correction. 'Deprived of the traditional protection and leadership of secular authority, religion in India has sought to set itself up as a rival centre of power' (p 107) as reflected in resurgent Hinduism (also Sikhism) and the meteoric rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in recent times. Many observers of Indian politics view this as a death knell for secular, democratic state. But Mitra does not seem worried about it. On the basis of his analysis of the social and political attitudes of the voters of BJP and a perusal of its policies, he suggests that 'the Indian political system possesses enough resilience to cope with the challenge of the rise of political movements that draw support from their identification with religious identities, and to transform them into parties that are willing and able to abide by the rules of the game' (p 394). This is exemplified presently in the BJP entering into alliance with a large number of other parties and sidelining the contentious religious/communal issues and concerns previously central to its agenda. However, he notes that India is not alone in facing the issue of the conflict of the commitment of the state to be a state for all citizens and the demand of the majority for a more prominent expression of their cultural symbols in the public sphere. He observes 'Perhaps, the negotiated incorporation of the cultural aspirations of India's competing communities within the public space would be the next necessary step to ensure the continuation of nation-building and democratic consolidation in India' (p 402).

The chapter on sub-national movements has a slightly wider canvas. It covers different (cultural) identity based movements such as those launched by the Kashmiris, Sikhs, Gorkhas, Jarkhandis, Nagas, Mizos in India, and also the Tamils in Sri Lanka. In his analysis, the author claims to have moved beyond the sociological and historical accounts of the origins and evolution of sub-nationalism in South Asia. He formulates a political explanation drawing on theories of rational choice and collective action. He observes that such mobilisations draw on both nationalist sentiments (transcendental) and material interests (transactional) to generate a movement for a separate homeland. And the specific mix of these two sets of motives depends on the political context. Once the values championed by such a movement are accommodated within the political domain – through granting autonomy or constitutional recognition within the framework of the national state – the normal politics of ‘who gets what and how’ replaces the complex interplay of transactional and transcendental issues. If the central authority reneges on its commitment, the fire of sub-nationalism would burn again. So the suggestion given by the author on the basis of his analysis is that the decision-makers of the central authority should minimise some of the costs by entering into negotiations at an early stage with the sub-nationalists along with effective law-and-order management. ‘However, while prompt decision-making based on political foresight can lower the costs, it is unrealistic to suggest that costs can be avoided altogether’ (p 216). The very understanding of the protagonists that their movements are rational, proves the ‘tragic inevitability of their recurrence’.

The book presents an interesting position, though disputable, on the issue of dynastic rule. Having inferred the major rules of political succession in India, the author affirms that ‘the appointment of Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister does not appear to be radically outside the norms’ (p 308). The exception noted by him in this case is the absence of intense and protracted bargaining among competing factions of the Congress Party. But what is similar to the past trend was the perception of Rajiv Gandhi as an electoral asset, who could retain the support of the traditional Congress voters in addition to mobilising new constituencies in favour of the party. This is examined in detail on the basis of empirical data. The author asserts that it was misleading to infer a ‘theory of dynastic succession in India’. There is no system of nomination of his/her successor by the ruler or a priori acceptance of the

legitimacy of such act by the ruler and the ruled. If the whole political system is taken into account, the instances of succession to political offices by the immediate kin of leaders appear to be 'exception rather than the rule'. The institutional fabric essential to dynastic theory was missing (p 320).

The book frequently refers to the theme of the growth of authoritarian tendencies, symbolised by imposition of the Emergency, which generated severe crisis for Indian democracy during the 1970s. But it is noted that the void created then between the state and society has been filled in by the rise of local protest movements and civil rights activists, rejuvenated non-Congress parties, and an active judiciary operating as a balancing factor to the further growth of authoritarian tendencies. The discussion in the book using the universal categories as crowds and power in relation to political order and the crisis of governability seeks to establish a frame of analysis that moves beyond the conventional view of considering all challenges to established authority as indicative of deinstitutionalisation.

On the whole, the book gives an optimistic view about the strength and resilience of Indian democracy. It underlines the factors and processes including conflicts which have led to the successful implementation of democratic values and institutions and their moral acceptance by the majority of the population. The modern state in India has provided the institutional framework to bring together diverse forces in an interlocking structure at the national, regional and local levels. In the process, however, the post-colonial state has changed in the country. Old institutions have struck root and new institutions have emerged to bridge the gap that divided the people and their rulers. 'This great transformation has taken place through the deepening of legitimacy and its occasional contestation, and, political discontinuities and renewal' (p 406). In this sense, the Indian democracy has arrived. So asserts the author. Thus, the author covers in the book a wide range of socio-political issues of great current relevance. Most of the issues discussed are highly contentious both in academic and common parlance. However, he takes a liberal position with strong welfarist stance in his analysis. What emerges strongly from the book is that India has largely followed a right path, though with a few faltering steps, in striking a right kind of interaction between the modern state and its traditional society in the post-independence period.

The author claims to have moved beyond the conventional approaches in his analysis. However, he does not seem to be fully successful in this effort. The modernisation theory reads the major patterns of change in India in terms of resilience of the state and adaptation of the traditional identities to the modern democratic set up rather than their disappearance. This is also evident in the book. The author talks of 'India's hesitant progress in the direction of an endogenous modernity'. Obviously, he has not been able to detach completely from the modernisation paradigm. Many essays included in the book give a faintly comparative touch to the analysis by referring to the socio-political scenario in other countries of the world. Some essays also identify research issues for further study. Moreover, the book offers certain suggestions for tackling and resolving some of the ongoing socio-political tangles in India. The book would be relevant for those in the disciplines of political science, sociology and anthropology.

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